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Article
BEYOND THE NEW ROLE MORALITY FOR LAWYERS
ROB ATKINSON*

And he told them a parable also .... "And no one puts

new wine in old wineskins; if he does, the new wine will
burst the skins and it will be spilled, and the skins will be
destroyed. But new wine must be put into fresh wineskins.
And no one after drinking
old wine desires new; for he
'
says, 'The old is good.'

"'
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INTRODUCTION

Conscientious lawyers and teachers of lawyers continue to face
an ancient and fundamental question: Can a good person be a good
lawyer? 2 The orthodox answer-the answer of what I will call the
old role morality-has been increasingly criticized. Recently, two
2. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical
Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614;
GeraldJ. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and ProfessionalResponsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS
THE GOOD LAWYER];

see also DAVID

286, 287 (David Luban ed., 1978) [hereinafter

LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE

109 (1988) [hereinafter

LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE]; Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1986) (reviewing THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, and STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984)); cf. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 32 (1981) ("Is it possible to be a Christian

and a lawyer?"); Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1148 (1990). But cf. Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.

551, 560 (1991) ("To ask whether one can be both a good person and a good lawyer is
to ask the wrong question.").
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veteran critics, David Luban and William Simon, have offered a new
answer, in the form of a new role morality for lawyers. In this Article, I will argue that their answer, though a substantial improvement
over the old, is fundamentally flawed. They try to fashion the limits
on lawyers' conduct from public norms, essentially the same stuff
from which the old role morality was cut. If we replace that material
with the moral commitments of individual lawyers, we can create a
workable, though not flawless, lawyers' morality-new wineskins for
Luban and Simon's new wine.
I.

ROLE MORALITIES, OLD AND NEW

A.

The Old Wine

In its current formulation, the central question of legal ethics is
usually posed as "May a lawyer always do all that the law allows for
every client?" This formulation reflects the orthodox answer, which
has been yes, and sometimes (particularly in the criminal defense
context) a very strong yes. To do all that the letter of the law allows
for clients, even if that causes considerable harm to innocent third
parties, is not only permitted, but perhaps required, of lawyers. It is
not just one way to be both a good person and a good lawyer; it is
the one true way. Under it, Shylock may lose his pound of flesh, and
Simon Legree his fleeing chattel, but not for want of a lawyer's help
in securing them.3 And this basic principle, the principle of partisanship, has a corollary, the principle of nonaccountability: the lawyer who advances a morally odious but arguably legal claim is not to
be faulted. Together, the principles of partisanship and the corollary principle of nonaccountability constitute the old role morality.4
This traditional solvent of lawyer morality's basic issue has been
3. These are, of course, fictitious cases. But the fugitive slave laws were painfully
real, and the old role morality allowed their invocation by lawyers who thought them
odious. Shylock's cause has its explicit defenders in theory, see, e.g., Fried, supra note 2,
at 1088; RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAw 86-88 (John J. Lalor trans., 2d
ed. 1915), and a close factual analogue in Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704
(Minn. 1962). There the court assumed, without explicitly holding, that the professional
codes governing lawyers did not compel an insurance company's lawyer to reveal an
aortal aneurysm to an accident victim when the company's liability was at issue. See id. at
710. The flesh in question could scarcely have been nearer the heart, and surely
weighed less than the proverbial pound.
4. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at xx. The principle of partisanship is
sometimes referred to as the principle of professionalism. See Murray L. Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673-75 (1978); see also
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2.1 (1986) (discussing the principle
of professional detachment from a client's social, moral, political, or economic views).
Because "professionalism" has come to be used as something of a slogan in another
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distilled from various sources-the demands of the adversarial system,' the advancement of individual autonomy, 6 the special friendship of lawyer and client 7-and dispensed or analyzed under several
labels-the lawyer's amoral ethical role,' the traditional9 or standard'" conception, the full advocacy model," the libertarian approach.' 2 In its purest form, this elixir is unadulterated by .ordinary
morality or by personal responsibility on the part of the lawyer for
the concurrent rights or interests of adversaries, third parties, or the
public.'l The individual lawyer is sometimes permitted, and occasionally encouraged, but never required, to take these matters up
with clients. '

4

context, see infra text accompanying note 437, and because the term's positive connotations should not be surrendered without objection, I follow Luban's usage.
5. See Monroe H. Freedman,Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060
(1975); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of theJoint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958); see also Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy,
4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 12 (1951).
6. See Pepper, supra note 2, at 614; Fried, supra note 2, at 1060.
7. See Fried, supra note 2, at 1061; see also Pepper, supra note 2, at 614 n.5 (describing his article as an elaboration and modification of Fried's position).
8. See Pepper, supra note 2, at 613.
9. See Fried, supra note 2, at 1061.
10. See LUBAN, LAwYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at xix (following Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980)).
11. See ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 92

(1980); Paul L. Haines, Restrainingthe Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for JudicialIntervention,
65 IND. L.J. 445, 453 (1990).
12. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1084-85 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion]; see William H. Simon, The Ideology
of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29 [hereinafter
Simon, Ideology] (describing his subdivision into further categories).
13. Here I am following a distinction, firmly ensconced in the literature, between
lawyers' role morality and ordinary morality. Ordinary morality comprises "the moral
principles that govern people as people," the "ordinary conceptions of how good people
or good citizens should behave." Stephen Ellmann, Lawyeringfor Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 118-19 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,
supra note 2). Conversely, role morality consists of the special obligations placed upon
lawyers qua lawyers. Problems arise because (lawyer jokes aside) lawyers are people,
too. The distinction is a useful shorthand for pointing out this conflict, but it blurs badly
upon close scrutiny, in ways that we will take up in detail below. Suffice it to say here
that ordinary morality cannot be constructed without reference to roles, see infra note
280, and that the sources and status of ordinary morality are anything but clear. See infra
Part II.
14. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE] ("In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for
a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as
well as legally permissible."); id. EC 7-9 ("However, when an action in the best interest
of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego
such action."). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which superseded the Model
Code as the American Bar Association's (ABA) recommended standard for lawyerly con-
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This removal of ordinary morality produces not just a purer,
but also a more potent, product. The old role morality is primarily
imbibed in two contexts: by new initiates in law schools, the Eleusinian mystery of the lawyer cult,' 5 and by full-fledged members of
the law fraternity in their sacramental meals, bar association banquets.' 6 It weans the former away from the moral commitments of
their undergraduate idealism, and it fortifies the latter against the
moral ambiguities of practice. Like the magic mead of the mythic
Norsemen, the old role morality induces something akin to a state of
berserk. Partakers are steeled against cries for quarter that might
otherwise distract them from wholly zealous pursuit of client ends in
the chaos of courtroom combat and in the staging areas of office
conferences. 17
B.

The New Wine

Without questioning the elixir's efficacy, observers have, for a
decade and a half now,' 8 been pointing to its potentially dangerous
side effects: persistent moral tunnel vision and general atrophy of
duct in 1983, is considerably less open in urging lawyers to engage in such moral dialogue with clients.
15. See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247 (1978); see also Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching

Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 7, 9-10 (1991) (noting that law school classrooms
extol loyalty to the client above all, and arguing that there is a need to include ethical
issues in substantive courses); David W. Raack, Law School and the Erosion of Student Idealism, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 121, 131 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND

(1989))
(noting that the emphasis placed on "hard legal analysis" erodes student idealism);
BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL

Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 617 (1985)

(noting that legal education is "a socialization experience that erodes conviction at every
turn"); Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting ProfessionalService on the Agenda of Legal

Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 43-44 (1991) (arguing that the failure of law schools to
train students in client interaction leads to undisciplined uses of the lawyer's power).
16. See Abe Krash, Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a
Conflict?, 55 CHI. B. REC. 31 (special centennial issue 1973).

17. More recent defenders of the old role morality have criticized their predecessors
for limiting client-oriented zeal outside the litigation context and have explicitly expanded their justificatory theories to cover the lawyer's advisory role. Pepper, supra note
2, at 621-24.
Lest you think my berserker metaphor excessive, see Bernard Williams, Professional
Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 2, at 259, 263, particularly

the discussion of specific professional adaptation.
18. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1
(1975). Wasserstrom's article began what might be called the contemporary phase of
criticism, but critics can trace their roots much farther back. Their antecedents include
George Sharswood and David Hoffman, two of the first systematic analysts of legal ethics in the United States; Charles Dickens in his fictional portrayals of lawyers, see generally
Robert Coles, The Keen Eye of Charles Dickens, HARV. L. ScH. BULL., Summer/Fall 1984, at
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the organs of ethical discernment, leading to atrocities against other
combatants and mounting casualties among the civilian population.
Some have urged that the old role morality be diluted with a dose of
ordinary morality' 9 or at least labeled with a disclosure of its potential hazards to moral, if not mental, health.2 0 The challenge has
been to formulate an equally effective tonic without the unsettling
side effects. It must not be too unpalatable to the lawyers and law
students for whom it is prescribed, and it must not come out of solution when subjected to analysis by legal scholars and thoughtful
practitioners .21
Luban and Simon offer similar prescriptions on the basis of
similar diagnoses. 2 2 Each attempts to transcend the old dichotomies of role morality versus ordinary morality, to avoid the unstable
old combination of advocate for the client versus officer of the
court. Drawing upon their earlier critical work, 23 each offers a
formula for lawyers' ethics that is a substantial improvement on the
old role morality.
24
Though their formulations differ in important respects,
Luban and Simon themselves emphasize their similarity,2 5 and with
30; and, of course, Socrates, particularly as depicted in PLATO, GORGIAS (Walter Hamilton trans., 1960).
19. The classic article along these lines is Fuller & Randall, supra note 5, at 1159, the
position of which is clearly reflected in the ABA's 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. See Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, at 62 n.75. For prominent contemporary critics in addition to Luban and Simon, see Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Postema, supra note 10; Rhode, supra note 15; Schwartz,
supra note 4; Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963

(1987).
20. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 18.

21. Simon explains why the early efforts to blend client loyalty with concerns for
larger moral issues were notoriously unstable and why the public interest component
tends to sink to the bottom. See Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, at 61-91.
22. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra
note 2. Goldman anticipated their position in important respects. See GOLDMAN, supra
note 11, at 93; see also Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra, at 1090 n.21. Goldman's system,
which focuses on the vindication of clients' moral rather than legal rights, most closely
resembles Luban's position and is subject to much the same criticism.
23. Luban maintains that Simon's 1978 article, see Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, is
"the first genuinely convincing critique of the dominant theory-and still the best."
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at xxi n.2. I would qualify my agreement in
that assessment only by adding a point on which modesty may have estopped Luban:
His own The LysistratianPrerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 637 [hereinafter Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative], and LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,

supra note 2, are second to Simon only chronologically.
24. See infra note 66.
25. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1090 n.21; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 167 n.13.

19921

BEYOND THE NEW ROLE MORALITY

859

good reason. What they offer us is a new role morality for lawyers.
It is new, because it offers an answer 26 to the fundamental question
of lawyers' professional morality, an answer that lies between those
who advocate the old role morality and those who criticize its lack of
ordinary morality. On the one hand, Luban and Simon's approach
omits the central ingredient of the old role morality, the premise
that a lawyer is morally entitled, if not obligated, to do whatever the
law allows for clients. For both Luban and Simon, the old excuse
that the law allows a client to undertake a particular course of action
is no longer sufficient, though it is still necessary, as a justification
for the lawyer's assisting in that action. Individual lawyers must justify their actions on behalf of clients in terms of additional, and generally more restrictive, criteria. 27
On the other hand Luban and Simon maintain that lawyers in
their professional capacities must still do things that will give them
moral pause as conscientious individuals. The flavor of zealous advocacy is thus not wholly lost. The limits on what a lawyer may
properly do for clients are found by something other than a direct
recourse to ordinary morality. In that sense, theirs is still a role
morality.
Moreover-and now we reach what is, for me, the crucial
point-theirs is not just a role morality, but a role morality that purports to be derived from mandatory, objective norms. Luban and
Simon draw their new, narrower limits on what lawyers should do
for clients from norms that purport to be universally binding, even
as the outer boundary of the letter of the law, the standard of the
old role morality, is universally binding. What Luban and Simon
have given us, then, is the new wine of personal moral accountability
for our actions as lawyers, but in the old wineskin of a societally
defined role morality. I shall argue that the old vessel is unworthy
of the new vintage, and perhaps incapable of containing it. Before
turning to a detailed criticism of Luban and Simon, however, I must
outline their alternatives to the old role morality and identify the
problems their alternatives raise, particularly the problems attributable to their assumption of an underlying set of public norms.
26. The "mediating position" in which I place Luban and Simon is different from,
but not inconsistent with, the position that David Wasserman correctly identifies Luban
as occupying, between the standard conception and "the legal realism popular in academic circles." David Wasserman, Should A Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David Luban
on the Morality of Adversary Representation, 49 MD. L. REV. 392 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2).
27. See, e.g., Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1083.
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I shall not rehearse here Luban and Simon's reasons for rejecting the old role morality; if they have not shown the old vintage
to be vinegar, they have at least accounted well for the bitter aftertaste it leaves in the mouths of many of us. But, in order to understand the alternative they propose, we must look briefly at how their
conception of law differs from that implicit in the old role morality.
According to the old role morality, law creates a sphere of autonomy in which individuals may act without having to account to
society.28 The law does not quite condone the actions that it does
not condemn, but in permitting these actions it expresses a preference for individual autonomy over collectively defined "right" behavior.2 9 That implicit preference is frustrated if a legal right goes
unexercised because someone does not know what the law permits
and, conversely, whenever lawyers inform their clients of what the
law permits, they advance that preference.3 0 Thus, assisting others
to understand and realize their legal rights is always good,3 ' even
if
32
this involves assisting in immoral practices like pornography.
Luban and Simon agree that the law frequently permits actions
that are morally wrong and socially harmful, but they suggest a
wider variety of reasons for this phenomenon than the old role morality recognized. 3 Sometimes this over-permissiveness is attributable to a social recognition that governmental regulation of
unwanted conduct like pornography will chill desirable activity that
is easy to identify on an ad hoc basis but difficult to define generally.
Magazines like Hustler stay on the newsstands not because their merits outweigh their offenses, but because, rightly or wrongly, the cost
of banning them is deemed greater than the harm of their circulation.3 4 In other cases, the law permits unwanted conduct simply because its eradication is not worth the cost. Either way, the realm of
28. Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, at 40; Pepper, supra note 2, at 616-17; see also Fried,
supra note 2, at 1073.
29. Pepper, supra note 2, at 616-17; see also Fried, supra note 2, at 1074-75; cf. Simon,
Ideology, supra note 12, at 40 (arguing that on this conception of law the sovereign is
indifferent to individual ends).
30. See Fried, supra note 2, at 1075; Pepper, supra note 2, at 616-17.
31. See Fried, supra note 2, at 1075; Pepper, supra note 2, at 617.
32. See Fried, supra note 2, at 1075; Pepper, supra note 2, at 614, 617.
33. See Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative,supra note 23, at 640; Simon, Ideology, supra note
GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 28, 140; Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's
Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529, 1540.
34. Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornographyas Act and
Idea, 86 Mici. L. REV. 1564, 1566 (1988); see GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 28; see also

12, at 41; see also

ACLU v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F. Supp. 417, 427 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that the
"Mayor's threatened 'massive sweep' and 'initiation of criminal proceedings' against
vendors of Hustler magazine, prior to a judicial determination that the Easter edition of
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the legal includes not just those exercises of individual autonomy
that society wishes to foster, but also some, perhaps many, activities
that are too costly, for one reason or another, to forbid. The law is
far too porous to filter out all socially harmful client desires.
Luban and Simon, however, point out that it does not follow
that giving legal counsel that aids legally permitted but morally
wrong or socially harmful activities is necessarily good. The purpose of intentionally over-permissive laws is served when government is kept out of especially sensitive areas or when excessive
enforcement costs are avoided. Nevertheless, the resulting harmful
activity is a necessary, or at best tolerable, evil; it is not a good. This
evil could be averted, without the intrusion of the government into
sensitive areas or the incurring of inordinate enforcement costs, if
lawyers declined to assist in technically legal but socially harmful
conduct.3 5
Luban and Simon's perspective on the law's purpose offers lawyers an alternative perspective on their role. They need not assist
clients in serving their opponents and the public whatever unpalatable projects they can squeeze through loopholes in the law, only to
unravel its fabric further in the process. Lawyers can act instead as
supplemental filters, as part of a social fabric of informal controls
that is much broader and less porous than the positive law alone.3 6
Moreover, according to Luban and Simon, this supplemental screen
can-and should-be woven from the very same public norms that
37
inform the positive law.
1. Simon's Ethical Discretion Model.-Simon looks to the law itself for the supplementary limits on what lawyers should do for clients. The law governing lawyers gives them great latitude in
choosing the clients they represent, the claims they assert, and the
tactics they employ.3 8 According to Simon, lawyers should exercise
Hustler magazine was in fact obscene, is unconstitutional because it ignored constitutionally required procedural safeguards").
35. Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 23, at 640-41.
36. Id.
37. Proponents of the old role morality have a standard reply to this critique: itis
the job of judges and juries, not individual lawyers, to ascertain how the law is to be
applied in particular cases. If the lawyers present their respective clients' positions in
the most favorable light possible, the proper result will become apparent to the tribunal.
For Luban's and Simon's replies, see Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, and LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE, supra note 2.
38. This law is most typically in the form of lawyer regulatory codes promulgated by
the highest courts of the states. It also takes the form of rules of procedure and evidence, statutes dealing with such matters as subornation of perjury, and, indeed, any
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their discretion to "best vindicate our legal ideals,"' 9 to "further
justice," 4 ° and to achieve "the most legally appropriate resolution
Lawyers are to fashion the additional filter
of the matter." 4
through which they strain client ends from the very fibers of public
values and ideals that comprise the law itself."2 In deciding whether
to assist a client with a particular claim, a lawyer should determine
not only whether the claim is technically legal, but also whether it is
consistent with the purpose the law itself serves. Like a prism, Simon's discretionary approach refracts the single question of the old
role morality-Is the claim colorable?4 3 -into a wider and more
clearly visible spectrum.
Against those who are skeptical about the feasibility of leaving
this flexible approach in the hands of lawyers representing private
clients, Simon cites the analogous decision-making styles now
widely accepted as not only possible, but appropriate, for two other
agents of the legal system, judges and public prosecutors. Few
doubt, he points out, that judges reach principled applications of
the law without recourse to the kind of formalistic, mechanical jurisprudence discredited by the legal realists."4 Common law judges,
under the prevailing theory of adjudication, reach principled decisions that cannot be logically deduced from existing legal authorities. 4 5 Similarly, public prosecutors are meaningfully admonished
to seek justice, that to which the legal system aspires, rather than
merely convictions that the letter of the law might allow."6 Even if
precedent and statute provide no map to the right legal conclusion,
judges and prosecutors nevertheless can reach that conclusion by
reference to certain fixed stars in the firmament of legal values." 7
aspect of the civil or criminal law that applies to lawyers qua lawyers. See WOLFRAM, supra
note 4, at 20; see also David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
801, 805-09 (1992) (identifying four basic systems of enforcing the law of lawyering);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE LJ. 1239, 1249-60 (1991)
(describing the process by which rules of the legal profession came to be enforced by
agencies of the state).
39. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1084.
40. Id. at 1083.
41. Id. at 1096.
42. Id. at 1090.
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]; FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

44. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1090.
45. Id. at 1090-91.
46. Id. at 1091 n.25.
47. In arguing from the analogy ofjudges and prosecutors, Simon is careful to qualify his key premise. He says that it is widely accepted among lawyers and legal scholars
that judges and prosecutors make principled decisions not dictated by mechanical appli-
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Equipped with similar methods of reckoning, lawyers in private
practice can discern when a colorable interpretation of substantive
law contravenes the law's spirit and when invocation of a particular
procedure or technique, though formally in compliance with the relevant rules, nevertheless frustrates their purpose. Thus, unlike the
adherent of the old role morality, the lawyer exercising Simon's
brand of ethical discretion will recognize circumstances under which
it is not appropriate to press a client's position to the furthest extent
of the law. Yet, unlike the ordinary moralist, Simon's ideal lawyer
will find those limits in the law itself, not in some other set of norms.
Moreover, even when such lawyers find themselves pressing beyond
the clear intent of a particular law, they will not always feel compelled to check themselves. Rather, they will recognize that ambiguities in particular laws sometimes invite them to press toward the
frontiers on behalf of their clients. This will be especially true when
the clients' fundamental legal rights are at stake or when the adversary system is working well enough to sift out their more dubious
substantive positions and to curb their lawyers' more aggressive
methods. In these cases, but not in all cases, lawyers taking Simon's
tack will rely on the system rather than their own self-policing to
generate the legally appropriate result.4"
In using this calculus to limit the ends they pursue and the
means they employ, lawyers are, in Simon's view, performing the
fundamental purpose of their role. That purpose, like the purpose
of the law itself, is to serve justice, which for Simon means to advance the values of the legal system.4 9 In this way, one's function as
a lawyer converges with the goal of the legal system itself in the
promotion ofjustice. Over against the advocates of the old role morality, Simon believes that the letter of the law stultifies, but that its

cations of the law. He notes that "this portrayal has been challenged," but he says nothing to counter the challenge that such principled decisions are in fact impossible. See id.
at 1090. Rather, he argues that principled judicial decisionmaking and his model of
ethical discretion stand or fall together. If some of the more radical critics of this view of
law are right, then presumably both fall. See Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984) (setting out the position of the
Critical Legal Studies movement that law is indeterminate); cf. Richard A. Posner,Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MicH. L. REV. 827, 828 (1988) (defending a less radical view of
the impossibility of resolving some adjudicated issues by legal reasoning). This possibility obviously weakens Simon's position, but not in a way that concerns me in this Article.
My concern is that, even if such principled decisions are possible, Simon must show why
lawyers should feel bound by these principles and not others.
48. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1096-1113.
49. See id. at 1083-84, 1119-23.
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spirit gives life. 50 But over against the ordinary moralists, he insists
on exorcising all extra-legal spirits as phantoms, if not chimeras. 5 '
2. Luban's Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason-Luban also provides a flexible method for resolving conflicts lawyers encounter between the demands of their role and the dictates of ordinary
morality. Luban derives his limits on the lawyerly role morality by
placing that morality in the broader setting of ordinary morality. He
requires that each act purportedly required by the role be grounded
in ordinary morality by a four-stage scheme he dubs "the fourfold
root of sufficient reasoning."' 52 Stated at the highest level of generality, it goes like this: "[T]he agent (1) justifies the institution by
demonstrating its moral goodness; (2) justifies the role by appealing
to the structure of the institution; (3) justifies the role obligations by
showing they are essential to the role; and (4) justifies the role act by
'
showing that the obligations require it.

53

Luban illustrates the application of this system with the notorious Lake Pleasant Bodies case. 54 In that case, Frank Armani, defense counsel for serial killer Robert Garrow, learned from his client
the location of the victims' bodies, visited the sites, and photographed the corpses. 5 5 But when the victims' bereaved parents
asked for the locations, he declined to reveal this information, citing
the rule of lawyer-client confidentiality.5 6 In support of Armani's
anguished decision, Luban argues as follows:
The lawyer's role acts (preserving the defendant's confidences, photographing the bodies but telling nobody) were
required by the general duty of confidentiality-the role
obligation. This is justified by arguments that confidentiality is required in order to guarantee an adequate criminal
defense-the institutional task . . . . The next step is to
show that zealous criminal defense is required by the ad50. See id. at 1103-04.
51. I examine below why Simon is anxious to avoid recourse to ordinary morality.
See infra text accompanying notes 202-208.
52. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 131-32. Luban has since regretted
using the name, having come to see it as awkward and obscure. See David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, 49
MD. L. REV. 424, 427 n.6 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Mid-Course Corrections]. For a similarly tiered system ofjustification, see MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 18-19
(2d ed. 1989).
53. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 131.

54. See id. at 53-54.
55. See id. For Armani's own account of the Garrow case, see TOM ALIBRANDI &
FRANK ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (1984).
56. ALIBRANDI & ARMANI, supra note 55, at 94-98, 100-03, 188.
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versary system, and this in turn . . . serves the positive
moral good of overprotecting individual rights against the
encroachments of the state.
We will return to this particular example in considerable detail
below. We can already see, however, several ways in which Luban's
fourfold root differs from the institutional excuse typically given by.
defenders of the old role morality. For one thing, the chain ofjustification is longer; we do not move directly from the lawyer's status
as client representative to the moral legitimacy of doing whatever
the law allows for a client. For another, Luban's longer chain is
carefully forged to be only as strong as its weakest link; indeed, "a
weak link weakens the entire chain and several weak links together
weaken it more than any single link does on its own.""8 Finally, for
Luban, the adversary system, the very link that joins ordinary moral
values like truth and individual autonomy to the lawyer's role, is
never the strongest, but often the weakest, link.59 In the criminal
defense context, as the example quoted above indicates, Luban does
find strong justifications for the adversary system, its corollary role
of zealous advocate, and role obligations like client confidentiality.60
On the civil side, however, he finds the standard apologies for
the adversary system deficient and concludes that it is only pragmatically justified: it is not much worse in theory than such alternatives
as the inquisitorial system of continental Europe, and it is very costly
to change in fact. 6 ' Like the family car my parents always refused to
trade in, it may not run as well as the latest model from Europe or
Japan. But it works as well as anything else that has been around as
long, and all the available alternatives are costly, not least in that
their foibles are unfamiliar. An adversarial system that is only
pragmatically justified, however, is a very weak link in the chain of
justification that connects morally questionable acts with the values
the adversary system is supposed to serve.6" Accordingly, lawyers
are morally entitled (if not required) to examine the other links
carefully and to conclude, more often in the civil than the criminal
defense context, that the chain simply will not support many of the
57.

LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 149.

58. Id. at 134.

59. See id. at 67-103. Not all defenses of the old role morality make the adversary
system its linchpin. See supra Subpart I.A; infra Subpart III.B.

60. See supra text accompanying note 57.
61. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 92.
62. Contra Ellmann, supra note 13, at 143-45 (disputing this point). Luban replies in
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1020-21 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Partisanship].
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legally permissible but morally blameworthy ends and means that
the old role morality tolerates or encourages. Thus, for example,
Luban maintains that the protection of client secrets is generally too
broad a justification in civil matters, and therefore those who knew
of the design flaws in the Pinto gas tank6" should have revealed
them in violation of the rule.'
The fourfold root, then, is distinct from the old role morality
both in conception and in application. It is important to note, however, that the fourfold root's departure from the old role morality is
not identical with a more direct (and arguably less sophisticated) application of ordinary morality. To be sure, Luban's four stepjustificatory scheme bridges the gap between lawyers' role morality and
ordinary morality, and in a way that seems to subsume the former
under the latter.6 5 Thus, for example, Garrow's lawyer, by refusing
to reveal the locations of his victims' bodies to their parents, is promoting the goal of over-protecting criminal defendants' rights, a
goal grounded in ordinary morality under Luban's fourfold root.
Note, however, that an unreflective application of ordinary morality
suggests a different answer and a diametrically opposed course of
action: Tell the parents! Thus, although Luban's justificatory
scheme grounds his new role morality in ordinary morality, its application is more complicated than, and will sometimes give very different results from, a direct appeal to ordinary morality.
3. The New Role Moralityfor Lawyers.-Luban and Simon agree
that the old role morality is not necessary to achieve, or even fully
consistent with, the ends it purports to serve, and that conscientious
lawyers must seek a supplementary standard to bare legality. For
Simon, the spirit of the law sometimes constrains us from pressing
to the limits of its letter, and other times compels us to test those
limits. For Luban, thejustificatory link between problematic act and
institutional good is sometimes too tenuous to bind us, but other
times strong enough to bind us against our own better judgment of
63. Internal company memoranda of the Ford Motor Company revealed that Ford
executives were aware of the propensity of the Pinto's gas tank to leak and explode in
rear-end collisions; they rejected, however, proposed modifications as too costly. See
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 206-10.
64. Id. at 206-34.
65. Indeed, one critic has charged that "Luban's discussion fails to show how lawyers, even those engaged in the most strongly justified forms of adversary practice, are
ever exempt from the demands of common morality." Wasserman, supra note 26, at
404. This criticism, in turn, led Luban to a significant revision of his earlier position. See
Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52; see also infra Part III.B.
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the morally right result. For both, the supplementary standard will
come from objective norms: the spirit of the law for Simon, ordi66
nary morality for Luban.
C.

The Old Wineskins

This recourse to objective norms is the central problem with
the new role morality that Luban and Simon offer. It is their attempt to eliminate conflicts between individual conscience, on the
one hand, and the dictates of public standards, of professional role
and of law, on the other. To get at this problem, we must first look
at several ways in which conflicts can arise in their system. Recall
that public norms impinge on that system at two distinct levels. The
first, the outer limit, is positive law itself, public norms embodied in
such conventional sources as statutes, administrative regulations,
and judicial opinions. We have already encountered one point on
this frontier, the virtually universal obligation to protect client confidences even at the risk of great harm to innocent third parties. The
second, inner limit is Simon's spirit of the law and Luban's recourse
to ordinary morality through the fourfold root.
Conflicts between individual conscience and public norms can
and do arise at each level. Sometimes an individual may conscientiously disagree with the dictates of Luban and Simon's inner limits.
At the most general level, the adherents of the old role morality are
an obvious example, for they disagree with these inner limits in their
entirety. Sometimes one's individual conscience may conflict with
66. In describing their alternatives, Luban and Simon address slightly different questions and, accordingly, give slightly different answers. Simon looks for guidelines in
exercising discretion, in deciding when to do less (or more) for clients than procedural
or substantive law allows. Luban, on the other hand, seeks guidelines for what to do
when the dictates of one's lawyerly role require conduct inconsistent with ordinary morality.
Yet, in an important sense, they differ primarily in that they are dealing with the
negation of the central premise of the old role morality in slightly different versions.
Recall that at the outset I said that the standard answer had a strong and a weak form.
In the strong form the lawyer must-in the weak form, the lawyer may-do all that the law
allows on behalf of clients. Simon, addressing the weak form, asks what is left of a specifically lawyerly role if one abandons the idea that it is always proper to go to the limit
of the law for a client. Luban, reading the standard answer in its strong form, subsumes
it under the larger question of when it is proper to depart from a role norm. This is
simply the converse of when role norms are justified, a question whose answer, as we
have seen, leads Luban to try to reconcile lawyerly and ordinary morality through the
fourfold root analysis. Luban's program has, however, a positive program much like
Simon's, which he sets out in a long chapter on "Opportunity in the Law." See LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 148-74. There he discusses how to act within

justified role norms to promote justice, and in that sense his treatment parallels Simon's
discussion of how to exercise discretion.
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the outer limits of the positive law, when what one feels required to
do or forgo doing for a client runs afoul of what the law requires or
forbids. Thus, the fourfold root presses Luban to counsel violations
of the letter of the law on confidentiality in the Pinto fuel tank
case, 6 7 and the spirit of the law presses Simon to countenance violation of superannuated divorce statutes 68 and evasion of dubious
welfare eligibility regulations.6 9
To resolve these conflicts between the individual lawyer and the
inner and outer limits of their systems, Luban and Simon import the
problematic, and not always fully explicit, assumption of a set of
identifiable and objective public norms. With the help of these
norms, disagreements between the dictates of individual conscience
and the demands of publicly defined duty are reduced to a common
denominator-reduced in principle, if not in practice, as easily as
halves are converted to quarters. Those who find their individual
consciences out of accord with the inner limits Simon and Luban
reveal can be shown that they are simply out of personal harmony
with the public norms from which those inner limits are derived.
Alternatively, they can demonstrate, as Luban and Simon purport to
do with the entire old role morality, that the norms themselves are
wrong. Similarly, those who find themselves in disagreement with
the outer limits of law can in principle determine whether the law is
reducible without remainder to the same objective standards ofjustice from which they derive their own personal moralities. But if it is
not, then they can legitimately resist it. If it is, they should obey it as
the embodiment of that norm, and disobedience can justly and legitimately be punished.
These are, of course, the fundamental questions of political obligation: when may the state legitimately coerce dissidents, and,
conversely, when are dissidents morally bound to obey? Under the
rubric of a universal set of norms, and at a fairly high level of abstraction, the answers are easy. The state legitimately may coerce,
and the citizen morally must obey, when the law in question is just.
Conversely, when the law is unjust, coercion is illegitimate and disobedience is morally permitted, if not required. In a sense, then, in
order to resolve these conflicts, Luban and Simon need only apply
this answer directly to disagreements between lawyers and law, as a
special case of disagreements between citizens and law, and interpo67. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
68. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1116-18.

69. See id. at 1105-07, 1116.
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late from this answer at the outer level to an analogous answer at
the inner level.
This mode of resolution, however, has two serious problems,
one internal and the other external. The internal problem arises
when we move from the level of abstraction at which conflicts between individual consciences and public norms are in principle reducible to the common denominator of justice, and address
ourselves to particular disputes. How, in a particular citizen's challenge to a particular law, do you know who is really right and who,
wrong? As Socrates long ago pointed out, the very things people
disagree on are whether actions and laws are just.7" When both the
dissident and the state invoke the same set of universal norms, one
to challenge the positive law and the other to defend it, who will
decide who is right, unless one party is to be judge in its own case?
At the level of practical application, then, the standard theory runs
71
into serious internal problems.
Furthermore, this internal problem at the practical level points
to a more fundamental problem at the theoretical level. How is it
that conscientious individuals and the state differ in their understanding of the universal norms to which they both appeal and in
terms of which they agree their dispute is to be resolved? Perhaps
the norms are not as readily discernible as we might wish, leading
some of us to get them wrong, a possibility we have already discussed. But there is another way to account for the disagreement.
That is to wonder whether anyone is, or can be, right about such
matters, whether there really is a common set of public norms out
there to which ultimate appeal can be taken. To ask this question is
to present the external problem with Luban and Simon's approach,
to challenge the common denominator to which they try to reduce
conflict between individual consciences and collective standards at
both levels, the inner and the outer. To answer this question in the
negative is to deny that such conflicts are ultimately reconcilable,
and to affirm, on the contrary, that they are fundamental and irreducible by rational means.
This, in turn, gives a deeper, and more disturbing, concern at
both levels of conflict between individual consciences and collective
norms. With respect to individual disagreements with Luban and
Simon's inner limits on lawyerly conduct, the problem is not that
70. See, e.g., PLATO, Crito, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO (F.J. Church trans., 1956).
71. Luban nicely describes this problem in discussing Dr. King's theory and practice

of civil disobedience. See David Luban, Diference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2152, 2173 (1989) [hereinafter Luban, Difference Made Legal].
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some of us have failed to perceive the public norm properly, but
that there is no such norm. Similarly, with respect to conflicts between individual consciences and the outer limits of the law, the
problem is not whether the law embodies or departs from true morality, but that there is no "true" morality that law can embody, or
from which it can depart. The obligation to obey the public policy
embodied in law and the legitimacy of coercing those who disobey
are thus in principle much more problematic, because they cannot
be said to be wrong about the true public good if there simply is no
such thing.
Denying the premise of universal norms would, of course, have
dramatic consequences in the realms of both politics and ethics. In
the political realm, in the absence of such norms, how could we ever
accept coercion of dissidents? At the extreme, must civil government grind to a halt in the face of the first crank who objects to an
otherwise universally approved law? Make no mistake: In the absence of universally binding norms, that law might be the prohibition of murder. Yet, on the other hand, how could we ever resist
government? To take, again, the extreme case, governments, too,
get into the business of killing, internationally in the form of war,
domestically in the form of genocide. In the realm of ethics, how
are we, as conscientious citizens, and citizens who are also lawyers,
to find guidance for our personal and professional conduct in a
world without objectively ascertainable values?
These and other problems posed by abandoning the premise of
objective public norms are vexing, and that fact in itself makes the
premise attractive. By assuming such a set of public norms, Luban
and Simon are able to sidestep or dismiss the fundamental questions raised here. But, I shall try to show, the system Luban and
Simon stitch together from the fabric of universal public norms
comes apart at the seams. As we have seen, their system is one of
individual responsibility. What they contemplate is individual responsibility for the pursuit of collective goals and conformity with
publicly imposed paradigms, not for individually determined values
and orderings of values. But as individuals press, at Luban and Simon's invitation, for an account of public norms that squares with
an objective standard of right and justice, they find themselves at
odds with collective interpretations of those norms. Either the individual or the collective may, of course, be wrong, but there is a more
radical possibility-the norms may not really be universal. In raising this possibility, their methodological individualism-the new
wine of individual moral responsibility-presses upon their substan-
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tive assumption of objective moral norms. And this pressure threatens to burst the old wineskin they fashioned from that assumptiontheir two levels of public limits on lawyer conduct.
It is fair to object that I am holding their model to an impossible standard. No normative account of politics or ethics can be
proved in the abstract; it need only be shown to be better than alternative accounts. My challenge to Luban and Simon's account, then,
is but a first step; I must also give at least the outline of a better
account-and an account of what better means in this context.7 2 I
must also give a plausible answer to the fundamental problems of
politics and ethics posed by the denial of universal norms. Thus,
along with my criticism of their account, though more tentatively
and in less detail, I want to suggest how a viable legal ethics can be
founded on the denial of the critical assumption of their accounthow new wineskins can be fashioned for the new wine Luban and
Simon offer.
In Part III of this Article I will criticize in detail the models of
legal ethics that Luban and Simon have erected on the premise of
objective norms. Before we can question their recourse to such
norms, however, we must first explore a current debate in ethical
philosophy about the source of any such norms. That is the subject
of Part II. Then, after criticizing their collective norms in Part III,
we will look in Part IV at their (and others') distaste for a model of
lawyering that is founded on radical skepticism about the existence
of any such norms. That discussion will address the two problems I
identified above: Can such a system have an adequate politics and
an adequate ethics? In the course of that discussion, we will see
that, in order to give an affirmative answer, we will have to revise
our notion of what adequate ethics and politics are. This revision,
in turn, will take us back to our initial, and central question: Can a
good person be a good lawyer? In order to answer that question
without circularity, we must first attend to the foundations of ethics
and politics. We cannot know what a good lawyer is until we understand what would count as a good legal system, and we cannot know
whether such a lawyer can be a good person until we have a clearer
idea of what that latter notion entails.
But, having warned you of one danger of circularity, I must admit that I court, indeed embrace, another. I assume that the question "Can a good person be a good lawyer?" must be answered in
72. See Rhode, supra note 15, at 639 (" 'But what's the alternative?' [to the old role
morality] will remain the stopping point in too many discussions of legal ethics.").
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the affirmative; the only real question, then, is "How?" Explaining
how will require much of what follows, but the basic notion can be
given here in the form of a paradox to be unpacked later: I will
count as a good lawyer one who functions in the legal system without compromising his or her own conception of being a good person. All those who meet that standard by their own lights, however,
will not meet it according to mine. That answer to the central question of lawyerly morality is grounded in the reason I think I am entitled to beg the central question; I deny what both the new role
morality and the old affirm, namely, that there is an objective set of
norms binding on individuals. In its place, I affirm individual responsibility for choosing, not just pursuing, the good.
The picture of legal ethics that Luban and Simon paint for us is
in a perspective that the Old Masters of the High Renaissance would
find familiar. In Luban and Simon's picture, parallel lines of ethical
thinking comfortably converge in a vanishing point like that invented by the Old Masters, a point far in the background where the
seemingly irreconcilable are imagined to merge. I want to paint, or
at least sketch, a picture in which the vanishing point itself vanishes,
a picture in which parallel lines of ethical thought are not bent together toward ultimate reconciliation. I want to show you that this
picture of the landscape of legal ethics is not too horrible to behold.
It is not a flattening out of all moral viewpoints into a blurred foreground, but rather a deepening of perspective, albeit beyond the
73
visible moral horizon.
To criticize Luban and Simon's picture and to begin sketching
my own, I must first bring our differences in moral perspective into
focus. That is the subject of Part II.
II.

METAETHICAL INTERLUDE

Luban and Simon's insistence that lawyers conform to publicly
defined role obligations is a statement of what moral philosophers
call normative, or first-order, ethics, a statement about the content
of ethical norms.74 Such statements tell us what we ought to do, or
73. I am borrowing here, though in a more figurative sense, an analogy that Luban
draws between modernist painting and what he calls modernist legal theory. See David
Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656 (1986) [hereinafter Luban, Legal Modernism]. I do not mean, however, to ally myself uncritically with those whom Luban identifies as the modernists of legal theory, the Critical Legal Studies movement. If normative
objectivity is dead, surely more than one alternative is possible.
74. See, e.g., J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 9 (1977); BERNARD
WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS x-xiv

(1972).
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what is good. 75 A set of second-order moral questions, questions of
what ethical philosophers call metaethics, deals with the status of
first-order statements. In this Part we will explore one such question, that of the foundation of first-order statements: whether and
in what sense they can be said to be objective, 76 to rest on some77
thing other than individual human wills.

A.

Three Positions

There are three basic positions on that issue that are relevant to
our purposes, if not exhaustive of the possibilities: realism, interpretivism, and skepticism. 78 Once we have examined these positions, we will be better able both to assess Luban and Simon's
75. In thus distinguishing the right from the good, I am following Ross's shorthand
for the emphases, respectively, of deontological and teleological ethics. See W.D. Ross,
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 1-15, 65-74 (1930).
76. J.L. Mackie uses the term "objective" in the way that I intend it here. See MACKIE,
supra note 74, at 15-49. Nagel uses it in a way that is somewhat different, and perhaps
confusingly so. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986). Mackie's use,
which I set out in my definition of realism below, points to the notion that objective
reality is "out there" beyond human will. See MACKIE, supra, at 15 (referring to objective
as "part of the fabric of the world"); infra Subpart II.A.l. Nagel's use points out that
even our view of what is "out there" is in some sense always our view. Nagel's discussion,
accordingly, deals with the general problem of trying to find a perspective outside ourselves from which to view what is "out there," and to include ourselves in the panorama.
See NAGEL, supra, at 7. Mackie, on the other hand, is at pains to show that there are no
moral values out there to see, and thus he never reaches the question of from where to
view them.
77. My thinking along these lines owes more than I can feasibly acknowledge at all
the relevant points to Arthur Leff's essay, Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural
Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229.
78. I am particularly indebted to Michael Walzer and Michael Moore for my tripartite division of metaethics. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM
(1987); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41
STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989). Walzer identifies the path of discovery, the path of invention,
and the path of interpretation. WALZER, supra, at 3. Moore speaks of realism, antirealism, and interpretivism. Moore, supra, at 872-73. The scheme set out here is subject, of
course, to significant subdivision. Robert Nozick, for example, sets out a five-part
scheme that covers pretty much the same ground. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 555-57 (1981). James Fishkin offers seven categories, three that claim
objectivity and four that do not. SeeJAMES S. FISHKIN, BEYOND SUBJECTIVE MORALITY 1023 (1984). But Nozick may make the best case for the schematic trinitarianism he parodies: "Dyadic classifications ... have less interest, while quadratic ones are too complicated for most people to keep fully in mind, which is why there is no holy Quadrinity."
NoZICK, supra, at 557 n.*.
In addition to this heuristic value, tripartite schemes do correspond to the world
they describe in one important respect. Like Caesar's division of Gaul, they identify
those who are close to the writer's viewpoint, those who are farthest away, and those
who are in between. In my scheme, if not in Caesar's, the middle ground suffers the
most distortion, as it ranges from views fairly close to mine to some rather far away, and
thus covers a wide range of terrain. For more on the problem of dividing this middle
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alternative to the old role morality and to understand why they have
rejected other alternatives, including the one that I prefer. We will
see some general problems with realism and interpretivism, 79 the
positions they implicitly adopt, and some of the reasons they and
others find the skeptical position unappealing, and even a bit
appalling. 0
1. Realism. -Realism 8 ' maintains that binding ethical norms or
values are "out there," objective and identifiable, both external to
individual human wills and binding upon them. Furthermore, realground, see infra text accompanying notes 123-124; for further discussion of the other
terms see infra Subparts II.A.1, II.A.2.
There is one general inadequacy in my terminology that I should address here. The
particular terms I have chosen are not precisely parallel, in that they do not refer to the
same aspect of the different schools that they describe. "Realism" and "skepticism"
refer fairly directly to positions on the standing of moral values; "interpretivism," on the
other hand, is more descriptive of methodology. This asymmetry occurs because no
single aspect adequately distinguishes the three positions. With respect to the most important aspect for my purposes, their positions on the possibility of grounding morality
on something other than individual human wills, both interpretivism and realism give an
affirmative answer. On the other hand, interpretivists and skeptics tend to agree, over
against realists, that moral values are not "part of the furniture of the universe." See
Moore, supra, at 872.
79. It is far beyond the scope of this Article to disprove either realism or interpretivism. Indeed, Nozick argues, but self-consciously does not prove, that disproof in the
strong sense of a logically compelling case may even be beyond the proper scope of
philosophy. See NozIcK, supra note 78, at 4-24 (contrasting "coercive philosophy" of
"knockdown arguments" with "philosophical explanations," which make "[v]arious
philosophical things . . . coherent and better understood").
80. For still other reasons, see infra Subpart IV.B.
81. Several overlapping or synonymous terms in current use also denote this position: naturalism, foundationalism, rationalism, intellectualism, objectivism, and "the
path of discovery." I have followed Moore, see Moore, supra note 78, the most direct and
detailed exponent of this position in contemporary American legal scholarship, in
choosing the term "realism."
"Naturalism" is used at least as widely as "realism," and nicely connotes the core
notion of moral values being "out there" beyond human will. See BERNARD WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 121-22 (1985). In the technical vocabulary of
ethical philosophers, however, naturalism is sometimes used in a sense that is too narrow for present purposes. In that sense all naturalists are realists, but not all realists are
naturalists. G.E. Moore's position is perhaps the best example of the latter. See G.E.
MOORE, ETHICS (1912). Michael Moore's broader term lets me cover nonnaturalist realists, like G.E. Moore, without discussing them further. See Michael Moore, Moral Reality,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1117, 1136 [hereinafter Moore, Moral Reality]. Another problem with using "naturalism" to denote the metaethical position under discussion here is
the risk of confusing it with the notion of natural law in jurisprudence. While natural
law jurisprudence almost certainly implies a realist moral theory, see Moore, Moral Reality, supra, at 1153; Oliver W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918), alternative jurisprudential theories do not similarly imply moral skepticism, a point on which
H.L.A. Hart, a confirmed legal positivist, was emphatic. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and
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ism maintains that these norms or values are knowable by human
reason. 8 2 Realism is the metaethical position that best comports
with our ordinary moral language, taking it at nearest to face value.
When we say that something is right or good, on this view, we mean
precisely what those words ordinarily imply: that the something in
question "really" is right or good, right or good for all times and
places, at least for those similarly situated.8 3 And not only do we
mean this; according to the realists, we are also correct. In a phrase
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); see also Moore, Moral Reality,

supra, at 1066 n.10 (arguing that not all legal positivists are moral skeptics).
"Objectivism," like "naturalism," nicely focuses on the central issue, the "giveness"
of ethical norms. As we have seen, however, interpretivists as well as realists claim objectivity for moral statements, and thus "objectivism" is too broad a term for present
purposes. Thus, for example, Robin West rightly describes David Luban as an ethical
objectivist, though he is emphatically and explicitly not a realist of Moore's stripe. See
Robin West, Relativism, Objectivism, and Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1473, 1498 (1990) (reviewing
BARBARA H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE (1988)). The same overbreadth infects
Singer's "rationalism," see Singer, supra note 47, at 35-38, and Olafson's "Intellectualism," see FREDERICK A. OLAFSON, PRINCIPLES AND PERSONS 4 (1967). Walzer's "discovery" avoids this problem, but it is less commonly used and emphasizes methodology
over ontology and epistemology. Luban's "foundationalism" not only captures the distinct feature of realism, but also has the advantage of being used by Luban in explicit
contrast with his own views. But it too is less commonly used and is, moreover, a bit
unwieldy.
"Realism" itself, however, is not wholly satisfactory. For one thing, I include in my
realists one subclass of Moore's antirealists. See infra note 103. The term's primary liability is the risk that its use here will be confused with its use in two other contexts. The
first of these refers to the jurisprudential school of American Legal Realism, whose primary exponents, as Moore points out, were generally moral skeptics. See Moore, supra
note 78, at 872 n.4. The second potentially confusing context is the scholastic debate
between realists and nominalists, a debate that involved very similar issues and produced recognizable antecedents of the present contenders. That Michael Moore's moral
realism is indeed a lineal descendant of the Thomistic realism of the Middle Ages is clear
if not explicit. See Moore, Moral Reality, supra;JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1980). But the relation of medieval nominalism to modem ethical skepticism is
less direct. See OLAFSON, supra, at 15-16, 19-33 (discussing this latter relationship).
82. Realism thus has both an ontological premise, that ethical norms are "out

there," and an epistemological premise, that they are knowable; critics attack both. See
OLAFSON, supra note 81, at 4; Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1117-25; WILLIAMS,
supra note 74, at 12-13; KAI NIELSEN, WHY BE MORAL? 7 (1989). Furthermore, the two
premises are related: If objective values were not out there, how could we know them; if
we could not know them, how could we know they were out there?

83. Mackie is insistent on this point, in disagreement with many linguistic analysts.
Skepticism, in his view, cannot give a better interpretation of the ordinary language of
morality than realism. See MACKIE, supra note 74, at 34-35; see also WILLIAMS, supra note
74, at 15-19; WILLIAMS, supra note 81, at 120-31 (rebutting the linguistic form of skepticism). What skeptics must do, therefore, is show why ordinary language is wrong in its
implied affirmations about moral reality. MACKIE, supra, at 19-20, 31-35. For Mackie's
own account of how ordinary language fell into the error of objectifying morality, see
MACKIE, supra, at 42-46 (describing "patterns of objectification"); infra notes 101-102
and accompanying text.
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more popular among critics of this approach than defenders, moral
values are "part of the furniture of the universe, ' 84 at least in the
sense that statements about moral values are no less true or objectively verifiable than statements of scientific or historical fact. 5
But what are these objective moral values like, and how do we
have access to them? David Hume noted a fundamental problem in
this regard:
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance.
In every system of morality... I have always remark'd, that
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I
am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations
of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as an ought, or ought not, expresses some
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be
observed and explained; and at the same time a reason
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be deduced from others, which
are entirely different from it . .

.

. [T]his small attention

wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us
see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded
merely on the relation of things, nor is perceived by
86
reason.

The question Hume raised is phrased variously-whether an
"ought" can ever be derived from an "is"; whether prescription can
ever be fully reduced to description; whether reason can bridge the
84. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 80 (1986) (discussing "'fabric' of the universe"); MACKIE, supra note 74, at 16 (discussing "furniture of the world"). But see
Moore, supra note 78, at 872 (using the phrase approvingly).
85. In Moore's words, the claim is that "[i]f one applies to moral knowledge the
standards of meaning, ontology and justification thought adequate in contemporary philosophy for nonmoral knowledge, the former does not suffer at all in terms of its objectivity." Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1152-53. I follow Moore here in defining
the realists' claim to the objectivity of moral values relative to that of "hard" nonmoral
facts. See id. at 1153. This avoids the very difficult task of further defining objectivity
itself in more absolute terms. See id. It also obviates the need to discuss differences
among realists concerning the precise way to achieve the ontological parity of facts and
values. See id. at 1143-49. This leaves open, of course, the objection that nonmoral
statements themselves lack objectivity in any meaningful sense. See id. at 1153.
86. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70

1964).

(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
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gap between facts and values.8 7 The debate on these points is still
open (and vigorous), 8 and I cannot close it definitively here. Nevertheless, we should note briefly two fairly common forms of response, and the issues they in turn raise.
In the first place, some realists themselves concede that the gap
between is and ought cannot be filled, that moral principles cannot
rationally be derived from matters of nonmoral fact. For them, the
objective values are out there to be discovered, but not by inference
from nonmoral facts. Rather, they are to be perceived directly, by
intuition or by reason acting in a special mode distinct from its ordinary empirical methods.8 9
Thus, according to John Finnis, a leading exponent of this
school,
When discerning what is good, to be pursued (prosequendum), intelligence is operating in a different way,
yielding a different logic, from when it is discerning what is
the case (historically, scientifically, or metaphysically); but
there is no good reason for asserting that the latter operations of intelligence are more rational than the former.9 °
Thinkers of this school quite rightly point out that, even if Hume is
87. Hume made this observation as something of an aside; he quite possibly was
unaware of its ramifications and the debate it would set in motion. For an argument that
he did not have in mind the standard modem interpretation, which is the one I implicitly
adopt, see FINNIS, supra note 81, at 37. See also THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION 35-80 (W.D.

Hudson ed., 1969) (collection of papers on Hume's treatment of the is-ought question).
As Finnis notes, however, others arrived at that position soon enough. See FINNIS, supra,
at 37. In England, the watershed was G.E. Moore's PrincipiaEthica (1903) (adopting the
modern interpretation). But see NIELSEN, supra note 82, at 35 n.l (arguing that Axel
Hagerstrom in Sweden identified the problem before its modem discussion in England
and Germany).
88. See, e.g., THE Is-OuGrT QUESTION, supra note 87 (collection of essays on the question); MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY (Ted Honderich ed., 1985) (essays honoring J.L.

Mackie); WILLIAMS, supra note 81, at 132-55 (examining the nature of ethical objectivity
in terms of the purported distinctions between fact and value); Alan Gewirth, The "IsOught" Problem Resolved, 47 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS'N 34 (1974), reprinted in
ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS 100 (1982) (suggesting that a more apt title might have
been "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved-Again?!").
Indeed, one of the most traditional of efforts, Aristotle's quest for a morally determinative human nature, enlists legal scholars who are by no means traditionalists. See
ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 3 (1984) (declining to repudiate "the ascription of normative force to conceptions of fundamental human identity");
Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U.

Prrr.L. REV. 673 (1985) (describing the pragmatists' search for an evolving conception
of ideal human nature).
89. See FINNIS, supra note 81, at 33, 66-67; Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at
1153.
90. FINNIS, supra note 81, at 34.
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correct that an "is" cannot be derived from an "ought," it does not
follow, as he seems to have thought, that moral values are not directly apprehended by reason. It is one thing to say that "the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded on the relations of things";
it is quite another to add "nor is perceived by reason."
Yet though this is logically true, it is not without problems of its
own, most particularly, how reason works in this distinctive mode.
Consider Finnis's account:
At this point in our discourse (or private meditation) [the
point at which we are discovering the basic forms of human
good], inference and proof are left behind (or left until
later [when moral laws are derived from basic human
goods]), and the proper form of discourse is: ".

.

. [a candi-

date for basic human good] is a good, in itself, don't you
think?" 9 1
As an instantiation of this approach, Finnis discusses in detail one
particular putative basic good, knowledge.9" According to him, we
move in the following way from the desire or felt inclination for particular knowledge-from what Hume and his skeptical successors
would call a fact-to grasping that knowledge in general is inherently valuable:
Commonly one's interest in knowledge, in getting to
the truth of the matter, is not bounded by the particular
questions that first aroused one's desire to find out. So
readily that one notices the transition only by an effort of
reflection, it becomes clear that knowledge is a good thing
to have (and not merely for its utility), without restriction
to the subject-matters
that up to now have aroused one's
93
curiosity.
This process crosses the gap between is and ought without a logical
inference; the objective and intrinsical value of what you are in fact
inclined to pursue (knowledge, in the example) simply "becomes
clear." 94
Such insights logically divide the world into two classes, those
who have had them and those who have not.9 5 Those who have
91. Id. at 85-86.
92. See id. at 59-75.
93. Id. at 61.
94. Id.
95. Certifying membership in the latter class poses an initial hurdle with respect to
the purported intrinsic goodness of knowledge. We must be careful to distinguish those
who deny the goodness of knowledge, who are probably as scarce as those who denied
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seen the light need no further proof; the insight is, as Finnis describes it, as irreducible as a sense perception. The problem, however, is not that they have seen something, but whether what they
have seen is the kind of externally existing moral value they claim.
How can they know that their perception of intrinsic goodness corresponds to something in an external world of moral values any
more than, say, an alcoholic's pink elephants correspond to something in the external world of sensory objects? One answer is to
import God as the guarantor of the moral vision.9 6 This way, however, only moves the problem back a step: How do you know that it
is God who guarantees that your moral vision is clear? Mystics tell
us that direct contact with the Ultimate is unmistakable. But it tends
to be ineffable as well. Again, they can only point us in the right
direction and, in their own darker moments, wonder not whether
they have really touched the Ultimate, but what the Ultimate really
97
is.
the sportiness of the emperor's new clothes, from those who deny that knowledge's
goodness is intrinsic and objective. One may deny the intrinsic goodness while affirming the goodness on any of several grounds, including the usefulness of knowledge
as a means to other ends, or the bare fact that one chooses to pursue it. The critical
question is thus not whether knowledge is good, but whether it is intrinsically good, and
how it adds anything useful to say that this inherent goodness is directly perceived by
reason in a unique moral mode.
This is not to say that Finnis invidiously chose a tendentious example. All the items
on his list of intrinsic goods are, like knowledge, very widely thought to be good: life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion.
Id. at 85-90. This is precisely what one would expect if one thought that Finnis had
blurred the line between the "is" and the "ought" by mistaking the desired, the things
that people as a matter of fact generally do seek, for the desirable, the things that they
ought to seek. See infra text accompanying notes 101-102 (discussing Mackie's error
theory).
96. This, ultimately, is Finnis's way. See infra text accompanying notes 360-370 (discussing Finnis's political theory and its ultimate reliance on divine revelation).
97. A different, but related, answer is to import God, not as the guarantor of our
vision of the ultimately and inherently good, but as the source of the good. Under this
approach, God does not merely reveal what is good, he declares it. In the language of
linguistic analysis, God's moral language consists of performative utterances. See Left,
supra note 77, at 1231. This position is logically unassailable, because it can be made a
matter of definition: God, the Unevaluated Evaluator, is He Who declares what is good;
good is what He declares it to be. This answers Socrates's question to Euthyphro head
on, see PLATO, Euthyphro, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, supra note 70, at 11: the good
is good because God loves it; he does not love it because it is good. This is the answer
favored in the Middle Ages by the Ockhamists, over against the Thomists, whom Finnis
follows, and it has its adherents today. See OLAFSON, supra note 81. It shares, however,
the problem of certifying the revelation, and it raises a new problem. The standard
objection is that it makes the good quite literally arbitrary, determined by the will-the
arbitrium-of God. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it qualifies as realism, because it
gives a standard of goodness independent of the will of humans.
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Another answer is to insist that I have placed too great a burden
of validation on the realists and their moral perceptions, that I am
trading at their expense on an unwarranted distinction between the
"hardness" of physical facts and the "softness" of values. This distinction, so the argument runs, rests on a naive, and erroneous, understanding of what physical phenomena are and how they are
perceived.9" This response has an appealing symmetry about it.
Against the objection that the perception of values is peculiar, the
response is that, on close analysis, the perception of facts becomes
equally peculiar.9 9 In a world of quarks and quantum mechanics,
things may well not be quite what they seem.
Even so, however, the question remains: Are things as they are
in the realms of physics, history, and the like, of the same order, and
knowable in the same way, as the values that realists purport to find
in the world? To show that they are, realists must disabuse us of
"the stubborn intuition that particular factual judgments are 'given'
by observation in a way that particular moral judgments are not."' 0 0
Claims in the factual realm, after all, are submitted both in principle
and in practice to the judgment of the conscientiously skeptical.
But, on the other hand, what are the conscientiously skeptical
to make of these facts: first, that our ordinary moral language bristles with implications of objective morality; and, second, that Finnis
and others report rational contact with real values in the world? To
take the latter first, it will hardly do to deny the data, particularly in
light of the notorious difficulty of proving a negative. In the absence of disproof, perhaps the best we can do is offer a plausible
alternative account.' 0 ' Perhaps what realists see-and really see-is
not a realm of moral values outside themselves, but a projection of
their own or others' values upon the world, a projection induced not
by the effects of drugs on the brain, but by the effects of social conditioning upon the conscience. Ordinary language simply reflects
the fact that we have long mistaken this projection of ourselves for a
discovery of something other, just as it reflects our more readily discredited geocentricism in expressions like "sunrise" and "sunset."' 0 2 On this view, it comes as no surprise, nor any metaethical
98. Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1117-36.

99. Mackie anticipates this response and notes its symmetry, which he describes as
"look[ing] for companions in guilt." MACKIE, supra note 74, at 39.
100. Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1113.

101. This account follows that of MACKIE, supra note 74, at 42-46. For a parallel account of Christian theology, see

LUDWIG

FEUERBACH, THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

(1957).
102. As Bernard Williams points out, "If we are engaged in a fraudulent or self-de-
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problem, that when we stare down into the inky waters of morality,
we see what seems a familiar face. The problem only arises when we
are moved to declare the face ideal, or when we become convinced
it has an existence apart from our own.
Once again, I am not asserting that the position of the realists
has been, or even can be, disproved. But we are on notice that these
claims are problematic, and we are entitled to wonder whether the
realists' efforts to defend them are worth the energy. In particular,
we may legitimately question whether morality cannot be built on
another foundation.
2. Skepticism.-One response to the claims of moral realism is
skepticism," of either a more or a less thorough-going sort. In its
ceiving business of reading our values into the world, our language is likely to be deeply
implicated." WILLIAMS, supra note 81, at 130.
103. Here again, although I might have chosen another label, skepticism has several
advantages. For one thing, it captures the critical difference from realism on the question of the objectivity of morals: realism affirms it; skepticism is, well, skeptical. What is
more, skepticism is fairly widely used to denominate the position I am setting out here.
J.L. Mackie, in particular, has both defined the term nicely and distinguished among
possibly confusing uses. See MACKIE, supra note 74, at 15-17.
Other possible labels are subjectivism and voluntarism. Subjectivism has the advantage of directly pointing to the position's rejection of objective values and norms, but it
is susceptible to confusion with other positions, particularly with relativism, which I distinguish below, see infra note 112, and emotivism, a theory about the meaning, as opposed to epistemological and ontological standing, of ethical statements. Compare
MACKIE, supra note 74, at 17-18 (warning against the latter confusion) with WILLIAMS,
supra note 74, at 13 (falling into it).
Voluntarism has the advantage of pointing to a positive feature of the position I am
defining, rather than emphasizing its negation of the realist premise; the only possible
basis for a moral system is, or may be, human will. See OLAFSON, supra note 81, at 14-15.
Moreover, voluntarism is widely used to describe the position I label skepticism. See id.
at 14 ("The most familiar label for this tradition or counter-tradition in moral philosophy is 'voluntarism.' "). Voluntarism in the sense that is synonymous with skepticism,
however, must be distinguished from at least two fairly common alternative senses. The
first is the much broader sense used to describe a number of theories about the freedom
of the will. Id. at 15. Second, and more narrowly, voluntarism refers to the position in
theological ethics maintained, for example, by William of Ockham, that God's will is not
bounded by any rational necessity in its determination of what is good. Id. at 22-23.
Drucilla Cornell preferred the term "decisionism," which covers much the same ground
as voluntarism without the unwanted baggage, but it is not in widespread use. See
Drucilla Cornell, Towards a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
291, 300 (1985).
My skeptics include some, but not all, of those whom Moore calls antirealists. See
Moore, supra note 78. Specifically, I include those whom Moore identifies as skeptics
and those he places in the subjectivist branch of idealism, but not those in his conventionalist branch of idealism. See id. at 880-81. I place Moore's conventionalists either
among the realists, for affirming moral values not based on individual human volition, or
among the interpretivists, for sliding into realism by privileging the conventional as the
good. See infra Subpart II.A.3. I do not precisely distinguish skeptics from subjectivist
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more aggressive mode, skepticism denies in principle the possibility
of moral truths.' °4 The claims of the realists are to be not just
doubted, but denied; they are not just unproved, but false. In its
milder form, moral skepticism implicitly adopts the logic of what in
law is known as the Scottish verdict-to show that someone's case is
not proved is not to have disproved it. 10 5 As we have seen, the realists' claims that rest on special forms of knowing are especially difficult to disprove in principle. After all, the more modest skeptic
admits, some day the scales may fall from my eyes, allowing me, too,
to see the ineffable and underived light of moral truth. Until then,
however, we must live by our own lights, even if they fail to reveal a
moral code in the order of the cosmos.' 0 6 The common element in
these two forms of moral skepticism, the mild and the aggressive, is
the rejection, tentatively or tenaciously, of an objective moral realm
external to the human will.
So stated, skepticism has not only a negative, but also a positive, or at least potentially positive, aspect. Denying moral standards external to the human will leaves open the logical possibility
of grounding morality in the will itself. Yet this is only a potentially

idealists, primarily because the distinction between them in Moore's scheme-whether
they deny that moral entities exist at all, or affirm that moral entities exist, but only in
individual minds-is more refined than necessary for my purposes. See Moore, supra
note 78, at 880-81. For my purposes, it is enough that both deny the existence of binding norms outside the individual.
104. MACKIE, supra note 74, at 16; see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1948); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

(Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
105. The relation of this mild form of skepticism to the more aggressive form parallels
the relationship between agnosticism and atheism in matters of theology. Like mild
skepticism, agnosticism rests on a verdict of not proved, rather than one of disproved or
not provable. See Thomas H. Huxley, Agnosticism and Christianity, in ESSAYS UPON SOME
CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 449, 450 (London, MacMillan 1892).
106. This position is captured, albeit in a religious rather than an ethical context, in
the first stanza of Hardy's poem "The Impercipient":
That with this bright believing band
I have no claim to be,
That faiths by which my comrades stand
Seem fantasies to me,
And mirage-mists their Shining Land,
Is a strange destiny.
Thomas Hardy, The Impercipient, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE
1740 (5th ed. 1986). Hardy goes on to wonder, in the next stanza, "Why always I must
feel as blind/ To sights my brethren see." Id. The note of forlornness presages the
metaphysical forlornness of the existentialists, and differs markedly from the exuberant
iconoclasm of Nietzsche. SeeJEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM 25-28 (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1947).
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positive aspect; it is only to say that if moral values exist at all, they
are grounded in the will.
To affirm the position that moral values do exist, grounded in
the will, is to move beyond skepticism to what I will call fideism, 10 7 a
kind of Cartesian 0 8 ethical system. I may (and I do) doubt that
things come with value attached or built-in and that, as Art Leff puts
it, an Unevaluated Evaluator confers it upon them.' 0 9 But I cannot
doubt that I myself evaluate things, in the sense of judging them
worthy of my time and talents. " 0 My very belief in their worth, not

in the sense of acknowledging their objective value, but in the sense
of committing myself to their realization, gives them their worth in
the minimal, Cartesian sense that fideism requires.''

We will examine more fully in Part IV whether this minimal
sense of value can give human life enough meaning and purpose to
support a moral system in general and a system of legal ethics in
particular. I put forward the possibility here not to defend it in detail, but to anticipate the objection that skepticism logically leads to
either of two very different metaethical positions.
Some, lapsing in their logic, suggest that skepticism leads to the
first of these other positions, relativism, the notion that one first107. I choose the term "fideism" to suggest a parallel in the field of ethics to Kant's
famous dictum about metaphysical theology: "I have therefore found it necessary to
deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 29 (Norman K. Smith trans., 1933). Though Kant was not a fideist in this ethical
sense, his ethical writings mark a pivotal point in the shift away from realism. See OLAFSON, supra note 81, at 37-44. I mean to suggest more than just an analogy between
ethical and religious thought, a suggestion I will take up more fully later. See infra note
403; text accompanying notes 472-474. Faith in this ethical sense is not wishful thinking; it is active commitment.
108. See RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD (L. LaFleur trans., 1950).
109. See Leff, supra note 77, at 1230-31.
110. See HAZEL E. BARNES, AN EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS 27 (1967) (noting the universality of evaluation).
111. Id. Barnes, Olafson, and de Beauvoir have all built ethical systems, similar to
what I am outlining here, on the basis of an existentialist metaphysics of human personality. See id.; OLAFSON, supra note 81; DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 104. That foundation is
not necessary, however, and it may even prove problematic, because too close a linking
of freedom as the essential human condition with freedom as the basis of an ethical
system verges on deriving an "ought" from an "is." To show that autonomy is the
essential human condition is not to show that it, or its cultivation or exercise, is good per
se. But cf. BARNES, supra note 110, at 26 ("If one accepts freedom as a fact, then no act is
ethical which acts as if men were not free."); DE BEAUVOIR, supra, at 58 (stressing "the
importance of that universal, absolute end which freedom itself is"). On the mistake of
confusing autonomy as a prerequisite to ethics with autonomy as the goal of ethics, see
Luban, Partisanship,supra note 62, at 1035-42. I wholeheartedly concur with Luban's
conclusion: "Isee no intrinsicvalue to autonomy." Id. at 1037. It would, indeed, be peculiar
to call one who sees such intrinsic value a metaethical skeptic.
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order moral position or system is just as good (or right or true) as
any other. To say that all values are groundless (or, more precisely,
grounded only on human will), however, is not to say that all things
capable of being valued should be valued equally. Indeed, to make
the latter claim is implicitly to deny the skeptical premise, for that
claim implies a position of moral certitude, a "midair" position morally superior to the contending moral claims, from which perspective each is declared good. The central tenet of skepticism, by
contrast, denies, or at least calls into fundamental question, the very
12
existence of any such metaethical high ground.'
Just as fideism must be distinguished from its logically illegitimate sibling, relativism, so it must be distinguished from its suicidal
twin, nihilism." 3 To draw the latter distinction we must backtrack a
bit. Recall that, although the derivation of relativism from skepticism is logically flawed, the derivation of fideism from skepticism is
not logically compelled. Relativism wrongly suggests that from
skepticism necessarily follows the conclusion that one substantive
moral position is as good as any other. Nihilism rightly points out
that from skepticism precisely nothing positive necessarily follows." 4 Skepticism is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of
fideism. The next move, on the very premises of skepticism, is not a
matter of logic, but of choice. " 5 Fideism's move is affirmative; it
112. This critique of relativism, and particularly its purported derivation from skeptical premises, is drawn from fuller critiques in GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 8-15, and
WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 20-29. This "midair" position-Williams's term, see id. at
29-is not to be confused with the position of skepticism itself. Cf. David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33J. LEGAL EDUC. 636, 657 (1983) [hereinafter Luban, Epistemology]. Somewhat confusingly, Goldman refers to his critique of what Williams calls
"vulgar relativism" as a "refutation of skepticism." GOLDMAN, supra, at 13. This is a
semantic, not a substantive, difference.
113. In thus distinguishing nihilism from its parent, skepticism, and its sibling, fideism, I am following Singer. See Singer, supra note 47, at 3-4; see also BARNES, supra note
110, at 98; DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 104, at 10. Nozick implicitly raises the question I
address here in his statement of the nihilist position: "There do not exist any values or
true ought statements (and there cannot?)." NozIcK, supra note 78, at 555. If you answer that there cannot be, you move from skepticism to nihilism.
114. See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 104, at 57. De Beauvoir explains: "The nihilist is
right in thinking that the world possesses no justification and that he himself is nothing.
But he forgets that it is up to him to justify the world and to make himself exist validly."
Id.; see also MACKIE, supra note 74, at 34. This point is also made by those who would
"defuse" skepticism. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 29. Moore is quite literally
emphatic about this point: "Nothing that could be called a normative theory follows from moral
skepticism." Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1070-71.

115. Though I have described nihilism as an alternative to fideism, it may not be experienced as an active choice, but as a mishap, as the loss, rather than rejection, of
meaning and purpose. See PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE To BE 46-51 (1952) ("The Anxiety of Emptiness and Meaninglessness"); WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 1 (identifying two

1992]

BEYOND THE NEW ROLE MORALITY

885

chooses to believe in, in the sense of being committed to,
something.
But there is another, negative, possibility, and that is to deny
that anything matters. This is the turn that nihilism takes. As
Yoda" 6 and the Prince of Denmark will tell you, the pull of this, the
Dark Side, is strong. Yet you do not necessarily ally yourself with
the Dark Side when you begin to wonder whether there is any moral
Force out there to be with." 7 From the position that "there are no
moral absolutes, no objective measures of the right and the good,"
it does not follow that "nothing matters," that "all is vanity and a
striving after wind."" '
Indeed, implicit in the position I have described as fideism is the affirmation that something does matterwhat you are committed to. At that most minimal level, for example, this discussion matters to me, who wrote it, and to you, who are
reading it. (And beyond that, it is but a short step for what I say to
matter to you, and for what you say to matter to me." 9 )
With this distinction between nihilism and fideism in mind, I
can correct a possible misunderstanding of something I implied in
Part I and anticipate an objection I will address in Part IV. In Part I,
I referred repeatedly, and with at least implicit acquiescence, to the
claims of ordinary morality, its goods and its goals; in this Part, I
have suggested that those goods and goals are without any external
foundation. These two positions are discordant, but they can be
harmonized. Even if the moral skeptics are right on the metaethical
issue, and the moral score is not to be transcribed from the music of
the spheres, it does not follow that every note sounded by ordinary
morality over the centuries is sour.
You could, of course, opt for the self-induced moral tone deafness of the nihilists, or you could follow Nietzsche's invitation to
compose on a value scale of your own creation, perhaps with particforms of amoralism, one of which is expressing "despair or hopelessness," the other,
"sounding a more defiant note"). But see NozIcK, supra note 78, at 558 ("A depressed
person not only chooses to be affectless-he chooses that the world correspond and be
valueless too.").
116. See THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilms Ltd. 1980).
117. See also infra Subpart IV.B. But see UNGER, supra note 88, at 12 (describing skepticism as brushing with nihilism when it goes so far as to reject "any hope of objectivity
beyond human communities and their contingent histories").
118. Ecclesiastes 1:14-15 (Revised Standard). This realization is the "baphometic Firebaptism" that Carlyle's Dr. Teufelsdrockh experienced in the Rue Saint-Thomas de
L'Enfer, where he turned from the "Everlasting No" of nihilism toward the "Everlasting
Yea," a form of fideist self-affirmation. THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS 127-28,
138-49 (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1973).
119. See infra Part IV for a discussion of Socratic friendship.
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ular emphasis on percussion. 120 But you could also follow fideism
in a different direction. You could compose a moral score of your
own with not just notes, but phrases and leitmotifs, borrowed from
ordinary morality but transposed into a skeptical key and recombined into a new song, a song to which no one but you (and perhaps
your friends) need march-or dance.
3. Interpretivism.-Realists, we have seen, insist on a world of
hard moral reality outside human will; skeptics doubt, or even deny,
the existence of such an external moral world. Interpretivists try to
have the best-and avoid the worst-of both positions. From their
perspective, they have transcended a tired old philosophical dualism
and salvaged a binding, public, and objective morality from the
to the metaphysical
bleak conclusions of skepticism without resort
2
and epistemological oddities of the realists.' '
It is in this metaethical middle ground that Simon and Luban
have chosen to erect their new role morality.' 2 2 If it is fairly easy to
define interpretivism in relation to realism and skepticism, it is virtually impossible to give a positive, descriptive account of interpretivism in its own right. If the interpretivists are united in what they
want to avoid and, at least in broad outline, in what they want to
achieve, they are deeply divided on how they propose to go about it.
For our purpose, however, defining them in terms of what they
try to do will suffice; our purpose is to see the difficulties they have
120. Hear, e.g., RICHARD STRAUSS, ALSO SPRACH ZARATHUSTRA (RCA-Victor 1990); cf.
WALZER, supra note 78, at 8 (describing this approach as "more frightening than
attractive").
121. Moore's entire article is a response to the interpretivist view that the debate between realists and antirealists-terms that roughly correspond to my realism and skepticism-is meaningless or insignificant. See Moore, supra note 78, at 872-73. In large
measure this Article is my response in the more limited area of legal ethics. In siding
with Moore on this point, I am in a sense playing both ends against the middle: I, a
moral skeptic, am taking comfort in the views of Michael Moore, a realist, against the
interpretivists. It is also possible to play the ends against each other. Thus, for example, James Fishkin argues that, given the realists' impossible demands on objectivity,
skepticism and its problems inevitably follow unless we find some middle ground. See
FISHKIN, supra note 78, at 129.
122. Luban is especially and explicitly critical of what he calls "foundationalism,"
which is basically the equivalent of my realism. See David Luban, The Misuse of Objectivity in the Foundations of Politics, Language, and Knowledge (1974) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) [hereinafter Luban, Misuse of Objectivity]. Luban is
also rather explicitly an interpretivist. See, e.g., Luban, Epistemology, supra note 112, at 652
(approvingly comparing Aristotelian ethics to manners, in that both refer to what is appropriate under community standards). As to Simon's interpretivism, see infra Subpart
III.A for a discussion of his view of justice and legality, especially his reliance on
Dworkin.
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in meeting the task they have set for themselves.' 2 Trying to prove
that this middle ground is a mirage would take us beyond my present purpose, and beyond the mild form of skepticism I identified
and espoused above.' 24 What I mean to do here is show how unstable this middle ground is, as a prelude to more particular criticisms
of the foundations that Simon and Luban try to build upon it.
The middle ground of interpretivism is a continental divide that
slopes steeply down to realism on one side and to fideism on the
other; walking the dividing line makes extreme demands on interpretivists' intellectual equilibrium. On the one hand, interpretivists
tend to fall into realism, in any one of several related ways. They
may assume or suggest that our "shared" values are as they should
be, or at least are not subject to further analysis.' 12 Similarly, they
may maintain or imply that considered opinions about moral matters, the perspective of "reflective equilibrium," is objectively superior to other perspectives, 12 6 or that matters as to which some (or
27
most, or all) members of a community agree are morally binding.'
In all of these ways, they risk implicitly elevating an "is"to an
"ought," importing a judgment that a particular state of affairs not
Hume's
only is the case, but also is good. In so doing, they invite
129
polite puzzlement 2 and Leff's insistent "Sez who?"'
Interpretivists may answer by asserting that "we say," where
''we" are those who share a set of common convictions about values.
Interpretivism, then, becomes a process of revealing and systematizing common moral convictions, a process of organizing the data
123. In defining interpretivism in terms of its effort to transcend the realist-skeptic
debate, I am following Moore. See Moore, supra note 78, at 873 n.5, 890-92. For a
detailed taxonomy of interpretivism, see id. at 873, 891-92.
124. Michael Moore's criticism is more ambitious. See Moore, supra note 78.
125. Michael Walzer seems to take the latter view. See WALZER, supra note 78. The
former is the approach of the pragmatists and their progeny. See Margaret J. Radin,
Cruel Punishment and Respectfor Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143,

1176 n. 109 (1980) (expressing hope that objective ethics can be interpreted as "deep or
coherent moral consensus"); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 267-72 (1973) (noting the tendency to take the American way of life as a
normative concept, begging the question of how this is known); Ellmann, supra note 13,
at 129 (arguing that even if general agreement on moral matters were achieved,
"[w]hether what most people accept as moral is actually 'right' would [also] have to be
decided").
126. See Leff, supra note 77, at 1238-39 (noting that this is the position of the Rawlsians and demonstrating that it involves an implicit, and ungrounded, preference for

reasoned discourse).
127. This is Dworkin's approach. See DWORKIN, supra note 84; infra text accompanying

notes 372-380.
128. See supra Subpart II.A.I for a discussion of Hume's is-ought question.
129. See Leff, supra note 77, at 1230.
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of our shared moral experience into a more coherent whole. But if
interpretivists take this tack, they run a dual risk. The first risk is
that of leaving the path of ethics for a special branch of cultural anthropology, a purely descriptive exercise that recounts the shared
views of a particular community without claiming any normative
force for those views. On the other hand, if they stay on the path of
interpretivist ethics and try to give those views any normative
weight, they run the risk of falling into the fideist form of skepticism. 1 30 By focusing on moral common ground, they tacitly admit
that their moral system binds only those who find themselves in
agreement with it, and binds them only on the basis of their individual assent. This is a viable alternative for interpretivists, as it is for
others, but it returns them to the problem with which we began. If
they abandon an objective basis for morality by tacitly admitting that
their conclusions rest only on their own individual commitments to
them, then on what grounds can they claim that those who disagree
are morally bound?
B.

From Metaethics to Role Morality

Now we are in a better position to see why the problem of public norms implicit in Luban and Simon's new role morality requires
a brief excursion into metaethics. They need a common denomina130. A variation of this is James Fishkin's invitation to occupy a metaethical middle
ground that makes more modest demands of objectivity than either realists, on the one
hand, or skeptics, on the other. See FISHKIN, supra note 78, at 12-13, 32-35, 129-39. His
requirement of minimal objectivity is that ethical questions be considered "in a reasonable manner from what we regard as the appropriate perspective'"-liberalism's impartiality toward claims and interests. Id. at 130, 140. But he gives us no reason for adopting
that perspective or for thinking it more reasonable than others, except that it takes account of the skeptical critique of realism. He also claims that it delivers us from skepticism itself, but it is hard to see how it does so except through something like a fideist
affirmation of the foundations of liberalism. See George C. Freeman, III, Liberalism and
the Objectivity of Ethics, 47 LA. L. REV. 1235, 1251-52 (1987) (reviewing FISHKIN, supra)
(noting Fishkin's failure to account for why his manner is reasonable and how his perspective is appropriate). Bernard Williams's account of objectivity in ethics also depends on a practical convergence of what people actually desire and what they live as the
good life, on a "shared way of life." See WILLIAMS, supra note 81, at 152-55, 171; see also
GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 15-16 (suggesting that disagreements between conflicting
moral systems can and should be reconciled by reasoning from agreed cases and shared
principles under the constraint of consistency); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1548 (1988) ("[Rlepublican theories tend to be united by
four central commitments, and in any event it is in these commitments that the contemporary
appeal of republican thought can be located." (emphasis added)); Cornell, supra note
103, at 379-80 (arguing that commitment to a regulative ideal of dialogism and citizenship, though "without the promise or security of rational guaranty," is not to be confused with "the denial of the cognitive status of value judgments").

BEYOND THE NEw ROLE MORALTY8

1992]

889

tor of public norms to resolve conflicts between individual conscience and the two levels of public limits on lawyerly conduct that
their system incorporates. Of the three metaethical positions we
have seen, only two, realism and interpretivism, hold out the promise of such norms. Yet it is not clear that either realism or interpretivism can deliver on that promise, in view of the problems I have
identified in this Part.
It bears repeating that to raise these problems is not to disprove the existence of binding public norms. Nor would it be appropriate to place on Luban and Simon the burden of proving that
these problems are remediable. For the most part, they do not directly address these problems in their writings on the new role morality, and that is hardly a fatal omission. They instead tend to
assume the existence of a fundamental set of public norms and to
erect their system on that foundation.' 3 ' Without further examining the soundness of the foundation, we can question whether leaving fundamental problems unresolved gives rise to problems
elsewhere in their conceptual edifice, problems that could be
avoided by starting from a position of metaethical skepticism. We
will try to find answers to that question in the next Part, where we
examine Luban and Simon's system in more detail.
III.

A.

OBJECTIVE OBLIGATION AND THE NEW ROLE MORALITY

The Law Writ Large.- Simon's Ethical Discretion Model

Simon claims not only that the spirit of the law is intelligible to
lawyers as well as to judges and other public officials, but also that
Thus, we reach the
lawyers should take that spirit as their guide.'
critical turn Hume described: Given, for the sake of argument,' 3 3
that the law has an intelligible spirit that we could take as our guide,
ought we to follow that guide, and if so, why? How do we get from
the "is" of the law's spirit to the "ought" of our obedience to it?
Simon offers the most direct possible link between the fact of
the law's spirit and the imperative force of that spirit over our conduct as lawyers: "The discretionary approach is grounded in the
lawyer's professional commitments to legal values."' 4
We thus move from the "is" of the law's existence not to the
131.
132.
133.
found
134.

See infra Part III.
See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1090-1119.
But cf. Singer, supra note 47, at 28 (noting "the weakness of the theory that law is
and not made").
Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1113.
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"ought" of its morally binding force, but to another "is," the fact
that the lawyer is committed to the values in law. If lawyers in fact
are committed to legal values ab initio, then what the spirit of the law
whispers is not a command, but a reminder. It does not say, "Follow me, because you ought to commit yourself to me," but rather,
"Remember: You have committed yourself to legal values."' 35 This
neatly avoids the question of how the law binds us to itself; it turns
out that we have already bound ourselves. Simon simply reminds us
of our self-forged fetters.' 3 6
It is conceivable, however, that a lawyer will not have forged
such fetters 3 7 or, having forged them, will wish to sever them, at
least in some cases. Moreover, at least sometimes lawyers will have
bound themselves to norms outside the law, irrespective of whether
those norms are somehow latent in the law. For the Abolitionists,
lawyers as well as laity, slavery was wrong and to be resisted irrespective of what the Constitution said or, by force of arms, could be
made to say.' 38 For Dr. King, segregation was unacceptable
whether or not the overruling of the "separate but equal" doctrine
135. Michael Walzer generalizes this point in OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE,
WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP (1970): "The paradigm form of consent theory is simply, I have
committed myself (consented): I am committed (obligated)." Id. at x.
136. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1091 (explaining that the public
dimension of a lawyer's discretion is "grounded in the lawyer's age-old claim to be an
'officer of the court.' ").
137. Compare Fried, supra note 2, at 1065-66 (arguing that grounding a lawyer's obligation to obey professional norms on the lawyer's entry into the profession merely pushes
the good person as a good lawyer issue back a step) and Benjamin Freedman, What Really
Makes Professional Morality Different: Response to Martin, 91 ETHICS 626 (1981) (commenting on Mike W. Martin, Rights and the Meta-Ethics of ProfessionalMorality, 91 ETHICS 619
(1981), and arguing the same point as to doctors) with Ellmann, supra note 13, at 137,
152-53 (looking to the oath of admission to practice as a possible source of obligation to
obey professional rules) and Stier, supra note 2, at 591-92 (stronger statement of the
same position).
138. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 150-54 (1975). The position of the dominant wing of the Abolitionist movement, the Garrisonians, as to the legality of slavery is
eminently clear from the title of the first book in a trilogy on the issue by their leading
advocate. See WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTTTrrION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (1844).
To be sure, they countenanced, and even encouraged, the work of lawyers on behalf of
individual slaves within what they considered an immoral legal system. See COVER, supra,
at 159. As to the system itself, however, their prescription was not meliorist. They advocated "disobedience, abstention from voting or office holding, and disunion." Id. at
151. Against this position, within the Abolitionist movement, were a "handful of relatively unimportant antislavery thinkers" whose "position that slavery, itself, was unconstitutional was so extreme as to appear trivial." Id. at 156. Robin West, in discussing
the political and economic nature of the Constitution, summarizes the point as follows:
[T]he Constitution is of negative value for those persons whose interests are at
odds with the mandates of constitutionalism. Again, to take only the most obvious example, the Constitution was not only of no objective value but was posi-
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was a logical or inevitable or legally appropriate evolution of the
equal protection clause.13 9 And although those who sat-in at lunch
counters may have recognized a moral duty to take their lawful punishment when disagreeing with a law, those who ran Underground
40
Railroads did not.'
Simon is well aware that, for reasons such as these, his commitment-to-law approach is not a complete answer to the question of
why lawyers should be guided by the spirit of the law:
The discretionary approach does not deny that some issues
are best understood as involving conflicts between legal
and nonlegal moral commitments. In fact, the distinction
between legal and nonlegal commitments has some importance in delimiting the sphere of the discretionary
approach, since the approach does not address decisionmaking involving nonlegal commitments. There are currently no generally accepted guidelines for making such
14 1
distinctions, and I am not prepared to offer any here.
What Simon is prepared to offer, however, is the suggestion that
one can make these distinctions for oneself, on the basis of one's
answer to fundamental jurisprudential questions. Moreover, he
strongly implies that this exercise will leave only a small residuum of
genuinely moral questions.' 4 2 I think he is wrong on both scores.
To see why, we must look first at how Simon proposes to distinguish
between legal and moral questions, and then at whether the distinction he offers really does reduce the scope of necessary moral
decisionmaking.
According to Simon, if you are a "natural law lawyer" of the
Lon Fuller school, the relationship between moral and legal matters
is fairly straightforward.' 4 3 You will understand the law itself to intively lethal to slaves, escaped slaves, and freed slaves up to the passage of the
Civil War Amendments.
West, supra note 81, at 1481; see also Anthony D'Amato & Edward J. Eberle, Three Models
of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 761, 795-98 (1983) (discussing a lawyer's violation of
the Fugitive Slave laws as justified by moral rather than legal considerations).
139. But cf. Luban, Difference Made Legal, supra note 71, at 2197-99, 2206 (discussing
the tension between Dr. King's "higher law" and antinomian arguments against
segregation).
140. These are, of course, tendentious examples. I am trying to show that some of
our shared, and most revered, cultural heros have taken a more open attitude toward the
law than Simon, at least at the margins. In appealing to these shared values, I am not
lapsing into interpretivism, as will become clear when I turn explicitly to my methodology in Part IV.
141. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1114.
142. See id. at 1090-1119.
143. See id. at 1115.
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corporate moral values. To qualify as a law, a pronouncement must
not only have an impeccable official pedigree; it must also meet certain threshold requirements of substantive moral content. If it does
not cross that threshold, then it simply is not a law, and you show
respect for law writ larger not by honoring the pronouncement, but
44
by disavowing it.'
If, on the other hand, you are a positivist who "regards the decisions of authoritative institutions as conclusive" of the status of official pronouncements as law, the relationship between law and
morality is more complex.' 4 5 You must then decide, according to
Simon, "the scope of [your] own authority within the scheme of
legal institutions."'' 46 In particular, you must determine whether
within the law your lawyerly role confers "nullifying powers of the
sort commonly imputed to the roles of prosecutor, jury, and judge,
and-less commonly-private citizen (to the extent that civil disobedience is justified in terms of, rather than in opposition to, legal
values)."'' 47 Simon offers several examples to show that, at least
sometimes, the law itself does--or should-give lawyers such nulli48
fying authority.'
Even if we agree with Simon here, we have not gotten very far.
For the positivists among us, there remains the question of what to
do when legal nullification does not cover the case in which we feel
morally compelled to dissent. What if the law's position is insistence on obedience? Simon himself admits that the option of nullification is less commonly afforded private citizens than judges, jurors,
and prosecutors, 4 9 and he offers no evidence that the law is any
more generous in this regard when the private citizen is a lawyer,
though he seems to think that it should be.' 50 And even for those
who are "natural law lawyers," the notion that the law has an inherent moral dimension only says why we should dishonor "failed"
laws. It does not show why we should be committed to laws that
pass the minimum content test but still strike us as more or less ill144. Id. One need not, of course, be a natural law lawyer of the Lon Fuller School to
invoke moral principles as a check on the law. Robin West, for example, argues that
objective ethics can be an effective check on arbitrary power. See West, supra note 81, at
1483-87.
145. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1116.
146. Id.
147. Id. (footnote omitted).
148. See id. at 1116-18.
149. See id. at 1116; see also id. at 1117 n.76 (noting that the criminal defense ofjustification is limited to violations of statutes that do not specifically exclude the justification
proffered).
150. See id. at 1116.
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considered or awful.' 5 '

In addition to arguing that the number of instances in which the
spirit of the law and the dictates of morality conflict is small, Simon
makes the stronger claim that the proper aim of the individual lawyer and the aim of the law itself actually converge in a set of common norms, justice and legality. As Simon puts it, "the
discretionary approach requires that the lawyer make her best effort
to achieve the most [legally] appropriate resolution in each case.""5 2
To see why this convergence is to occur, we must examine what Simon means by the norms of justice and legality. This, in turn, will
take us back to our original question: How do these public norms
become binding on the individual?
In a subsection entitled "What Justice?" Simon anticipates the
charge that his use of terms like "justice," "merits," "fair," and "appropriate" begs a critical question-whether these normative terms
have any objectively ascertainable content and are not, as some
would object, simply "subjective and arbitrary."'
Simon begins by
pointing out that this skeptical view is at odds with "the most basic
premises of the understanding of the legal system held by most lawyers," according to which "our legal system depends on the possibility of grounded judgments about legality andjustice."' 5 4 But this
can only be the prologue to the answer, not the answer itself. To
say that skepticism is at odds with an assumption of the prevailing
view is hardly to show that that assumption is sustainable and that
skepticism is, accordingly, wrong. To think otherwise is to beg the
question.
In what, then, does the prevailing view ground judgments
about legality and justice? Here we are invited to take the interpretive turn:
In the dominant understanding, judgments about legality and justice are grounded in the norms and practices
of the surrounding legal culture. These norms and practices are objective and systematic in the sense that they
have observable regularity and are mutually meaningful to
151. See, e.g., id. at 1140-43 (objecting to the present rules that aggressively protect
lawyer-client confidentiality); id. at 1118 (objecting to the Model Rules' categorical prohibition of lawyers introducing what they know to be perjured testimony into evidence).
152. Id. at 1096. The word "legally" is critical here, and is no doubt what Simon has
in mind. In the quoted sentence he is explicitly comparing the discretionary approach to
two other approaches, both of which permit or require the lawyer to act in a way that
admittedly "frustrates the most legally appropriate resolution of the matter." Id.
153. Id. at 1119-20.
154. Id. at 1120.
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those who refer to them and engage in them.

55

This may be true, but there is still a critical gap, something very like
Hume's gap between the "is" and the "ought."' 5 6 Even if the law is
clear and "objective" in its pronouncements, even if others are in
general-perhaps unanimous-accord that those pronouncements
advance a constellation of values accepted as "just" in "the surrounding legal culture," there still remains a fundamental question:
whether you as an individual should-morally should-adopt those
values, so ordered, as your own. Both the law and "correct folk
spirit" may tell you that Jews should live in ghettos, or that Blacks
should sit in the backs of busses, or that a woman's place is in the
home. It still makes sense to ask, "Is it right?" or "Is it consistent
with the values to which I am fundamentally committed?"' 5 7
Because these fundamental questions remain, moral issues cannot be merely a residuum for you as a lawyer. Before you can confine your moral judgment to cases in which the law departs from the
prevailing notion of justice, as Simon suggests, you must first answer in the affirmative an anterior question, whether you are morally
committed to that notion ofjustice. Simon implies either that there
is no such question, or that you must answer it in the affirmative. I
maintain that you must answer it, even if by default, and that an
affirmative answer is not the only alternative. You can, of course,
simply assume that you are to be committed to the law where it promotes the prevailing conception ofjustice, and leave to one side the
harder cases in which law departs from that kind of justice. But if
you do, you will not have avoided the anterior question; you will
merely have answered it in a particular way, and in a way that is not
the only way.
I shall turn shortly to an obvious retort, namely, that "right folk
spirit," rightly understood, never called for any such atrocities as
anti-Semitism or racism or sexism. First, though, I want to clarify
155. Id.
156. See HUME, supra note 86, at 469 (pointing out the need to explain the "inconceivable" relation between the propositions of is and ought).
157. As these alternative formulations of the question imply, fidelity to the prevailing
spirit of the law can be challenged from a realist as well as from a skeptical perspective.
The realist would ask the former question in the text; the skeptic, the latter. See Anthony
D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 202, 214-16 (1981) (applying Lon Fuller's natural law approach to fugitive slave laws). As we have seen, however, the realist challenge is the less fundamental of the two. It would be that the law
has itself departed from binding public norms. In contrast, the skeptic challenges the
very existence of such norms, and hence the possibility of grounding any act of coercion
in them.
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with two examples the distinction between Simon's collectively defined justice and an individual's moral position. In these examples
the position of right folk spirit is both less objectionable and more
readily identifiable, and a morally grounded departure from it is
easy to demonstrate. The first example is one of Simon's own, and a
favorite jurisprudential jawbreaker, the case of Riggs v. Palmer.'5 8
The issue was whether a murderer could be legally barred from inheriting from his victim in the face of an intestacy statute that provided no specific preclusion.' 5 9 The dissent read the statute
literally, to uphold the ill-gotten inheritance; 60 the majority imported from elsewhere in the law an implicit limit on profiting from
one's own wrong, at least in so unseemly a fashion.' 6 ' Simon's view,
and the orthodox rule-of-law position, is that the majority approach
was not only wise, but legally principled and objectively correct as a
matter of law. Indeed, he holds the Riggs case up as a paradigm of
62
discretionary, flexible, spirit-of-the-law decisionmaking.,
No doubt a strong case can be made for the view that the Riggs
case was properly decided according to law, and, in addition, for the
wisdom and justice of a legal system under which the wealthy pass
63
their property on to whomever they like, for as long as they like.'
The point to note is that, though one might concede that this sort of
thing is both "just" and "legal" in the sense of being "grounded in
the norms and practices of the surrounding legal culture,"' 64 you or
I might still quite plausibly maintain that it is wrong. By "wrong"
we might have reference to Christian charity or Nietzschean
Ubermenschlichheit, to Marxist dialectic or an ascetic (perhaps even
aesthetic) revulsion at the antics of the idle rich.
So, when a close friend asked me how I could have spent a significant part of my life helping the phenomenally wealthy reduce
their federal transfer tax liability, I knew he was talking about justice, but by a quite different standard from that which Simon in158. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). Cardozo, Dworkin, and Hart and Sacks have all had a
go at it. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1121 n.85.
159. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
160. See id.at 191-92.
161. See id.at 189.
162. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1121-22.
163. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 693-94 (1986) (arguing for the abolition of the traditional rule against perpetuities as an unnecessary restraint on the power of alienation)
with LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955) and ADAM J. HIRSCH &
WILLIAM K.S. WANG, A QUALITATIVE THEORY OF THE DEAD HAND (forthcoming) (defend-

ing the rule against perpetuities on efficiency and other policy grounds).
164. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1120.
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vokes. 1 65 Whether or not I agreed with his indictment, I could
hardly have dismissed it to his satisfaction on the grounds that I was
committed to values firmly ensconced in the law, the "dominant understanding" of justice, or both.
Disagreement with the spirit of the law need not be so thorough-going, however, as we can see by looking at another wealth
transfer case, this time hypothetical. Alan Goldman presents a case
in which a lawyer is asked to draft a will for a wealthy widow who
66
wants to disinherit her son for marrying outside the family's faith. 1
He uses this example to contrast the responses of various systems of
lawyers' ethics, the old role morality and three alternatives.
The answer of the old role morality is easy-you need have no
moral qualms about drafting the widow's will the way she wants it.
Whether her manipulativeness is misplaced or even malevolent is of
no concern to you. According to Goldman's first alternative to the
old role morality, "the lawyer could be required to advance his client's cause only through means compatible with settlement of the
conflict on the legal merits."'167 On a sufficiently broad reading of
"legal merits," this alternative would cover Simon's discretionary
model. On first face, this approach would seem to agree with the
old role morality in this case; the widow is surely within her legal
rights in disinheriting whomever she likes-or dislikes. 168 Simon
might argue, under an analysis like that of the majority in Riggs, that
the lawyer should frame the issue more broadly, and should look,
for example, to the law's interest in family stability and harmony.
165. In fairness to Simon, I must concede that under his own "relative merit" idea, see
infra text accompanying notes 173-175, my prior life might also come in for censure, but
it would be censure of a different sort. Under the relative merits analysis, I could arguably have allocated my time to clients whose needs for legal counsel were identifiably
more pressing in terms internal to the law itself. My friend's point was more radicaleven if all other needs for legal assistance had been met, I would have been wrong to
lend my assistance to these morally questionable transactions.
166. See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 104. Like the Riggs case, this example, with slight
permutations, is a perennial favorite. See, e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 3 (disinheriting
husband and children so as to give all of the estate to the Christian Anti-Communist
Crusade); Pepper, supra note 2, at 614 (disinheriting children should they marry outside
the faith); Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 7, 10 (disinheriting children who object to
Vietnam War); Schneyer, supra note 33, at 1562-63 (disinheriting son for resisting the
draft); see also Stier, supra note 2, at 564 (discussing Schneyer's example).
167. GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 137.

168. Goldman's "legal merits" alternative will generally produce a different result
from the old role morality only when the latter would involve procedural maneuvering
to achieve a substantive result inconsistent with the letter of the positive law by, for
example, imposing unnecessary costs or delays on opponents. Id. at 137-38. Because,
as we have seen, Simon defines legal merits more broadly, his approach will part ways
with the old role morality more often.
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But even if there were no such other constraints available within the
law, there might be moral reasons for a conscientious lawyer to reject the case.
For one thing, the lawyer might, like my friend, think that the
laws permitting freedom of testation are immoral.' 69 Still in disagreement with the legally permissible outcome, but on a much narrower front, the lawyer might think that, even if freedom of testation
is generally good, this particular exercise is bad' 70 on account of the
kind of control the mother is trying to exercise or the likely bad
7
effects it will have on either the child or the family as a whole.' '
The conscientious lawyer with either conviction would feel disinclined to write the will even if nothing in the spirit or letter of the
law forbade it.
Under a corollary of Simon's discretionary approach, however,
Simon could respond that, on these facts, the lawyer considering the
case would never reach this conflict between the spirit of the law, or
the legal merits broadly defined, and individual moral convictions.
Under the central premise of Simon's discretionary approach, lawyers pursue justice, as embodied in the spirit of the law, in their
exercise of discretion. 172 So far, I have focused on only one aspect
of that discretion, deciding whether the outcome the client seeks is
consistent with the legal merits of the matter. Simon has, however,
identified another, distributional, aspect of discretion, "an assessment of the relative merits of the client's goals and claims and
claims of others whom the lawyer might serve."' 7 ' The first aspect
of discretion acknowledges the fact that some claims are meritorious
169. This approach corresponds, in principle at least, to Goldman's second alternative to full advocacy, under which the lawyer is required "to aid his clients in achieving
all and only that to which they have moral rights." Id. at 138. In applying that principle
to this case, however, Goldman reaches a different result because he assumes that the
widow has a moral as well as legal right to dispose of her property as she wishes. See id.
at 148.
170. This approach corresponds to Goldman's third alternative to full advocacy,
under which the lawyer should "aid clients only in doing what is moral to do." Id. at
138. As applied in this example, the difference between Goldman's second and third
approaches seems analogous to the distinction in moral philosophy between rule and act
consequentialism. Under the second, or rule consequentialist alternative, the lawyer
drafts the will because, in the usual situation, free testation produces the best result;
under the third, or act consequentialist alternative, the lawyer declines to draft the will,
because in this particular case disinheritance is a bad result.
171. See Shaffer, supra note 19, at 965-68 (arguing for the representation of organic
groups like families in addition to, and sometimes as more fundamental than, their individual constituents).
172. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1091.
173. Id.
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in an absolute sense, as measured directly against the standard of
the law itself; the second aspect recognizes that, even among legally
meritorious claims, some are more worthy of advancement than
others. With the second aspect as with the first, the assessment of
merit can be made on the basis of standards internal to the law. The
spirit of the law offers us guidance, according to Simon, not only as
to which position on a particular issue should prevail if pressed, but
more important, more worthy of
which kinds of issues are relatively
74
resolution by legal process.
Applying this second aspect of the "pursue justice" model to
the case of Goldman's widow, Simon might argue that this simply is
not a case worthy of a lawyer's attention. A lawyer should decline to
help Goldman's widow not because intra-family wealth transfers are
inherently evil, or because this one is particularly ill-motivated, but
because there is a more pressing need for legal talent elsewhere. In
response, perhaps we could, with a bit of tugging and hauling,
squeeze Goldman's widow past the criteria Simon identifies in the
75
law itself for assessing the proper distribution of legal services;'
perhaps we could not. If we could, the moralist's objection remains:
it is wrong to lend assistance to such morally questionable transactions. But if we could not meet Simon's criteria of relative merit, we
are simply back to our original question: even if criteria internal to
the legal system indicate that a particular claim is more or less worthy of a lawyer's scarce time, why should we as individuals feel
bound by that? In this way the relative merits aspect of Simon's
''pursue justice" model raises the same issue as the internal merits
analysis: why should an individual lawyer be committed to a policy
even if it is implicit in the law?
The distinction that arises in this example between Simon's
spirit of the law and possible individual moral positions is just one
instance of a larger problem in Simon's approach. That problem is
a critical ambiguity in the concept of legitimacy. Simon argues that
174. See id. at 1092-93.
175. The primary factors are, according to Simon, "the extent to which the claims and
goals are grounded in the law, the importance of the interests involved, and the extent
to which the representation would contribute to the equalization of access to the legal
system." Id. at 1093. We can improve the odds for Goldman's widow under the last of
these criteria by hypothetically impoverishing her. If you believe in the declining marginal utility of money, this should also help us under the second of Simon's criteria. And
if the second is concerned more with the societal importance of the right in question
than with its significance in the particular case, Goldman's widow has the advantage of
raising a property right, a right protected in two places in the Bill of Rights. That, in
turn, should leave no doubt under the first criterion: both property rights generally, and
the right of free testation in particular, are well grounded in law.
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those who disagree with authoritative judgments about legality "are
often willing to accept a particular decision as legitimate, even when
they regard it as mistaken, in part because they recognize it as a
good faith attempt to apply the norms and practices of the culture."' 7 6 In the parlance of political science, legitimacy is a distinctly amphibious concept; it does some of its work in the
descriptive realm and some in the normative. In the former realm,
where it now sees the most action, it means that which is accepted as
authoritative. 17 7 It is in this realm, for example, where it can be accurately said that power tends to legitimate itself. Those who have
political power, however they came to have it, tend over time to become accepted as the legitimate authorities, both by their subjects
and by the corresponding heads of foreign regimes. 178 As E.S. Morgan put it, "If you can steal an empire you are not a thief, but an
emperor."' 1 79 It is no objection to this notion of legitimacy that the
acceptance sometimes comes after the fairly aggressive suppression
of opposition.
In the normative realm, "legitimate" denotes what ought to be
accepted as authoritative, what is morally acceptable, not just actually accepted.' 8 0 To be sure, one can elide the two realms with the
premise that what the culture accepts is itself the defining characteristic of what is normatively acceptable. Alternatively, one logically
could be committed, as a matter of personal moral choice, to the
values in law and public notions ofjustice. But this would just be a
special case of moral commitment generally, and so stated it gives
no reason for that commitment as opposed to some other set of values. One need not elevate the "is" to the status of the "ought,"
either by general definition or by personal conviction. You, as a
member of the political order, can always ask whether what is accepted as legitimate by the prevailing culture ought to be so accepted, under standards either external or internal to yourself.''
176. Id. at 1120.
177. See Felix E. Oppenheim, The Language of PoliticalInquiry: The Problems of Clarification, in 1 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICAL SCIENCE, SCOPE AND THEORY 283,

320-23 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).
178. See W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in MYRES S. McDOUGAL &
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAw ESSAYS 9 (1981).
179. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 10 (1975).

180. Oppenheim, supra note 177, at 322.
181. This understanding of legitimacy also answers Stick's argument that what is objectively legal may not be legitimate. This is true because the standards of objectivity in
law are set by lawyers and judges, whereas "the group who sets the standards for political legitimacy generally" are "the set of citizens with some political power." John Stick,
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This point is important, for in both his exposition of the discretionary model of lawyering and in his other writings, Simon is
2
clearly not a defender of the legal, economic, or social status quo.'1
The question, then, is how Simon's commitment to reform can be
reconciled with his insistence on the lawyer's commitment to legal
values. One way would be to object that I view the "norms and
practices of the surrounding legal culture" too narrowly, or too statically-too narrowly, in that the prevailing culture admits of more
demanding views of justice; and too statically, in that the prevailing
culture can be expected to mature, to evolve toward ideals which
exist in it now only in embryonic form. Ghettos, Jim Crow, and the
Stepford wife may have had the full support of law, but not of "right
folk spirit," rightly understood.
But the rub, of course, lies in giving content to "rightly understood." The broader and more dynamic one's definition of the prevailing culture, the more difficult it is to make predictable
extrapolations from it, the kind of predictable extrapolations that
are necessary if legality and justice are to have the objective, ascertainable contents Simon requires. At the margin, inclusiveness in
the definition of legal culture becomes dangerously circular; in
some sense, all future legal culture predictably will be built from the
materials of present legal culture. The appropriate historical image,
however, would not be the incremental construction of the Gothic
cathedrals for the greater glory of God, but the clandestine dismantling of the pyramids for incorporation in more mundane projects
elsewhere. Of course the subverters of the ancien regime will often
invoke some of the principles or institutions of that regime to undermine it now and to demolish it later. The English Puritans appealed to the same Bible for the justice of their regicide as the
House of Stuart did for the divine right of kings. 18 ' The French
Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 371 (1986). But it still leaves you to
wonder how the normative decisions of the latter group are binding upon you as an
individual.
182. Any doubts on that score can be resolved by reading William H. Simon, Visions of
Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984), in which he favors a form of law
practice that would move lawyers, clients, and society at large toward the Critical Legal
Studies movement's desideratum, "nonhierarchical community."
183. Some of the Puritans urged James to commission the translation that now bears
his name. See 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BIBLE 164 (1963). Others continued to
prefer the English translation made in Geneva under Calvin's auspices. See id. at 361,
454; see also ROLAND H. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 238-42

(1952) (The French Calvinists relied on covenantal theology for resistance to repressive
Catholic monarchs; the Jesuits made parallel appeals against heretical kings when the
Protestants were in power.).
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Revolution began, if such an upheaval can be said to have a clear
beginning, with dissidents' insistence8 on
a meeting of that moribund
4
medieval relic, the Estates General.1
Gramsci provides an insightful account of how this can be understood not merely as crass political posturing, but as a conscientious appeal by both conservatives and radicals to the roots of the
dominant culture. 8 5 Every ruling class, according to this theory,
must present itself as a universal class, as asserting not only its own
interests, but also those of the commonweal. In so doing, the dominant class gains wide legitimacy (of the descriptive sort), but at the
cost of espousing principles not entirely consistent with their particular interests. Radical critics insist that these espoused principles be
given their fully universal reading.18 6 In so doing they set in motion
what Gramsci called
"a process of differentiation and change in the relative
weight that the elements of the old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate [in
my examples, the individual interpretation of the Bible and
the political role of the Third Estate] ...is now taken to be

primary and becomes t8the
nucleus of a new ideological and
7
theoretical complex."'

To acknowledge the plausibility of this explanation is not to
deny that a particular historical course may be legal or just according to prevailing standards. Quite the contrary; it is to suggest that
interpreting the prevailing culture too dynamically or too inclusively
makes it virtually impossible to show that any particular course of
evolution is any more consistent with prevailing norms than numerous other, mutually inconsistent and exclusive, alternatives. 188 It
184. As Simon points out, even the eventual execution of the king was explained in
terms of the legal practices of the ancien r6gime. See Simon, supra note 182, at 496.
185. WALZER, supra note 78, at 41-42 (discussing SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 195 (Quinton Hoare & Geoffrey N. Smith eds. & trans.,
1971)).
186. Id. at 40-41.
187. Id. at 42 (quoting SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMsci, supra note 185, at 195). Simon himself is quite aware of, and even sympathetic with,
this process. See Simon, supra note 182, at 496-501.
188. As Simon notes, in the civil rights movement, "both the civil rights activists and
their antagonists understood their efforts as vindicating an established order." Simon,
supra note 182, at 500. Their appeal, accordingly, had to be to what they thought that
order should become or remain, not a question that could be answered by looking to
what it had been, and not a question that could be answered without a choice of deep
personal commitments. See Posner, supra note 47, at 887 (" '[A] concern for history and
context; ... an appreciation of the complexity of life'[-g]ive me these leeways and I will
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may be asking too much that plotting one's course according to the
constellation of legal values be as precise a science as astronomy.
But one can fairly complain of being told to make do with the ambiguities of astrology. It is one thing to be denied a sextant and told
that we are hopelessly adrift; it is another to be offered a horoscope,
with the suggestion that it will help.
Suppose, however, that you were to discover that the values you
espouse, and in terms of which you set your fundamental moral
commitments, are also embodied to a greater or lesser extent in the
law. This latter factor nevertheless may well be distinctly
subordinate to your commitment to the values on other grounds.
Suppose the law further evolves in the direction of your values.
Even if it could be said that the moral positions I now espouse will
someday be more fully realized in the law or more widely understood as the proper interpretation of the dominant culture, the fact
remains that I do not now espouse them for that reason. This is
even clearer if you imagine the law evolving in another direction,
away from those values. Quite plausibly, you may hold them no less
dearly. Indeed, you may hold them more dearly, as their survival will
depend all the more on your individual efforts, and the efforts of
other dissenters. So, a century before the Bastille, when Louis XIV
9 the Huguenots left
decreed "un roi, une loi, unefoi," Is
France to join,
or create, cultures more to their liking;19 0 so, despairing of the
Stuarts and their claims of royal prerogative and divine right, the
more adventuresome Puritans left Old England to build a New.' 9 '
And so the Abolitionists redoubled, rather than slackened, their efforts after Dred Scott,' 9 2 even as their progeny formed the
NAACP,' 93 in 1909, in the wake of Plessy v. Ferguson.'9 4
move the world; there is no decision that cannot be rationalized with the aid of such
open-ended concepts ...." (citation omitted)).
189. RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS, 1559-1689, at 160 (1970).
190. G.A. ROTHROCK, THE HUGUENOTS: A BIOGRAPHY OF A MINORrrY 175 (1979).
191. For a general history of the Puritan Revolution, see DUNN, supra note 189, at 13953. When the Stuarts returned from their travels, after the dismantling of the Cromwellian regime, and the prevailing culture in Old England took a less laudatory view of
regicide, several of the judges who had signed Charles I's death warrant took refuge in
New England. See 2 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 184-85 (1964); MARY JEANNE ANDERSON JONES, CONGREGATIONAL COMMONWEALTH
167-68 (1968). Their new compatriots welcomed them, protected them from the new
state of law and justice at home, and named the New Haven, Connecticut thoroughfares
Dixwell and Whalley in their honor.
192. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
193. COVER, supra note 138, at 159-62 (discussing the relations of abolitionists with
lawyers representing fugitive slaves).

194. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Dworkin's account of civil disobedience, on which Simon draws
for his notion of commitment to law,1 95 seriously underemphasizes
this distinction between moral and legal reasons for espousing or
resisting aspects of the positive law. Dworkin plausibly maintains
that those who objected to the Vietnam draft, like theJehovah's Witnesses who in earlier wars objected to mandatory pledges of allegiance by school children, 96 could have based their resistance on
good-faith and legally colorable beliefs that the laws in question
were unconstitutional, even after the United State Supreme Court
had declared otherwise.' 9 7 As Dworkin notes, however,
[t]his description may fit some of those who disobey the
draft laws out of conscience, but it does not fit most of
them. Most of the dissenters are not lawyers or political
philosophers; they believe that the laws on the books are
immoral, and inconsistent with their country's legal ideals,
but they have not considered the question of whether they
may be invalid as well.' 9 8
Dworkin attributes this divergence between the dissidents' subjective motives for disobeying the law and the available argument
against the law's validity to their lack of legal sophistication.' 9 9 This
divergence is, however, suggestive of something more dramatic.
We can safely surmise that many, perhaps most, of the dissenters
would not have been more respectful of the draft law had they been
convinced that it was valid, or even that it was consistent with their
country's legal ideals; it would have been enough for them that, by
their lights, it was wrong.
This coincidence of moral with legal grounds for disobedience
may be an important consideration for the law's enforcers. As
Dworkin suggests, they may well feel compelled to deal more leniently with violators if the law violated is of questionable validity and
if the violators invoke that questionable validity as their motive.
The legal system in general is less likely to be undermined, and may
in fact be strengthened, by the challenge of such violations. 20 0 But
to establish that those who adopt the values embodied in law have
195. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1116 n.73.
196. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 213 (1977); see West Va. State Bd.

of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
197. DWORKIN, supra note 196, at 214-15.
198. Id. at 215.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 206-22; see also KENT

83 (1987).

GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY
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good legal reasons, reasons internal to the law they serve, to deal
leniently with those who depart from the law in the name of values
the law recognizes is not to establish that the law is justified in coercing those who reject the law's ordering of values. Nor does it
establish that citizens are morally bound to obey a law they think
morally wrong. Establishing that will require an excursion into ordinary morality, an excursion Simon declines to make.2 ° '
If I am right, I have only shown that representation of clients
within the spirit rather than the letter of the law will not alleviate
ethical problems to the extent Simon believes. It would still be possible to ask whether the spirit of the law is to be followed in every
case and to ask in particular cases the more pointed question of
whether a lawyer should violate the moral rights of third parties in
advancing a client's claims within the spirit of the law. But to show
that obeying the spirit of the law does not necessarily remove moral
difficulties is not to show that it cannot remove such difficulties.
Perhaps ordinary morality itself supports Simon's discretionary
model of lawyering.
All I have done, then, is to press Simon back to ordinary morality. To answer the questions that I insist are still open, he need only
show how the commitment to legal values, on which his new role
morality rests, is reconcilable with ordinary morality. We must,
then, see why he is at pains to base his alternative to the old role
morality on legal rather than moral grounds.
On that point he is quite explicit:
Although critics of conventional legal ethics discourse [the
old role morality] often adopt the law versus morality characterization, its strongest influence is to bias discussion in
favor of conventional, libertarian, responses. Typically the
conventional response is portrayed as the "legal" one; the
unconventional response is portrayed as a "moral" alternative. This rhetoric connotes that the "legal" option is objective and internal to the professional role, whereas the
"moral" alternative is subjective and peripheral. Even
when the rhetoric expresses respect for the "moral" alternative, it implies that the lawyer who adopts it is on her
own and vulnerable both intellectually and practically. The
usual effect is to make it psychologically harder for lawyers
22
and law students to argue for the "moral" alternative.
The validity of this assessment depends, however, on its underlying
201. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1113-14.
202. Id. at 1114.
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metaethical assumptions. As we have seen, morality of the realist
and interpretivist modes purports to be every bit as objective as Simon's notions of legality and justice, even if it is not reducible to
either without remainder. Indeed, morality of the interpretivist
mode rests on precisely the kinds of communal consensus upon
which Simon rests his notions of legality and justice. Thus neither
interpretivists nor realists should in principle (or, to use Simon's
word, intellectually) be at a disadvantage on the grounds that their
position is more subjective.2 ° a Nor should they be particularly vulnerable to the charge that their moral norms are external to the law.
If they are "natural law lawyers," moral norms are part of their vision of the law. Even if they are not natural law lawyers, their moral
principles can still be said to derive from the same set of values as
those of law itself° 4 -- communal values for interpretivists, cosmic
values for realists. The very question with which we began-what to
do when moral and legal values appear to conflict-will of course be
left unresolved. But it is at least plausible that the ordinary moral
principles will trump the legal or that the two can be reconciled,
perhaps by subsuming one under the other.
It is also unclear why the opponent of the old role morality who
is a moral interpretivist or realist will be at any practical disadvantage. Moral principles writ in the heavens or graven on the hearts of
our fellows may sometimes be difficult to decipher, but there is no
reason to think that the spirit of the law residing in the same places
is any more readily accessible. Simon gives us no further reason for
thinking that the moral position should be psychologically harder to
argue; in the quoted passage, he posits psychological difficulty as
the effect of the moral lawyer's alleged intellectual and practical vulnerability, not as an independent impediment.20 5 If its causes can
be removed along the lines I suggest, presumably the psychological
hardship would disappear.
The story is not the same, however, for skepticism. By definition, skepticism accepts no objective set of moral standards external
to the individual will.20 6 But we must be careful in conceding that
this makes it "intellectually and practically" more difficult to argue
against the old role morality on moral grounds. On the one hand,
skepticism's removal of an objective basis for morality certainly
makes it difficult to account for why every lawyer is bound to obey
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
See supra note 81 (arguing that not all legal positivists are moral skeptics).
See supra text accompanying note 202.
MACKIE, supra note 74, at 15-17.
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the spirit, or even the letter, of the law, and why coercion of those
who do not obey is justified. Moreover, skepticism explicitly leaves
those who adopt it "on [their] own," at least in terms of the foundations of their moral commitments.2 °7
On the other hand, however, skepticism presents no intellectual
problem for the lawyer who wants to give an account of a personal
commitment to values inherent in the law, as opposed to an argument that those values command a universal pledge of allegiance.
Skepticism leaves open the possibility of fideism, and Simon's system can rest comfortably on fideist foundations. Recall that, on the
fideist principles outlined in the last section, all the grounding that
one needs for one's ethical commitments (and perhaps all the
grounding that one can ever have) is that commitment itself. Thus,
lawyers who are committed to implementing the spirit of the law in
their representation of clients need look no further. Indeed, on the
skeptical premises that underlie fideism, looking further would be
futile.
Doubts raised by moral skepticism only become a problem
when Simon tries to make his system universal, binding on all lawyers, either as a matter of public norms or as legally enforceable
standards of lawyerly conduct.20 8 For that, he needs the kind of
grounding in common moral principles that Luban tries to provide.
Luban's brand of the new role morality is an effort to do precisely
what Simon eschews: link law, and more particularly lawyers' obligation to law, directly to ordinary morality.
B.

Lawyers' Role Norms Grounded in Ordinary Morality: Luban's
Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason

Summarizing and reaffirming the position he took in Lawyers
andJustice, Luban has said that
207. Whether we are alone in any other sense, I will take up later. See infra Subpart
IV.B.
208. That Simon does see his system as universally binding in this sense is clear from
his opening paragraph: "Lawyers should have ethical discretion to refuse to assist in the
pursuit of legally permissible courses of action and in the assertion of potentially enforceable legal claims. This discretion involves not a personal privilege of arbitrary decision, but a professional duty of reflective judgment." Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note
12, at 1083. Later in his introduction, Simon adds that, "[t]hroughout most of the discussion I do not distinguish between ethical analysis relevant to a regulatory body
promulgating rules of professional conduct and analysis relevant to an individual lawyer
operating within the limits of promulgated rules. The argument is designed for both
contexts." Id. at 1084. This analysis could hardly be relevant to the promulgation of
rules Simon believes lawyers are morally bound to obey, unless he thought the analysis
had universal validity.
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cooperative schemes create moral obligations when
(1) they create benefits;
(2) the benefits are general: they accrue . . . to the
whole community;
(3) widespread participation in the scheme is necessary
for it to succeed;
(4) the scheme actually elicits widespread participation; and
20 9
(5) the scheme is a reasonable or important one.
There are several preliminary points to note about Luban's position on legal obligation. The first is that he does not quibble over
whether one's obligation is to the law per se, or to the law as the
embodiment of beneficial cooperative schemes;2 10 for Luban, it is
the latter. Law is a necessary means for the coordination of largescale cooperative schemes, and this is what gives law its morally
binding force.2 l '
The second point to note about Luban's view of legal obligation is its relation to legal ethics. At the broadest level of generality,
Luban's entire system of legal ethics, as articulated in his fourfold
root analysis, is meant to operate as a collectively beneficial scheme.
Recall from the brief description of that system in Part 1,212 in connection with the Lake Pleasant case, that the role of lawyer is
designed to implement important societal goals. We must scrutinize not only the lawyers' role in gross, but also the particular role
obligations it embodies and the particular role acts those obligations dictate. The touchstone, in the particular as in the general, is
fidelity to beneficial cooperative schemes.
The question on which I want to focus is why the touchstone of
that judgment is advancement of collectively beneficial schemes,
collectively determined-in other words, why a lawyer must advance
schemes with a public imprimatur of collective benefit even if the
lawyer's own view of the commonweal differs. To demonstrate why
this is so, Luban will have to take us to his moral foundations, to
209. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 454.

210. See Ellmann, supra note 13, at 135 n.41 (raising this issue). For a criticism of
quibbling on that score, see Mackie's discussion of Raz and Woozley's drawing of essentially the same distinction. J.L. Mackie, Obligations to Obey the Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 143,
149-50 (1981).
211. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections,supra note 52, at 455. Luban argues at considerable
length that we should honor collectively beneficial schemes even if they do not have the
force of law. See LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE, supra note 2, at 37-47; Luban, Mid-Course
Corrections, supra, at 458-60.

212. See supra Subpart I.B.2.
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show us why schemes that purport to confer collective benefits, both
in the law at large and in the particular obligations of the lawyerly
role, are morally binding on an individual lawyer whose moral judgment differs.
This brings us to the third, and final, preliminary point about
Luban's system: its premises are liberal or, more precisely if more
cumbersomely, secular, egalitarian, and humanistic. 2 13 Humanism
is implicit in the first proposition quoted above: it expresses the
value judgment that benefits to humans are of fundamental importance. Projects that benefit human beings not only are desired, but
also are to be desired; they are good, in either the absolute sense of
the realists, the fideist sense that I have outlined, or the mediating
sense of the interpretivists. The humanism of the first statement implies a secularism that Luban makes explicit elsewhere: 21 4 it is
human benefits that count, and it is humans that do the counting, by
their own devices and without divine assistance. Human beings are
the measurers, as well as the measure, of all things. Finally, egalitarianism is explicit in the second proposition: benefits ought to be
dispensed among humans equally, or at least with a strong presumption of equality, because all humans are of equal moral
worth.2 15 Any inequality must be justified in terms analogous to
213. To equate liberalism with secular egalitarian humanism is, of course, to define
liberalism more broadly than is either customary or suitable for general purposes. This
definition will suffice for my purposes, however, if we add another criterion: a belief that
the legal system of the United States is generally just. The point of the definition is to
capture, in a short-hand phrase, those to whom Luban is primarily addressing himself.
Furthermore, Luban explicitly adopts the "generally just" condition in his discussion of
legal obligation. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 43, 49. The criterion,
though somewhat crude, nicely brackets several groups of secular egalitarian humanists
whom Luban is not primarily addressing-traditional Marxists and certain radical feminists, for example-and who could be distinguished from a more generally satisfactory
definition of liberalism only at much greater length. The definition I use here also has
the advantage of including in the liberal fold libertarians, whose position Luban takes
pains to address. See infra Subpart III.B. 1.
214. Luban notes that "[m]y own point of departure has been neither legal nor religious doctrine but rather secular ethical thought." LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra
note 2, at xxvi. This is not, of course, tantamount to denying the relevance of religion to
legal ethics, and Luban himself describes "the role of religious thought in ethical
problems of law practice" as "tremendously important." Id. Arguing without appeal to
God is standard practice among liberal scholars, even among those who are themselves
religious. But Luban has clearly taken God out of the lineup, and if the divinity appears
as a designated hitter late in the game, it should be fair to remind Luban of the ground
rules. See infra text accompanying notes 368-370.
215. This third proposition is the only one of the three that Luban tries to prove, and
his proof is not particularly persuasive. According to that argument, "moral respect for
humanity and human interests" follows from the premise that "we are all equally deserving: we're all human and we all share the same human interests." LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
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constitutional equal protection analysis.216
Although these background assumptions are clear and need not
be questioned, the same cannot be said of the scope of the claim as
to legal obligation that Luban tries to build within these parameters.2 17 There are three basic possibilities that we need to consider.
First, and most modestly, he may merely claim to show that, by following the fourfold root-in particular, by adopting and acting
upon his deferential attitude toward what purport to be collectively
beneficial schemes-one can be both a good lawyer and a good liberal. To accomplish this most modest task, he needs only to show
that this position is consistent with a plausible reading and application of liberal principles.
More ambitiously, he might want to show that any or all alternative attitudes to schemes that putatively redound to the general welfare are inconsistent with liberalism, that his is the only way to be
liberal, or that at least some ways that permit treating putatively
beneficial cooperative schemes differently are illiberal. To establish
this position, like the first, he can take liberal premises as given. He
can, in effect, assume a fideist attitude toward the first principles of
liberalism: I can't prove them, and perhaps they are unprovable,
2, at 42-43. Now that is a fine premise, and one to which I myself am
deeply committed. But unless that premise is independently proved or grounded on
something other than my commitment and his, Luban is still open to the charge he
anticipates from those with "aristocratic pretensions": "at the very least it begs the
question to assume that [one's fellow humans] are worthy of respect." Id. at 42. See
Pepita Haezrahi, The Concept of Man as End-in-Himself, in IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 292 (Robert P. Wolff ed., Lewis W. Beck trans., 1969)
(criticizing as circular the arguments of Kant, Mill, Rousseau, and Sartre for the equal
moral dignity of humans). It hardly answers this objection to suggest, as Luban does of
Nietzsche and Max Stirner, that "ample grounds exist to deny that their inegalitarianism
was sane." LUBAN, supra, at 43 n.23. To deny that Luban has thus made the case for
egalitarianism is not, of course, to assert that anyone has made the case for inegalitarianism, or that the assertion of the latter cannot be satisfactorily answered. For a fideist
answer, see Part IV.
216. Luban describes how such departures might be justified in LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE,
supra note 2, at 43-49, and makes the analogy to equal protection analysis explicit in

JUSTICE, supra note

Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 456.
217. I am not the first to note this ambiguity in a traditional liberal political theorist,
and Luban is not the first such theorist of whom it has been noted. Philip Soper makes

the same point as to Dworkin's theory of legal obligation. See Philip Soper, Dworkin's
Domain, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1166, 1180 n.40 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, supra
note 84). More generally, Alasdair MacIntyre finds the tension between intramural and
extramural appeals endemic to liberal thought. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUsTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 328-48 (1988) ("Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition").
Liberals, he argues, are torn between their original claim to transcend tradition with an
appeal to universal truth, and their emerging realization that theirs is but one tradition
among many. See id. at 335-46.
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but I can discuss with fellow believers the consequences of our beliefs. Because logical coherence in moral life is one of our shared
commitments, they will be compelled to listen and change if my
point is well argued.
There is a third, and most ambitious, point that Luban might
want to make, and, indeed, sometimes seems to be making. He
might want to show that to be a good person at all, one must have
his attitude toward what are billed as collectively beneficial schemes.
To establish this claim, he cannot take the first principles of liberalism as given; to do so would be to beg fundamental questions.
Instead, he must appeal either to moral principles binding on all
people, as the realists do, or, in the interpretivist mode, to a set of
values or a foundational text to which all parties subscribe, a set or
text necessarily more inclusive than those of liberalism.
Luban focuses primarily on the first two, intramural claims, seldom addressing the last, extramural claim directly. 1 8 But he is
pressed back to the extramural claim, I shall argue, when his intramural arguments with fellow liberals fail him and he must look beyond the pale of secular egalitarian humanism to sustain a moral
obligation to obey the law. In this Part, I try to trace how this occurs. First, with respect to his ambitious intramural claim, I want to
show that the degree of commitment to public norms and putatively
beneficial schemes that he demands is not the only position consistent with liberal premises. Then I want to identify the problems that
commitment to public norms creates within Luban's own system,
threatening even his modest intramural claim that following the
fourfold root is one way to be a good liberal and a good lawyer. We
will see, finally, why these problems press Luban toward his most
ambitious, and ultimately extramural, claims of political legitimacy,
and why his arguments for those claims are either inadequate or
problematic.
In my assessment, accordingly, Luban makes good on none of
his three claims. But "good" here cannot be an absolute; it is always
fair to ask "Compared to what?," and I gladly concede that Luban's
system is an improvement upon the old role morality. Particularly
with respect to Luban's basic claim, the claim that the fourfold root
is a workable way of being a good lawyer and a good (liberal) person, my assessment will have to be that Luban's account is less
workable than some third alternative. Accordingly, as I critically examine the foundations of Luban's theory of legal ethics, I shall also
218. See supra note 215 for Luban's criticism of Nietzsche's inegalitarianism.
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be laying the foundation for my own account, an account that dispenses with Luban's reliance on binding public norms and obligatory deference to putatively beneficial cooperative schemes.
1. Luban's Ambitious IntramuralClaim.--As Luban notes, most of
his argument in Lawyers and Justice focused on defending the fifth
proposition quoted above ("the scheme is a reasonable or important
one") against a more restrictive alternative, which he labels (5'):
"the benefits actually are accepted by citizens (either tacitly or implicitly)." 2" 9 This is the position of libertarians, and Luban's argument with them is essentially an intramural dispute among secular
egalitarian humanists. Taking libertarians as his primary opponents
within the liberal fold, Luban tries to show that no system of legal
ethics with an attitude toward the scope of legal obligation different
from his own can be built upon liberal foundations. If we try, we
will fail in either of two ways: we will either deny our fellow citizens
equality or destroy our own integrity. On close examination, however, neither risk materializes.
a. The Threat to Equality.-The Lake Pleasant case, which we encountered in Part 1,220 is a useful avenue through which to approach
this aspect of Luban's position. As Luban himself admits,2 2 ' the departure from the role-required conduct in this case is almost certain
to produce more good in terms of ordinary moral considerations
than harm to the criminal defense system in terms of which the act is
to be justified. But if this is so, then why insist upon adherence to
the role in this instance? Why not reveal Garrow's dark secret and
relieve the parents' grief?
In response to these questions, 2 2 Luban explicitly shifts from
an act consequentialist to a deontological reading of the fourfold
root, thus moving from one hemisphere of substantive moral philos219. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 454-55. Luban defends against

another alternative to proposition (5), which would require that, in order to be binding,
collectively beneficial schemes be not just "reasonable or important," but uniquely appropriate, or nearly so. See id. at 458-61. We will concern ourselves with that alternative, which Luban attributes to David Wasserman, only to the extent that Luban traces it
and the libertarian alternative to a common root, fear of excessive immersion in the

collective will. See id. at 458-62. I will try at the end of this Part to trace Luban's preference for his version of (5) to just the opposite fear, fear of inadequate attention to the
collective. I note his looking behind the premises of his critics in this way as implicit
acknowledgment that such an analysis is both fair and useful.
220. See supra Subpart I.B.2.
221. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 426.

222. See Wasserman, supra note 26, at 398-402 (raising these questions).
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ophy to the other.22 - In an act-consequentialist system of ethics, an
action is deemed morally appropriate if its consequences advance a
given value or set of values more than any alternative to that ac22
In the Garrow case, Luban admits that revealing the location.24
tion of the bodies would better advance liberal values than would
keeping Garrow's confidence;2 5 relief of the parents' anguish more
than outweighs any harm to the system of criminal justice and to
2 26
other competing values.
But revealing Garrow's secret can also be analyzed in deontological terms, in terms not of the act's external consequences, but of
its internal form or the agent's motivation. 227 Even if Garrow's lawyer's revelation would not itself undermine the over-protection of
criminal defendants, it can be faulted on other grounds. According
to Luban, Armani's revelation (or, more precisely, his motive in revealing) would violate a classic deontological standard, Kant's categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you
22
1
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Why act only on such maxims? Not because your defection in a
particular case will cause catastrophe; Luban has conceded that that
is not true in the Lake Pleasant case, and that there may be relatively
few cases in which it is true. 229 Rather, the reason is that "[flor
Kant, the universalizability formula follows from the fact that moral
laws are binding universally, and that in turn follows from an underlying concern with human equality. ' ' 23 ° •
Because we are addressing this point as part of an intramural
dispute among egalitarians, we can properly take the concern for
human equality as a given.2 3 l Moreover, we can even grant Luban
that the universalizability formula is unproblematically derivable

223. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 428-31. More precisely, he

says he moves from act-consequentialism to a position that is either deontological or
ideal rule-consequentialism, a distinction that he shows makes no difference in this context. See id. at 438-43; cf. JJ.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 9-12 (1973) (Smart's analysis of Kant as a consequentialist).
224. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 438.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
ply be
230.
231.
text.

See id. at 430. But see id. at 430 n.18 (qualifying the admission somewhat).
Id. at 431.
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 437.
See id. at 430. Even in cases where it was true, deontological analysis would sima special case of act-consequentialism.
Id. at 439.
For a discussion of the egalitarian premise, see supra note 215 and accompanying
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Even on these assump-

tions, however, it does not necessarily follow that breaching what
purport to be collectively beneficial schemes shows disrespect for
one's fellows, either in the Lake Pleasantcase itself or more generally.
To see why this is so, we must first note that there are two ways
the maxim of an action may fail the Kantian generalization requirement. In Kant's words,
Some actions are of such a nature that their maxims
cannot even be thought as a universal law of nature without
contradiction, far from it being possible that one could will
it to be such. In others this internal impossibility is not
found, though it is still impossible to will that their maxim
should be raised to the universality of a 2law
of nature, be33
cause such a will would contradict itself.

Following Paul Dietrichson's analysis, we can conveniently refer to
23 4
these as the primary and secondary tests for universalizability.
In the Lake Pleasant case, the maxim prompting revelation of the
bodies can be easily enough formulated to pass both tests. One can
with no risk of contradicting oneself think of the following rule:
Keep client secrets inviolate except when doing so would, in the
judgment of a reasonable lawyer, cause extreme physical or emotional harm to a third party and when that harm would outweigh the
harm revelation causes the client and similarly situated clients. 3 5
This rule, of course, bristles with interpretive problems, most saliently the standard recourse to the reasonable person. It is not,
however, internally inconsistent, and it nicely covers the Lake Pleasant case. Furthermore, to return to what Luban rightly takes to be
the core of Kantian ethics, it treats similarly situated persons the
same as you, the agent, are treating yourself: anyone else in a similar dilemma is offered the same out. As Luban points out, we-we
liberals, that is-feel outraged at those who treat themselves as special cases. 23 6 This is true (and fair) enough. But such outrage is
quite out of place here, where we have a general rule available to all.
My revelation rule fares equally well under the secondary test.
232. See Haezrahi, supra note 215.
233. KANT, supra note 215, at 47-48.
234. Paul Dietrichson, Kant's Criteria of Universalizability, in KArr, supra note 215, at
184-85.
235. The present exceptions to Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules, in both their original
ABA version and in the more expansive version adopted in Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN.,
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Rule 4-1.6 (West Supp. 1992), are arguably instantiations of just such an approach. See MODEL RULES, supra note 43, Rule 1.6.
236. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 439.
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Not only can you think its universalization without contradicting
yourself; you can also will it. This becomes clear if we look closely at
Luban's argument to the contrary. According to Luban's preferred
reading of the categorical imperative,
An agent can assume that he is permitted to adopt a particular maxim just in case he can will that everyone should be
permitted to adopt it. To check this, he must then imagine a
world like ours-with the one modification that everyone
feels (morally) free to adopt his maxim.2" 7
In applying this test in the context of lawyer-client confidentiality,
Luban asks and answers much too broad a question:
[W]e ask what would happen if lawyers were permitted to
reveal client confidences at will. The most common answer
is that in a world in which lawyers were permitted to reveal
client confidences at will, clients would conceal information
from their lawyers that might prove vital for successful, or
even minimally competent, representation. We then conclude that confidentiality is an important role obligation for
lawyers .238
Even if this analysis justifies a general confidentiality rule, it
hardly precludes an exception for the Lake Pleasant case. It may be
that to obtain the information necessary for lawyers to represent clients adequately, we must forbid "reveal[ing] client confidences at
will." ' 23 9 But my rule for the Lake Pleasant and similar cases permits

237. Id. at 437 (quoting T. Pogge, The Categorical Imperative 2 (1986) (unpublished
manuscript)). It is worth noting here that the "like ours" clause threatens to reduce the
categorical imperative to a hypothetical imperative of the form, "If you want a society
like ours, do (or do not do) this (or that)." This shift from categorical to hypothetical
imperative is certainly evident in the Kantian work Luban cites, where Kant seems at
times rather explicitly to have Enlightment Prussia as his paradigm of a society "like
ours." See KANT, supra note 215. Thus, for example, Kant's problem with a universalized
rule that does not require development of individual talents is not that it is unthinkable
in the abstract or even that we cannot consistently will it, but that it would create the
society of Bougainville and Cook's Polynesia, rather than Frederick and Kant's Prussia.
See id. at 46-47. The shift from categorical to hypothetical imperative is quite harmless
at this point in Luban's argument, which, as I have said, is an intramural debate among
contemporary liberals. Nevertheless, it does imply that Luban's most ambitious claim,
legitimate coercion of those whose conception of society is not "like ours," will have to
rest on another, broader foundation, or a different reading of Kant's Foundations.
238. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 436. In the omitted footnote following this passage, Luban reminds us that, in his fuller discussion of confidentiality, he
subjects it to much broader limits than those in the official lawyer codes of most states.
Id. at 436 n.35. For our purposes, however, the important point is that these exceptions
do not call for revelation in the Garrow case.
239. Id. at 436. Mike W. Martin takes a similar step in arguing for doctor-patient
confidentiality: "there is no question that if doctors freely divulged personal informa-
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revealing confidences not "at will," but only under extremes specified in advance. Generalized permission-or even obligation-to
reveal in those extreme situations need not undermine successfully
representing clients as a general matter. As Luban himself admits,
no one knows whether, and to what extent, clients really rely on an
assurance of confidentiality. 24 0 Indeed, empirical evidence tends to
belie the high level of reliance traditionally asserted, at least as to
hard cases like Lake Pleasant.2 4 '
Even if I am right that revelation in the Lake Pleasant case passes
both the primary and the secondary tests of Kantian universalizability, the question remains whether the maxim behind that revelation could, consistently with those tests, be applied generally to
laws or putatively beneficial cooperative schemes with the force of
law. The arguably overbroad confidentiality rule that I suggest a
Kantian could conscientiously disobey in the Lake Pleasant case is,
after all, but one law. Luban may still be right that the maxim "ignore any collectively beneficial scheme with which you disagree"
24 2
may not be universalizable.
This can, I think, be shown not to be true under the primary
test. Without logically contradicting yourself, and without making
an exception for your own case, you could quite easily universalize
the maxim: I will deem myself obliged to obey only the laws I believe confer collective benefits; you feel free to do the same.243 This
is all that the primary test of universalizability requires.
Whether the maxim meets the secondary test, however, is less
clear because of ambiguity in the key phrase "a world like ours."
The problem is that Luban and the libertarians want different
tion about patients medical practice would then be harmed." Mike W. Martin, Rights and
the Meta-Ethics of Professional Morality, 91 ETHICS 619, 625 (1981).
240. David Luban, Against Autarky, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 176, 181 (1984) [hereinafter
Luban, Against Autarky ] (noting that the standard defense of attorney-client confidentiality rests on an untested premise of client knowledge of, and reliance on, the strict rule of
confidentiality).
241. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 430 (citing Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 383 (1989)); see also Freedman, supra note
137, at 629 (arguing against empirical claims of need for testimonial privilege to elicit
medical information from patients); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego. Disclosure of
Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IowA L. REV. 1091, 1172 (1985) (concluding that a
sweeping rule of confidentiality is not "required to protect the rights of individuals or
society"); Note, FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications
for the PrivilegedCommunications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1236 (1962) (concluding that
nonlawyers generally misunderstand the scope of the attorney-client privilege).
242. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 442-43.
243. See Ellmann, supra note 13, at 135-36. Philip Soper makes essentially the same
point in his review of Dworkin's Law's Empire. See Soper, supra note 217, at 1184-85.
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worlds. The libertarians value a world free of collective coercion
over a world with relatively more cooperative schemes. In other
words, for libertarians the most beneficial of all cooperative schemes
is a polity in which individuals are not coerced by the collective to
participate in schemes they deem dubious. Here we are at an impasse, unless Luban can show, within the confines of secular egalitarian humanism, why what he wants is better, why he is right in
placing a higher premium than his libertarian opponents on cooperative schemes.2 4 4
There are several ways Luban might go here. He might argue
that the libertarian maxim will produce not a world with fewer beneficial cooperative schemes, but a world devoid of all law and social
order. Luban does not take that approach. Another avenue would
be to seek a higher rule, either within liberalism or above it, to establish his preference for cooperative schemes. We will follow him
down that avenue in a moment; it leads to his most ambitious claim.
A third avenue, and the one I want to turn to now, is the argument
that abandoning dubious cooperative schemes harms not the community so much as the dissident.
b. The Threat to Moral Integrity.-Luban's second approach
shifts focus from macrocosm to microcosm, from the effects on the
world of generalizing disobedience to laws with which one disagrees, to the effects of this generalized disobedience on the self.
Luban is at pains to show that the result is complete personal and
professional disintegration.
Luban builds his disintegration claim upon the following case:
Take, for example, a hypothetical public defender we
shall call Cecilia, whose docket contains many guilty, violent, and unrepentant clients. Cecilia accepts the moral importance of zealous advocacy in criminal defense, and
understands herself as a faithful and stalwart adherent to
the advocate's role. Indeed, understanding herself that
way is essential for her integrity as a lawyer-what we may
call her "professional integrity." Her professional integrity
will be one important component of her moral integrity as
244. As Luban himself notes at another point, Hegel long ago faulted Kant's universalizability test on the ground that, in application, two sets of diametrically opposed
maxims can pass the test. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUsTICE, supra note 2, at 113-14.
What Luban fails to notice, both there and here, is that giving enough content to the test
to make it distinguish between such maxims involves a value choice not itself subject to
the test, a value choice, in Luban's case, in favor of contemporary liberal mores.
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a whole.24 5
Responding, again, to David Wasserman, Luban argues that Cecilia
as an act consequentialist faces a dilemma. On the one hand, she is
pressed by her ordinary moral commitments to "incapacitate[] her
dangerous client' ;246 on the other hand, she is drawn by her commitments as a criminal defense lawyer to defend such a client even
to the extent of securing an acquittal. In any particular case, Cecilia
as act consequentialist will usually be able, or morally compelled, to
resolve the dilemma in favor of departing from her role-obligation,
since the good effects of departing (getting dangerous characters off
the streets, for example) will outweigh the systemic harm to the
criminal defense lawyer's role and the underlying public policy of
overprotecting criminal defendants. What makes her position untenable, Luban maintains, is the fact that her professional career is
really a series of such dilemmas. As a public defender, she can reasonably expect that most of her clients are, in fact, guilty, and in
each case her personal morality presses her to sell them out.
The act-consequentialist's response to this series of dilemmas
produces a paradox. Commitment to her act-consequentialist ordinary morality forces her to depart from her role-obligation in each
particular case in order to maintain her integrity as a moral person,
yet the cumulative effect of these defections is to undermine her
professional commitment to the role of criminal defense lawyer.
The erosion of this latter commitment undercuts her professional
integrity, which is also, as we have seen, "one important component
of her moral integrity as a whole. ' 247 As Luban sums up the paradox, "what is morally right, and essential to her integrity on an episodic, or case-by-case-basis, is disastrous when the cases are taken
collectively. ' 248 On the strength of this example, Luban concludes
that, unless we as lawyers make the honoring of role-obligations, as
justified by the fourfold root analysis, our "default mode," we ultimately sacrifice not just our professional, but also our personal,
integrity. 4 9
But the Cecilia story simply will not sustain so general a conclusion. To see why not, we must first see how the Cecilia story fits into
the implicit syllogism from which that conclusion is derived. The
syllogism runs like this:
245. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 448.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 449.
See id. at 451.
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1. Integrity either is itself good or is a necessary condition of being human, and therefore of being a good
human.
2. To have integrity, you must faithfully perform the
role acts required by your publicly determined role.
3. Therefore, only those lawyers who follow public
role morality can be good people.
Though both premises are subject to challenge, only the secondthat conformity to publicly determined roles is necessary for integrity-need concern us here. 25" Not all secular egalitarian humanists
will agree on it, a fact that Luban implicitly acknowledges by offering his Cecilia example to the unpersuaded.
What Luban's Cecilia example illustrates is not the second
premise in the syllogism, but a much narrower point-you cannot
depart from a principle in which you believe every time that principle is applicable, and still retain your personal integrity. To do so
would, indeed, present a paradox of belief and action." 5 ' This is
true almost as a matter of definition, and true in either of two ways,
depending on which critical term, integrity or belief, you define by
reference to the other. For Luban, integrity implicitly includes fidelity to rules you believe to be justified by the fourfold root; accordingly, to break those rules repeatedly is to lack integrity. 2 52 For
existentialists, to believe in a principle is to be committed to it, and
to be committed to it is to act upon it. Accordingly, to violate a
principle consistently is simply to show that you are not really com250. The first premise-that integrity is necessary to be a human, or a good humancan be challenged on both factual and normative grounds. The example of Dostoevsky's
Underground Man, fictional though it is, casts doubt on whether human existence as a
matter of fact requires integrity. Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground (Constance Garrett trans.), in EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE 52 (Walter Kauf-

mann ed., 1975). If the Underground Man has integrity, it is a peculiarly limiting case,
the ethical equivalent of Heraclitus's metaphysics: The only thing permanent is change
itself. THE PRESOCRATICS 70-71 (Philip Wheelwright ed., 1966). This is hardly the kind
of integrity Luban is seeking. On the other hand, to say that the Underground Man's life
is, though possible, not good, is to make an unsubstantiated normative claim. See
BARNES, supra note 110, at 3-28 (discussing the position of the Underground Man as
distinct from both traditional morality and the moral position of existentialism). Because it is not a claim that Luban's intended audience of fellow liberals is likely to dispute, we can safely leave it aside here. See ROBERT NoZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 162-66

(1989) (arguing that integrity, in the sense of "unity in diversity," is inherently valuable,
and, indeed, the very structure of value).
We will return, see infra Part IV, to the fact that ethical skepticism cannot, consistent
with its own premises, objectively condemn the Underground Man.
251. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 446.

252. See id. at 448.
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mitted to it, that you do not believe in it.2 5 3 Either way, one cannot
maintain one's personal integrity and consistently decline to follow
the dictates of one's own principles.
But how does Luban get from this very modest, if not tautological, premise to his more general point that integrity requires obedience to public norms? In the Cecilia example, I am afraid, he begs
the question by implying that the principles to which one is committed either are, or must be, public norms. In setting up the hypothetical, he tells us that "Cecilia accepts the moral importance of zealous
advocacy in criminal defense, and understands herself as a faithful
and stalwart adherent to the advocate's role."2' 54 But adding the fact
that the norms to which Cecilia is committed are public norms does
not prove that it is their very "publicness" that undermines her integrity when she violates them. I have, indeed, already given an account that is both more economical, in that it does not refer to that
fact, and more general, in that it covers commitments both to private and to public norms.
But my account does not rebut Luban's assertion that departure
from public norms is fatal to personal integrity. Even if it is true, as
I suggest, that violations of one's own principles undermine one's
integrity, it may also be true that one's integrity will inevitably be
undermined in another class of cases-that in which one consistently violates public norms to which one is not personally
committed.
Another feature of the Cecilia case suggests that this is true:
Cecilia's violation of her publicly defined duty involves selling her
clients out. If we examine that feature closely, however, we can see
that it is adventitious. Cecilia may indeed be unable to depart from
her publicly defined role obligations in the way that Luban suggests
without sacrificing her integrity, but the reason has little to do with
the fact that those role obligations are publicly defined. The reason
is, rather, that one aspect of her personal morality conflicts with
another.
The first aspect Luban has identified for us: Cecilia is loath to
effect the release of guilty, violent, and unrepentant clients. Quite
possibly, this reluctance might lead her to disagree, contrary to
Luban's hypothetical, with a greater or lesser part of her publicly
defined role as a defense lawyer. As Luban's general model suggests, roles are not monolithic; they comprise, instead, aggregations
253. See OLAFSON, supra note 81; SARTRE, supra note 106, at 66-67.
254. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 448.
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of role obligations embodied in distinct though related rules. Thus
Cecilia might, for example, generally agree that a liberal society
should overprotect criminal defendants by requiring the state to
meet a high burden of proof. She might further agree that holding
the state to this burden requires criminal defense lawyers to get
truly guilty defendants acquitted in some cases. Yet, quite consistently with those beliefs, she might also believe that evidence that
would meet the government's burden should not be excluded because it was improperly acquired.2 5 5 Similarly, she might believe
that, in putting the government to its proof, she should not argue to
the jury as true alternative accounts she knows to be false.2 5 6 More
radically still, but still within the bounds of liberalism, she might
of lawyer-client combelieve, with Bentham, that the confidentiality
257
guilty.
the
to
apply
not
should
munications
Any of these positions would put her at odds with the dictates
of her role. This, then, appears to pose the critical question nicely:
Could Cecilia depart from her publicly defined role obligations
without sacrificing her personal integrity? We are led to think that
the answer is "no" by a second aspect of her character that is at
odds with selling out clients. Implicit in Luban's hypothetical is another of Cecilia's moral commitments, one that most of us share.
We can reasonably surmise, though Luban does not tell us in so
many words, that Cecilia is loath not only to put her more odious
clients back on the street, but also to sell them out. Even if she
believes that selling out such clients will not undermine the core
purpose of the criminal defense role, we can empathize with her
finding it impossible to do, for any one of several related reasons.
255. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the exclusionary rule and proposing congressional enactment of an alternative remedy); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926)
(Cardozo rejecting the exclusionary rule in New York with the observation that, under
the rule, "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered").
256. See Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False Look True, 41
Sw. LJ. 1135 (1988); Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? FurtherReflections on the Right to
Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1988) [hereinafter Subin, Is This Lie
Necessary?]; Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission"." Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987) [hereinafter Subin,
Different Mission].
257. Luban discusses and rejects Bentham's position, on nonutilitarian grounds, in
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 189-97. Whether Bentham's argument is rebuttable, either on its own terms or in terms of the rights analysis that Bentham dismissed as
"nonsense on stilts," id. at 368, it is certainly an argument with an impeccable secular
egalitarian humanist pedigree. Moreover, it is an argument that has contemporary liberal sympathizers. See Alan Donagan,JustifyingLegal Practicein the Adversary System, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 2, at 123, 146.
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She may be deeply personally committed to keeping secrets secret,
either as a matter of choice or as a matter of nonvolitional moral
disposition. 25 Alternatively, she may object to placing the particular clients she represents in a worse position than they would have
been in if they had drawn a true-believer public defender instead of
her. Although she rejects the general justification of working to acquit violent, guilty, and unrepentant defendants, she may think it
unfair to her clients, not her fellow citizens generally, to break that
rule piecemeal and clandestinely in her clients' cases. If this is so,
then Cecilia cannot depart from her public role obligation without
loss of personal integrity. But the reason is not that which Luban
suggests.
You will note, however, that Cecilia's personal opposition to
selling out clients is not wholly divorced from her publicly defined
role obligation. Under Luban's fourfold root analysis, the justification of the criminal defense lawyer's role and its component obligations is to overprotect criminal defendants against the state. That
role arguably forbids selling out clients on rule-consequentialist
grounds. Cecilia's grounds are, as we have seen, different, but they
press her in the same direction. Thus, we find that the Cecilia example does not adequately isolate for us a conflict between the dictates
of individual conscience and the dictates of role, a conflict in which
we could test Luban's loss of integrity argument.2 5 9
We could, of course, produce such a conflict by imagining a
Cecilia who is not bothered by the sell-out factor. She may have no
moral qualms about selling out the guilty, or her qualms may be
outweighed by her aversion to putting sociopaths back on the street.
But such a Cecilia would bother most of us deeply. It would be hard
for us to assess whether she maintains her personal integrity or not,
because we find what that integrity entails-the selling out of clients-to be deeply troubling. It is appropriate to make explicit at
this point what the implicit standard of proof so far has been, both
for me and, I think, for Luban. 26 0 The standard of proof has been a
life that not only meets the requirement of formal consistency and
258. See Williams, supra note 17, at 259, 263-64 (contrasting general moral dispositions with professional dispositions and showing how the two may conflict even when a
lawyer believes a professional role-act to be morally justified).
259. Wasserman has made this point more generally: "There is ... no reason to
believe that such ordinary moral obligations [as, for example, the sell-out prohibition]
are always available to support a role-act with a consequentialist justification." Wasserman, supra note 26, at 403-04 n.68.
260. This standard, in effect, applies the two-part Kantian test we encountered above,
see supra notes 233-234 and accompanying text, to an entire way of life, not just to a
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integrity, but also embodies substantive values in a way that is acceptable to liberals, not necessarily as the life each would choose to
live, but as a life most liberals could respect. Under this standard,
portraying Cecilia as a kind of "Dirty Harriet" in the PD's office
would be to make Luban's case, if not his day.
There is, however, a more sympathetic example that squarely
raises the issue of departure from public role norms for reasons of
individual conscience. It is the example of the criminal defense lawyer faced with client perjury. Like Cecilia's case, this example involves both the publicly defined role of criminal defense lawyers and
the sellout factor. In this case, however, the sellout factor cuts the
other way, in favor of the client and against public role norms, for in
this context it is the rules themselves that require selling the client
out. Here the defense lawyer is tempted to bend the rules in favor
of the client, rather than to the client's disadvantage.
Monroe Freedman has long argued that a criminal defense lawyer has (or, more recently, should have) a professional obligation,
an enforceable duty under the lawyer codes, to present testimony
the lawyer knows to be perjurious no differently from other testimony. 261 The lawyer faced with client perjury, Freedman concedes,
faces a trilemma, a conflict of three role obligations: to find out
everything about the client's case, in order to present an effective
defense; to keep information about the case communicated by the
client in absolute confidence, in order to encourage the client to
reveal the facts the lawyer needs for the defense; and to be candid
with the tribunal, in order to prevent false evidence from distorting
the search for truth.2 6 2 In the case of perjury, as Freedman tersely
put it, "the lawyer is required to know everything, to keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the court. ' 26 3 Obviously, something has
particular course of action. It is an application, within the perimeters of liberalism, of a
principle that Isaiah Berlin maintains can be applied across cultures:
Members of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand...
the values, the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or society .... They
may find these values unacceptable, but if they open their minds sufficiently
they can grasp how one might be a full human being ... and at the same time
live in the light of values widely different from one's own, but which nevertheless one can see to be values, ends of life, by the realisation of which men could
be fulfilled.
ISAIAH BERLIN, On The Pursuit of the Ideal, in CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY

10 (Henry

Hardy ed., 1990).
261. Freedman first took this position in Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 147578 (1966).
262. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27-28 (1975).
263. Id. at 28.
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to give; we must impale ourselves on at least one horn. None of the
choices is entirely attractive; here reasonable people can differ, and
have. 2 6 I have set this stage, not to resolve what Freedman rightly
regards as a trilemma, nor to offer my own choice of whose ox-or
sacred cow-should get gored. Rather, I want to spotlight the role
Freedman has played in the drama, and to contrast it with another
role, a role that is, depending on your perspective, more heroic or
villainous or quixotic but-and this is my central point-no less viable, no less consistent with personal and professional integrity.
Freedman's role has been that of the law's loyal opposition. In
his earliest writing on the subject, Freedman argued that his approach to perjury not only was preferable to, but also was consistent
with, if not required by, the then-applicable American Bar Association (ABA) Code.2 6 5 When an amendment to a subsequent ABA
code made that argument strained, if not untenable, Freedman
spearheaded the drive for a counter-amendment.2 6 6 When the
ABA, in drafts of its third official code, moved toward its present
candor-over-confidentiality position, Freedman drafted a competing
code that embodied his position.2 6 7 Most recently, when the United
States Supreme Court upheld a threatened revelation of intended
perjury against a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
challenge, 6 Freedman came forward with an article narrowly construing the holding, 26 9 suggesting alternative constitutional chal-

264. Freedman and the ABA, as we shall see, respectively opt for sacrificing candor
and for sacrificing confidentiality. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 183.
The Canadian Bar Association sacrifices full disclosure by client to lawyer, according to
Freedman, by requiring that lawyers warn clients at the outset that perjury will be revealed. See FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at 38.
265. See Freedman, supra note 261, at 1477-78. Freedman also argued that his position did not violate state criminal laws forbidding subornation of perjury. See FREEDMAN,
supra note 262, at 31.
266. See FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at 28-29 (noting that Freedman's version was first
adopted by the District of Columbia bar, then by the ABA). The amended ABA rule was
a paradigm of opacity. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Officers, Directors, and Their Professional
Advisers-Rights, Duties, and Liabilities, 1 CORP. L. REv. 34 (1978).
267. See THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Rev. Draft 1982).

Monroe Freedman was the Reporter for the June 1980 Public Discussion Draft. Initially,
the discussion draft of his code was strongly client-protective. In a revised draft, Freedman weakened his rule by requiring that lawyers reveal client confidences where there
was an "imminent danger to human life." This revised draft, however, was still not
approved by the American Trial Lawyer's Foundation (ATLF) commission. See LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 183.
268. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
269. See Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered
Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1946 (1988) (concluding that "the key question re-
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lenges to the ABA position,2 70 and insisting that the proper conduct
of a lawyer faced with the trilemma is still uncertain. 2 7 '
But at every point in what has become a rear-guard action
against the ABA's candor-over-confidentiality position, Freedman
has been unfailingly loyal to the law, in two ways. First, he has from
the beginning maintained that "before the client testifies perjuriously, the lawyer has a duty to attempt to dissuade him on grounds
of both law and morality. ' 2 72 Second, he has never argued that an
individual lawyer faced with the trilemma should handle it in any
way other than that which prevailing law dictates. 273 Thus he has
implicitly accepted Luban's obedience point.
But-and this is my central point in this subsection-Freedman
need not have accepted that point to maintain either professional or
personal integrity. Rather, he could have concluded that putting in
perjured testimony serves values more significant for him than obedience to the dictates of the law on that point. He could have taken
that view only as to those clients he thinks are innocent, but who
face conviction on false evidence or erroneous testimony. 274 He
might also have taken it as to all criminal defendants, either on the
rule-consequentialist argument that he emphasizes or on an alternative, deontological position that he sketches: "the criminal defendant has a 'right to tell his story' " when faced with the "horrors of
imprisonment," even if that story is a lie. 2 7 5 Unlike Cecilia, a lawyer
of this mind quite plausibly could function in violation of the present ABA position, ensconced though it is in law, without any loss of
personal integrity. But like Cecilia, the contemplated departure is
mains unanswered: what standard of knowing is required before a lawyer may threaten
to reveal a client confidence to prevent the client from committing perjury?").
270. See id. at 1946-52 (analyzing various arguments that an obligation to threaten
disclosure of a criminal defendant's perjury violates the Fifth Amendment's protection
against compelled self-incrimination).
271. See id. at 1952-55. The ABA, for its part, was no less eager to put its own spin on
the Nix opinion. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
353 (1987) (analyzing a lawyer's responsibility with respect to client perjury after Nix
and insisting that Freedman's position, explicitly identified as his, was no longer
tenable).
272. See Freedman, supra note 261, at 1478.
273. See id.
274. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at 30-31 (giving a heart-tugging example of
such a case).
275. See id. at 31 (suggesting that this position is reflected in the civil law practice of
permitting criminal defendants to testify without oaths); see also SHAFFER, supra note 2, at
94-95 (arguing that even ifa client has indicated an intention to commit perjury, a criminal defense lawyer should, as an expression of faith in the client, let the client testify
after urging truthfulness).
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from a central, not peripheral, aspect of the lawyerly role; it may,
indeed, be the perception of that centrality that occasions the
departure.
Freedman himself acknowledges this point, albeit somewhat
begrudgingly, in a short concluding paragraph on lawyers who falsify evidence for clients "from a personal sense of justice: those
lawyers who choose that role . . . must do so on their own moral
responsibility and at their own risk, and without the sanction of generalized standards of professional responsibility." 2 '76 This is a carefully worded concession, and several elements warrant elaboration,
2 77
some here, some in Part IV.
In the first place, Freedman is right to describe this position,
this way of practicing law, as a role. This is important because
Luban is at great pains to demonstrate both the factual impossibility
and the moral repugnance of trying to live one's moral life fully
outside social roles. As to the factual impossibility, Luban observes
that "[c]ommon morality cannot be described without incorporating
2' ' 7 8
reference to social roles: if it is, the result is empty and barren.
True enough-it is conceptually muddled to say that, in the circumstances of the Lake Pleasant case, one should follow ordinary morality
and not lawyerly morality. A nonlawyer cannot get into that predicament and many others that lawyers must face. The real question is
how an ordinary person who is a lawyer should respond to the especially uncomfortable situations peculiar to the lawyerly role. 279
But to say that an intelligible answer cannot be given if the social role is abstracted away is not to say that the morally right answer
is the one dictated by the socially approved parameters of role. Social expectations are in this context, as in all others, part of the factual context. Unless we are to reduce morality to mores, we are
entitled to ask whether it is right, as opposed to expected, that one
28 0
do what one's social role demands.
276. FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at 76.

277. One of the factors to be deferred is that Robin was not in the forest alone. The
relevance of his fellow outlaws will become clearer in Subpart IV.B.2, where I take up
the role of community in fideist ethics.
278. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115.
279. Id. at 114-15; see also Williams, supra note 17, at 260; Schneyer, supra note 33, at
1536.
280. This point has an important corollary. Just as it would confuse the "is" with the
"ought" to say here that the right thing to do is what one's social role demands, so it
would also confuse the two to conclude that the degree to which one may properly depart from role is to be derived from what society accepts as a proper departure. Society
may accept as proper a certain degree of "role distancing" on the part of various role
occupants, from doctors in surgery to children on merry-go-rounds. LUBAN, LAWYERS
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In assimilating a role he rejects to that of Robin Hood, Freedman underscores a real danger, 28 ' a danger that Luban, too, perceives when he brands as excessively romantic those who flout
publicly defined role obligations on grounds of individual conscience.2 2 Luban identifies three morally repugnant "roles-that-reject-roles": the Bohemian poseur, "the man or woman beyond
roles," who "reject[s] social roles in never-to-be-forgotten evenings"; the moral bully, who "make[s] a practice of denouncing hypocrisy," a "recognized (and hypocritical) role"; and the overgrown
adolescent, who "stand[s] at life's crossroads with ideals too high
for the compromises of professional roles-as well as a belief that
his own 'authenticity' is not to be sullied by the light of the public
23
that darkens everything.
These barbs are sharp, but if their point is to deny that there
are other alternatives to deferring to socially acceptable role obligations, Luban is wide of the mark. Certainly as incarnated in Errol
Flynn, and even in the carefully politically correct Kevin Costner,
Robin Hood has an unmistakable aura of machismo about him. 8 4
supra note 2, at 106-07 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS 85 (1961)).
We can, however, still ask what degree of departure is morally appropriate. Trying to
derive the morally appropriate from the socially acceptable in the way that Luban suggests is to invite Hume's query about deriving an "ought" from an "is." See Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Communitarian Ethics and Legal Justification, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 721, 735
(1988) [hereinafter Hazard, Communitarian Ethics]. But cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., My
Station as a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Hazard, My Station as a
Lawyer] (arguing that what is morally correct for a lawyer is determined by the function
of a lawyer in society).
This is the point of Sartre's famous waiter story. See SARTRE, supra note 104, at 7179. Sartre's point is not that it is bad faith to occupy a social role, as Luban shows is
inevitable. But it is bad faith to take the socially defined parameters of one's role as
determinative of one's self, as either what one is or what one ought to be. See OLAFSON,
supra note 81, at 112 n.7; BARNES, supra note 110, at 81-86; cf. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115 ("Nor should it be forgotten that Sartre, who argued that
role identification is bad faith, argued also that identification with a 'Me' that is not my
role is bad faith as well.").
281. See FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at 76.
282. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115; Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 443; see also LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra, at xix (rejecting
the suggestion that lawyers who decline to work moral harms at the behest of their clients are "Robin Hoods in business suits").
283. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115; see also ROBERT P. WOLFF, IN
DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 74 (1970) ("Even the social rebel characteristically opts for an
existing role, that of bohemian, or beatnik, or revolutionary."). It is somewhat misleading to suggest that Luban merely identifies these roles-that-reject-roles; in fact, he elaborates them in lurid detail. I deal with the Dorian Gray quality of the portraits below, infra
text accompanying notes 410-411, in my treatment of why Luban and others fear the
consequences of moral skepticism.
284. This is true, as well, of the Robin Hood of folklore, who "foreshadows the world
AND JUSTICE,
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But swashbuckling was not Robin's only business, and rescuing
damsels in distress was barely a sideline. Robin was the original
wealth redistributor, and, more generally, the prototypical righter of
legally countenanced wrongs.2 8 5 We would do well, no doubt, to
scrub that role clean of infantile (male) self-fixation. But we scrubbers should take care all the while not to become enamored of our
own reflection in the washbasin, and not to dump a significant social
2 86
role with the bathwater. Robin Hood is no Holden Caulfield;
those who adopt the former's role must be, not just muse about being, the catcher in the rye. Here, again, Freedman's description is
on target. Those who adopt Robin Hood's role must take personal
moral responsibility for their departure from public norms. There
is no denying that, under the regime of his day, Robin Hood's redistributive mechanism was theft, and that theft bore a serious penalty,
just as departing from central obligations of the lawyer codes does
today. Yet for Robin Hood to have shown respect for the law by
taking his legal punishment would have been the ultimate narcissism. The peasants did not need a martyr; what they needed was
money.
This underscores a final point implicit in Freedman's description of the Robin Hood role. In both its classic and its modem variations, a primary source of its appeal has been that it involves
helping other people. 2 87 To the original idea of robbing from the
rich to give to the poor, Freedman adds contemporary analogies:
the criminal defense lawyer who knows that prison is a horror and who believes that no human being should be subjected to such inhumanity; the negligence lawyer who
resents the arbitrary rules that prevent a seriously injured
and impoverished individual from recovering from an insurance company; the prosecutor who does not want to see
a vicious criminal once again turned loose upon innocent
citizens because of a technical defense; . . . the tax attorney
who resents an arbitrary and unfair system that leaves Peter
with his wealth while mulcting Paul. 8 8
of superman and the comic strip." J.C. HOLT, ROBIN HOOD 10 (1982). For a brief survey of Robin's career in cinema, see Chris Chase, Robin Hood Adds Up to a Thieffor the
Ages, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1991, § 2, at 13.

285. It is not clear that the original Robin Hood was either, though both aspects of
the role gained early and enduring prominence. HOLT, supra note 284, at 8-10, 38-39.
286. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115-16 (referring to Holden
Caulfield as the epitome of adolescent idealism).
287. See HOLT, supra note 284, at 10.
288. FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at 76.
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Nevertheless, the very viability of the Robin Hood role does
produce an apparent paradox, which we can see by returning to
Cecilia's case. Remember that, depending on how we define
Cecilia's personal moral commitments, she can either be a good
person and a good criminal defense lawyer in violation of critical
obligations of that role, as publicly defined, or she cannot be a good
person and a good lawyer despite compliance with these norms.
This is only a paradox, however, from the perspective of a metaethical position that assumes right answers to moral questions. From
the perspective of metaethical skepticism, the paradox disappears
because personal moral integrity depends on fidelity to one's own
personal moral commitments rather than to monolithic public
norms. There is more than one way to be, or fail to be, a good
person and a good lawyer (in criminal defense or other areas) because there is no one single measure of a good person, or a good
lawyer. The critical principle is the one that poor Polonius announced but could not live by-to your own self be true. 9 '
But to say that there are various ways to be a good person and a
good lawyer from one's own perspective is not to say that they are
equally valid and entitled to respect either from some higher, common, "midair" perspective or from the perspective of secular egalitarian humanism. If Luban and I disagree on whether there is only
one true way to be a good person and a good lawyer, we agree in
rejecting one way, the way of the old role morality. Performing the
duties of one's lawyerly role is no guarantee of personal moral integrity. I join Luban in emphatically disaffirming "the moral liberty
of a lawyer to make his life out of what personal scraps and shards of
motivation his inclination and character suggest: idealism, greed,
curiosity, love of luxury, love of travel, a need for adventure or repose; only so long as these lead him to give wise and faithful counsel." 29 Eliot's Thomas A Becket may have been wrong here: the
289. Luban takes this advice to be a call for the kind of egoism that "is the number
one cause of marital infidelity and child desertion." Luban, Partisanship,supra note 62, at
1041. But the self to which one is true can also be a self committed to unreciprocated
marital fidelity or parental devotion. See, e.g., Hosea 1:2-3, 3:1-3 (Revised Standard) (Hosea's devotion to Gomer); 2 Samuel 18 (David's devotion to Absalom). The problem with
Polonius was less that he was "a fountain of bad advice," Luban, supra, at 1041, than that
he did not heed his own good advice.
290. Fried, supra note 2, at 1088-89. This suggestion by itself should make us understand, if not entirely forgive, the bitterness of Leff and Dauer's reply to Fried. See Edward A. Dauer & Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573
(1977) (commenting on Fried, supra note 2); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 76 n.49
(describing Dauer and Leff's reply as "[a] sometimes telling but uncomfortably savage
critique"). With them, but for the benefit of their example, go I.

19921

BEYOND THE NEW ROLE MORALITY

929

highest treason is not to do the right thing for the wrong reason, but
to do so while invoking the right reason or asserting that motive
does not matter. 2 9 ' Even if love of money is the root of all evil,
there must be one evil lower: to dig for that dark root while purporting to be cultivating justice and the common good. It is no
wonder that, after a lifetime of such digging, Dickens' Mr. Jaggers is
continually washing the dirt from his hands.2 9 2
But Robin Hood, you will finally object, had right-publicly, if
not cosmically, determined right-on his side. He resisted the powers-that-were-the sheriff of Nottingham and the usurping Prince
John-in fidelity not to his own vision of justice, but to Richard the
Lionhearted, legitimate king, defender of the faith, indeed, crusader
extraodinaire.2 9 s In this section, I have been at pains to show that
this faithfulness to legitimacy is not essential to moral integrity; in
the next, I will argue that the two are at times inconsistent. Claims
of objective legitimacy make Robin Hood's position-and
Cecilia's-more rather than less problematic.
2. Luban's Modest IntramuralClaim.-Luban's modest intramural claim is that the fourfold root is a viable way of being a good
person and a good lawyer within the premises of secular egalitarian
humanism. 29 4 To sustain this position, Luban must address a problem he himself acknowledges.
Reflexive, universal deference to public role norms is stultify2 95
ing; 1 it is, after all, precisely the old role morality against which he
is arguing. In his own system, public role norms that purport to
implement collectively beneficial schemes are presumptively valid
and binding, but the presumption is rebuttable. 29 6 What he must
give us, then, is a chart between the Scylla of individualist ethics and

291. See Stier, supra note 2, at 604 ("Integrity depends on the reasons which determine the legal actor's actions.").
292. Philosophical objections to the moral worth of a life based on the pursuit of
wealth are as old as Aristotle, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 9 (Martin Ostwald
trans., 1962), and as new as Nozick, see NozICK, supra note 250, at 177. Fried's suggestion that a life is to be judged morally acceptable on account of the desirable results it
produces collapses the distinction between evaluating acts and evaluating persons-a
distinction recognized even in consequentialist systems.
293. See HOLT, supra note 284, at 10 (portraying Robin Hood as a sustainer and vindicator of social conventions). The early stories lack the link with Richard. Id. at 37.
294. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 131; see also Wasserman, supra
note 26, at 396-97; Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 424.
295. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 443.

296. Id. at 432, 451-52.
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the Charybdis of total absorption in collective norms, a guide as to
when we defer and when we depart.
I argued in the last section that Scylla is but a mythic monster, a
figment of Luban's imagination. Personal integrity is not in danger
of being dashed on the rock of individualist ethics. In this section, I
will argue that, by having us steer wide of this phantom shoal,
Luban directs us into the whirlpool of Charybdis, a hazard equally
of his own making. Here the danger is that of being caught in cross
currents. On the one hand, Luban warns us against being swept
along too fully in the mainstream of collective norms; on the other
hand, he warns us that the counter current of our individual moral
judgment will sweep us back upon the reefs of excessive individualism. The result, I will argue in this section, is a moral maelstrom
from which Luban's system offers no escape.
My most ambitious claim, then, is that Luban's least ambitious
claim is problematic. Honoring role obligations in the way he suggests is inherently unstable; it is new wine in old wineskins. To
show why this is so, I need to specify the levels at which conflicts
arise and the sources from which they come. The central problem
for Luban's system-the conflict between individual conscience and
collective norms-arises on several levels, levels that correspond to
the several steps of the fourfold root. One may disagree with an act
dictated by a rule of professional obligation, as we saw in the Lake
Pleasant case.29 7 Or one may disagree with a role obligation, as
Monroe Freedman disagrees with the present obligation to reveal
perjury. 29 8 Beyond that, one may disagree with an entire conception of the professional role, as Luban and Simon disagree with the
old role morality. 29 Finally, at the highest level of the fourfold root
analysis, one may disagree with the values that professional roles are
designed to implement, as Nietzsche rejects the egalitarianism of
modern western democracy.3 0°
The impetus to depart from the demands of a publicly defined
role may have several sources. One may be impelled by the spirit of
the law itself, as Simon suggests. 3 0 ' Alternatively, one may be
moved by other, but still public, norms of ordinary morality, like the
general aversion to harming innocent third parties, the aversion that
297. See supra Subpart I.B.2.
298. See supra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Subpart I.B.3.
300. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY
mann & RJ. Hollingdale trans., 1969).
301. See supra Subpart III.A.

OF MORALS
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pressed Cecilia to want to disable her dangerous clients.5 0 2 Finally,
one may be motivated by norms that depart from the spirit both of
the law and of public morality, norms that derive from and rest
upon personal moral commitments, the morality, for example, of
Monroe Freedman's Robin Hood role.
The critical question for Luban's system, when to defect from
public norms, can occur at any level of analysis and can rest on any
of these bases for dissent. Thus, for example, you may question
whether a particular rule-dictated act is consistent with, or compelled by, a valid social policy behind the rule or, beyond that,
whether the rule itself adequately advances that policy. The conflict
is most problematic when it occurs at higher levels and on account
of fundamental differences in values, when you question whether
the policy behind the rule achieves the most desirable balancing of
values, or you question the relevant values themselves. As we shall
see in this section, it is conflicts at the higher levels, and for the
more fundamental reasons, that Luban's system handles less well
and, indeed, tends to suppress. To see why this is so, we must look
at a series of conflicts between personal moral commitments and
public norms, beginning at the lowest level of the fourfold root and
moving to the top.
a. Disagreement at the "Act, "or Application, Level. -- Consider first
disagreement with a role obligation as applied in a particular case.
Sometimes the reason pressing you to depart from an act dictated
by a role obligation will be a reason the creators of the obligation
approve but, for reasons of difficulty in defining and enforcing exceptions, omitted from the letter of the law. As a result the law is,
even in its makers' eyes, overbroad. 3 This phenomenon of necessary overinclusiveness may, for example, account for the nearly absolute prohibition of revealing client secrets. If so, then revelation
in the Lake Pleasant case may have been consistent with the law's
spirit, though contrary to its letter. Revelation in that case thus can
be fairly easily squared with Luban's insistence on fidelity to benefi302. See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text. Another problem of this sort is
that of discrediting truthful witnesses, a problem poignantly illustrated in Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS 69 (Philip B.
Heyman & Lance Liebman eds., 1988), and extensively analyzed (though, I think, unsatisfactorily resolved) in Freedman, supra note 261, and Fried, supra note 2, at 1086.
303. Kent Greenawalt gives a detailed example of this possibility, and a useful analysis
of its consequences for the morality of disobedience. See GREENAWALT, supra note 200, at
12-15; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1118 n.81 (noting the problem of unavoidable overbreadth).
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cial cooperative schemes. One simply has to realize that laws are
written for Holmes's proverbial bad man; that, in the process of
plugging unintended loopholes through which he might squeeze,
the drafters of laws, including those laws that govern the professional conduct of lawyers, 3 0 4 must occasionally, and to their chagrin,
impede the way of the virtuous, those with the law's true purpose at
heart.3 1 5 Despairing that a more flexible rule might be twisted by
unscrupulous lawyers for their own advantage, the drafters have denied Garrow's conscientious lawyers a legal means of helping innocent third parties. The law itself recognizes a general need for such
latitude outside its letter in doctrines like justification, excuse,
prosecutorial discretion, and executive clemency, °6 and popular
culture frequently applauds those who transgress the narrow law for
the broader good.30 7
How does one following Luban's theory know when it is appropriate, in a particular case, to depart from the demands of a generally good law or justified role obligation? According to Luban,
"[t]he claims of role may be overridden if they are irrelevant to the
case or insufficiently strong. '3 0 8 Very significantly, the focus in such
determinations is not on the agent, the lawyer deciding whether to
break with role obligations, but on the person who will be affected
by the lawyer's action, whom Luban calls the moral patient. This is
what Luban calls "the morality of acknowledgment"; we as moral
agents are not entitled to depart from role obligations on our own
behalf, but we are compelled
to depart from them when the needs of
3 °9
others require it.
If this distinction worked, the morality of acknowledgment
would give Luban a way to resolve problems of the fairly easy sort
we are now addressing, hard cases in which the application of mor304. Ted Schneyer cogently argues along these lines that at least some of the aggressive advocacy rules of the lawyer codes are designed not so much to encourage what
Luban calls hyperzeal as to forbid sell-outs. See Schneyer, supra note 33, at 1543-45; see
also DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 146-47 (1974)
(relating empirical evidence of the risk of selling out in lower echelons of criminal defense work).
305. This is the converse of Luban's point about loopholes. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 48.
306. Greenawalt catalogues and assesses these "institutions of amelioration." See
GREENAWALT, supra note 200, at 271-76; see also Simon, Ethical Discretion,supra note 12, at
1116-18, 1118 n.77 (referring to justification, excuse, and jury nullification).
307. Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75
CAL.

L.

REV.

379, 381-84 (1987).

308. LUBAN, LAWYERS
309. Id. at 126-27.

AND JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 145.
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ally good laws would produce unquestionably bad results. Even at
this level, however, it is not without problems. As a conceptual matter, the morality of acknowledgement involves a curious, and admitted, asymmetry: "we are bound to extend to others a courtesy we
are bound to refuse to ourselves. 3 1 ° Why, on the one hand, are we
to extend the courtesy of departure from our role obligations to
others? The reason, essentially, is the one we have already seeneven good laws are only good in gross. But then why, on the other
hand, are we to depart only when the bluntness of general rules
harms others than ourselves? Luban gives no reason not logically
applicable to us; perhaps he supposes altruism to be unquestionably
superior even to treating ourselves and others on equal terms.3 1 1
Even if we agree with Luban in this value judgment, there remains a further problem with the morality of acknowledgement at
the level of particular acts: altruism is not an unambiguous sentiment. Depending on whose suffering or need one acknowledges,
the morality of acknowledgement will counsel divergent, even incompatible, courses of action. This is the dilemma of Sartre's resistance fighter. Should he stay at home, where his mother needs him,
or join the Resistance, where he can be of more help to his country
and his comrades?31 2 This dilemma also frequently appears in legal
ethics. Consider, once again, the Lake Pleasant case. Assume, arguendo, that you agree with Luban (and the law) on a general, and
very client-protective, confidentiality rule in criminal defense matters. What about the grieving, and perhaps righteously indignant,
families of the victims? On a slight and plausible change of the
t
facts, what about the victims themselves, dying but not yet dead?3 3
It is, of course, in view of just such considerations that the rule
of confidentiality admits of more or less broad exceptions in various
jurisdictions. 14 This points to a final problem with Luban's moral310. Id. at 127.
311. In addition to being ungrounded, this implication is in tension with Luban's
Kantian egalitarianism. According to Kant's "practical" version of the categorical imperative, you are to "[aict so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of another, always as an end and never as a means only." KANT,supra note 215, at 54
(emphasis added).
312. SARTRE, supra note 106, at 28-33.
313. Even Freedman's code would have blinked at confidentiality here. See supra note
267. But his constituents did not flinch. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2,
at 183; THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 267, Illustrative Cases
I (e)-(g). Luban's sympathies also shift here from the assailant to the victim. See LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 183.
314. See MODEL RULES, supra note 43, Rule 1.6 (permitting revelation to prevent
crimes resulting in "imminent death or bodily harm"); FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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ity of acknowledgment, and a problem that takes us to the next level
of the fourfold root. As Luban himself points out, the care for
others that informs the morality of acknowledgment is expressed
not just through departures from rules, but in rules themselves, and
thus in obedience to them. 1 5 The same consideration for others
that justifies departures from the rules in particular instances may
give rise not just to generally recognized exceptions to the rules, as
in the case of confidentiality, but also to pressure for the exception
to displace the rule. Just as different focuses of altruism may counsel different responses in particular cases, so also they may counsel
wider exceptions, up to and including different general rules. We
have encountered an instance of this already: that part of Freedman's position on perjury that invokes the lawyer's urge to let a desperate defendant tell his story, regardless of its falsity.3 ' 6 If given its
head, this sympathy with the defendant would unseat the present
rule.
b. Disagreement at the Higher Levels of the Fourfold Root.-Luban
himself does not find fault merely with rules as applied in particular
difficult cases; he sometimes finds fault with the rules in identifiable
classes of cases and calls for broad exceptions or different rules.
Thus, for example, Luban criticizes the application of strict confidentiality protection in the context of large entity clients,' 1 7 the requirement of destructive cross-examination of rape victims even in
the context of criminal defense,3" 8 and the obligation to take unfair
advantage of negotiation opponents with information they lack.31 9
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (requiring revelation to prevent crimes whether serious or not, and
serious injuries whether or not caused by crimes).
315. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 146-47.
316. See supra text accompanying note 261.
317. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 194-95, 228-33.
318. See id. at 150-52. It is particularly clear here that the morality of acknowledgment
is pulling Luban in opposite directions. In Lawyers andJustice, Luban argued that the
criminal defense lawyer should not brutally cross examine the complaining witness, in
view of the deterrent effect that such cross examination has on the reporting of actual
rape in other cases, "even if the victim really did consent to sex with the defendant." Id.
at 150-52. He noted, however, that "the question is a very close call," and that he arrived at his conclusion "without much confidence." Id. at 152. After being "take[n] to
task" for this position by Ellmann, Luban retrenched a bit. See Luban, Partisanship,supra
note 62, at 1026-27. He acquiesces to brutal cross examination in cases of genuine consent, but not in cases in which the client admits guilt to the lawyer, and not in typical
acquaintance rape situations where the defendant maintains his innocence, but argues
implicit consent on dubious facts. See id. at 1027-32. None of this is to deny that I am
inclined to agree with Luban here; it is rather to suggest that the morality of acknowledgment can-and does-pull in opposite directions.
319. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 396; infra text accompanying
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Indeed, as we have seen, he finds fault with the central conception
of the lawyerly role, the old role morality, that both embodies these
rules and provides their basis. This poses two related problems for
Luban's system: first, whether the disagreement can be accommodated within an objective morality and, second, if it can, what the
implications are for individual moral agents within the system.
With respect to the first problem, it is important to distinguish
among the different reasons Luban himself finds for criticizing general rules, for some of these reasons are easier than others to accommodate within a system of common values. Sometimes the
problem Luban identifies is a conceptual error, as in his criticism of
the confidentiality rule in the context of bureaucratic entity clients.
Here he identifies the fallacy of misplaced concreteness: a rule
designed to protect individual people from the psychological
trauma of self-incrimination has been extended to artificial persons
that,.literally if not figuratively, have no souls. 3 20 Such a problem is

fairly easy to account for within his system of assumed common
values.
Equally easy to account for is Luban's second basis for criticizing rules. Sometimes he thinks the rules do not, as a matter of fact,
achieve the values they purport to advance. This criticism is at the
root of his attack on unrestrained partisanship in litigation as the
engine of truth discovery-the system simply cannot be shown to
deliver the promised goods. 3 2 '
There is, however, a third basis on which Luban criticizes rules,
more often than not implicitly. Sometimes both the rule Luban prefers and the alternative he criticizes will have costs in terms of two
sets of values that Luban himself acknowledges as values. The problem is not that the criticized rule fails to advance the values it purports to advance, but that the cost of that advance in terms of other
values is, by Luban's lights, unacceptably high. In the Lake Pleasant
case, either the parents will suffer or the client's secret will be revealed to his disgruntlement, if not greater detriment. In the perjury trilemma, candor or confidentiality or completeness of client
disclosure will be sacrificed. In the context of negotiation, a lawyer
cannot reveal information the other side needs for a just result without denying the client the leverage that the information affords. In
the cross examination of rape victims, their privacy interests and the
note 340; see also infra text accompanying note 352 (discussing Luban's reading of the
ABA standards).
320. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 194-95, 228-33.
321. Id. at 68-74.
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public's interest in encouraging the reporting of sex crimes must be
balanced against the defendant's interest in a vigorous defense. At
the highest level of generality, any injection of moral limits on what
lawyers do for clients will come at the clients' expense.
Because this last example is central to Luban's criticism of the
old role morality and in a sense subsumes the others, it warrants
elaboration. Stephen Pepper has constructed a defense of the old
role morality on the foundation of individual autonomy. 32 2 His basic premise is that individual human autonomy is a good, and that
our society promotes that good by permitting citizens to operate
without interference as to matters not forbidden by law.3 23 The role
of lawyers, in this scheme, is to advise citizens of the parameters of
the law, for, in a complex culture pervaded by law, citizens unadvised by lawyers would be unable fully to exercise their autonomy in
the socially defined sphere.3 2 4
We have already seen one criticism of this approach-the argument that society would be better rather than worse off if what the
law cannot forbid without undue cost or intrusiveness could be
barred by other means.3 2 5 Here I want to examine a different criticism-the objection that Pepper's emphasis on autonomy comes at
too great a cost in another fundamental social value, equality. 26
The rub here is that not everyone has access to a lawyer, and that,
accordingly, those who do are in a position to exercise their autonomy at the expense of those who do not. Interestingly, both Luban
and Pepper accept that autonomy and equality are fundamental values 3 2 7 and that the conflict between them, posed by unequal access
to legal services, is a serious problem.3 28 Where they differ is on
which value to subordinate. The admitted impossibility of the full
autonomy of all poses a choice between the full autonomy of some
and the full autonomy of none; Pepper elects the former 29 and
322. See Pepper, supra note 2.
323. Id. at 616-17.
324. Id.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37.

326. As Isaiah Berlin put it, "[b]oth liberty and equality are among the primary goals
pursued by human beings through many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is death
to the lambs." BERLIN, supra note 260, at 12.
327. See Pepper, supra note 2, at 616-17; Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative,supra note 23, at

639, 642-43.
328. See Pepper, supra note 2, at 619; Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 23, at

643.
329. See Pepper, supra note 2, at 619-21; Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors
Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 657, 667-68.
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Luban, the latter.3 ° Either might have ended his reply to the other
with this observation by Isaiah Berlin:
What is clear is that values can clash.... They can be
incompatible between cultures, or groups in the same culture, or between you and me. . . . We can discuss each
other's point of view, we can try to reach common ground,
but in the end what you pursue may not be reconcilable
with33the ends to which I find that I have dedicated my
life. '
This impasse is highly instructive, for several reasons. For one
thing, it is clearly a dispute about how we are to order values, not
merely about how well a particular rule implements an agreed ordering of values.3 3 2 Full autonomy can only be purchased at the
cost of diminished equality. For another thing, it is an argument
between two scholars who agree on fundamentals, at least to the
extent of casting their positions in secular egalitarian humanist
terms. Finally, what they argue about here is more than a single
rule, more even than a very central rule like confidentiality. What is
at issue here is the principle of partisanship itself, the very principle
that defines the old role morality and distinguishes it from whatever
we are to put in its place.
Pepper's argument thus takes us above the third tier of the
fourfold root, the level of roles, and up to the fourth, and last tier,
the level of ultimate values. If his argument is sound, he has derived
the old role morality from one of the loftiest of values, autonomy,
and justified its cost in another superlunary value, equality. From
the principle of partisanship most, if not all, of the rules of the old
role morality follow-subject, of course, to the caveat that in the
friction-ridden sphere in which they operate, they must actually
achieve the goal set for them in the heavens.
Disposing of Pepper's argument, therefore, is critical to Luban,
330. See Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 23, at 643-45.

331. BERLIN, supra note 260, at 12. These irreducible conflicts leave me with little
confidence in Allan Goldman's program for resolving moral disputes, in professional
ethics and elsewhere, by reference to agreed principles, "the background of shared commitments and judgments." See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 15-17. The problem is not
that professionals seek refuge in isolated professional moralities, cf id. at 17-18, but that
individual professionals differ in their ordinary moral commitments in the way that the
debate between Luban and Pepper illustrates.
332. An equally accurate way of describing the conflict between Luban and Pepper is

to say that they embrace different conceptions of equality. Luban, on this view, favors
substantive equality; Pepper favors formal. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 185-86 (1981) (distinguishing political from distributional

equality).
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and his critique is illuminating. After carefully identifying Pepper's
subordination of equality to autonomy,3 3 3 he parodies Pepper's
conclusion effectively, if mercilessly, with a reductio that he calls "executive class citizenship. ' 33 4 Allowing some citizens to have lawyers
committed to the partisanship of the old role morality while other
citizens have no lawyers at all, Luban tells us, is like creating a special class of citizenship entitled to such perks as "dandy new tax
shelters, first-refusal mineral rights in the natural wilderness, nowait federal courts unavailable to anyone else, diplomatic passports. '3 3 5 We must be careful, however, to note what kind of responses parodies and reductios are, and under what conditions they
are effective. Rather than rebut the position they address by showing it to be irrational or erroneous, they highlight what is hoped will
be unacceptable consequences under norms the parodist shares
with the intended audience. Thus Luban concludes with a direct
appeal to the reader to adopt, or re-affirm, Luban's ordering of values: "[W]ould you say, as I would, that if everyone can't have executiveclass citizenship then no one should?" 3 6 It is worth noting that the emphasis is in the original; Luban is rhetorically raising his voice.
I fully agree with the point of the parody. It is hardly a great
moral advance to suggest that the law's magnificent equality lies not
in forbidding the rich and the poor alike to sleep under bridges, 3 7
but in permitting both classes to hire a lawyer to challenge this infringement upon their autonomy. But not everyone will agree. Parodies leave open the possibility that the proponents of the parodied
position will accept the parodist's "unacceptable" consequences because they have different values or, more likely, a different ordering
of the same values. This-with some unpersuasive softening of the
edges 3 38-is precisely what Pepper does.
333. See Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 23, at 643-44.
334. Id. at 644-45.
335. Id. at 644.
336. Id. at 645.
337. The parallel between Anatole France's parody and unequal access to lawyers
under the old role morality has not escaped even so firm an advocate of that morality as
Abe Krash. Krash, supra note 16, at 39.
338. Pepper says that, even if the current distribution of legal services were as unequal as Luban's "executive class citizenship" suggests, he would "continue to think that
the better solution is to improve the distribution of legal services, not to transform lawyers into police, judges, or deceivers." Pepper, supra note 329, at 668. This softening of
the factual predicate of inequality is unconvincing, however, in view of Simon's observation that "[t]here is no practical way of equalizing access to legal services sufficiently to
preclude oppression." Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, at 50. In fact, the very administration that Luban suggested might bring us "executive class citizenship" called for, and
got, substantial cuts in subsidized legal services for the poor. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4,
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I have eschewed trying to resolve the debate between the new
role morality and the old, though it bears repeating that my sympathies lie with Luban. Moreover, I have suggested that what supports
the firmament of values at the apex of the fourfold root is as insubstantial, and as unnecessary, as the ether. My point here is that, at
these lofty elevations, the atmosphere is rarefied indeed, and the
asserted links between ultimate values and conceptions of the lawyer's role are likely to leave you breathless. For the metaethical
skeptic, the problem of establishing these links is a molehill, if not a
mirage. But those who seek right moral answers must live on the
mountain they have made.
Even if Luban can surmount this problem, there is a second
problem at a more mundane level that confronts the individual lawyer trying to live out Luban's method. Convinced though you may
be of right answers to moral questions, you face a dilemma when
you conclude that a particular cooperative scheme is not beneficial,
whether under Luban's "reasonable and important" standard or another. Are you to accept your own assessment, or that of the community as reflected in the imprimatur of the law?
To see how this dilemma arises, consider one of Luban's own
concrete examples. Suppose you are a lawyer negotiating for a client who wishes to use a great advantage in bargaining strength to
gain what strikes you as an unconscionably lopsided result. After
unsuccessfully remonstrating with the client, you might consider
withdrawing from the case. As Luban points out, however, "[it will
often, or even usually, be the case that the client will be damaged if
the lawyer withdraws," particularly where timing is critical or where
the withdrawal might raise a red flag. s" 9 Furthermore, according to
Luban, "[u]nder the Code.... the lawyer cannot withdraw in any of
these circumstances, because in all of them withdrawal would damage the client; and if the client does not grant permission to forego
3 40
use of the odious tactics, the lawyer must proceed with them.1
§ 16.7.3, at 938-39 (describing President Reagan's cuts in the National Legal Services
Corporation budget and his efforts to abolish the Corporation). Perhaps Pepper disagrees with Simon over what would be an improvement in the availability of legal services sufficient to preclude oppression. If so, this disagreement simply suggests that
Pepper's softening of the facts will hardly make them cushy for the poor.
339. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 396.
340. Id. This conclusion is based on an aggressive reading of the MODEL CODE, supra

note 14, DR 2-110(a)(2), DR 7-101(A)(3).

As Luban concedes, the Model Rules are

more lenient with respect to withdrawal for reasons of conscience. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 43, Rule 1.16 (b)(3) (permitting a lawyer to withdraw when "a client insists on
pursuing an objective the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent," even if the withdrawal will have a "material adverse effect on the interests of the client"). Even if
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This negotiation rule is but a corollary of the old role morality's
principle of partisanship, a principle Luban may have led you, as he
has led me, to reject. But even if you are convinced that, on one or
more of Luban's criteria, the old role morality, together with this
and other corollaries, fails to qualify as a beneficial cooperative
scheme, what are you to do about the fact that it is the law-law that
defenders loudly declare to be a beneficial scheme? 4 '
Luban recognizes that your general disagreement with a conception of the lawyer's role or with one of its component obligations, as opposed to disagreement with a rule's application in a
difficult case, puts you as an individual lawyer in an uncomfortable
bind. You face what Luban admits to be an unpleasant series of
dilemmas. 4 2 You can leave the practice of law (or, as in Cecilia's
case, the particular branch of practice), or you can submit to the
authority of publicly determined role obligations.3 4 3 If you stay and
submit, you must either suppress your doubts and conform to the
publicly sanctioned role norms or heed your doubts and challenge
the norms in legally acceptable ways. You may disobey openly, in
the mode of classic civil disobedience, and either be vindicated by
the legal authorities or pay the legal penalty, thus showing respect
for law.3 4 4 Alternatively, you may disobey in secret, both treating
Luban's reading of the Code is overly aggressive, it is not implausible. If the 1969 Code
does not restrict withdrawal to quite the extent Luban maintains, it certainly comes
close, and the next ABA standards, or any state by adoption of amendments to existing
ABA standards or a code of its own, certainly could.
Moreover, even if withdrawal was not improper under the old code, it is pretty clear
that staying in and making the argument was proper. That, remember, was the conclusion of the court in the aortal aneurism case, Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704
(Minn. 1962), discussed supra note 3.
341. Luban argues at length in Appendix 1 of LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, that
the old role morality is firmly ensconced in the law governing lawyers. See id. at 393-97.
Even if, as I have suggested elsewhere, his reading of the ABA's official codes-the
Model Code of 1969 and the Model Rules of 1983-is overly aggressive, see supra note
340, we can assume he is right for the purpose of showing the dilemma in which his own
reading of the law places him. See Stier, supra note 2, at 580-87 (arguing that critics of
the old role morality misconceive its place in the profession's ethical standards because
they misunderstand the relation of law and morality in positivist jurisprudence).
342. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 139.
343. Id. at 138.

344. Id. at 156. Ellmann notes that Luban does not explicitly consider an alternative
to open civil disobedience:

covert violation of laws with which one disagrees. See

Ellmann, supra note 13, at 152 n.78. I believe, as Ellmann suggests, that Luban's rejection of that alternative is implicit in his notion of legal obligation-you cannot covertly
violate even laws with which you disagree without being unfair to your fellows and jeopardizing your own moral integrity. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 4748 (proposing that because of the connection between the lawyer's obligation to the law
and respect for fellow citizens, the lawyer must offer a reason for disobeying the law). It
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your law-abiding fellow citizens unfairly3 4 5 and doing violence to
lapsing into alcoholism and other
your own conscience,346 3perhaps
47
forms of personal decay.
This is essentially the set of dilemmas the Laws of Athens posed
to Socrates in the Crito.3 4 8 Socrates had not exercised the option of
expatriation, and so, according to the Laws, had subjected himself
to their authority. Having failed to persuade the jury in the Apology 3 49 that he was innocent of violating the laws, he was bound to
accept the appointed punishment. If he sought to avoid that punishment by accepting Crito's offer of aid in escape, he would be confirming the very verdict of subversion of public values that he had so
vehemently, and recently, opposed. To save his life, in a word,
would be to sacrifice his integrity, and thus what he had lived for.
But it will be objected that this analysis whipsaws Luban. I have
argued above that the individual is not in danger of unfairness to
fellows or personal moral decay in departing from collective norms;
now I am trying to have it the other way. But there is no inconsistency here; Luban is welcome to abandon, with me, the notion that
collective decisions are morally binding on individuals who dispute
them, and with it the conclusion that individuals should, and will,
feel conscience-smitten when they violate them. But until he drops
that notion, he must live with its consequences.
One could further object that the Laws of Athens offered another alternative: persuade the public authorities that the law is
wrong, not just wrongly applied. I have included this alternative
only in its post hoc, civil disobedience form-persuade the law's
agents that the law you have violated is bad, as applied generally or
to your case. But what about changing the law in advance? Here
Luban plays both sides of the fence. On the one hand, he admits
that the option of changing the rule is not really viable from the
perspective of the individual practitioner faced with a morally objectionable role obligation. 5 0 On the other hand, in his criticism of
rules he often, implicitly or explicitly, calls for the rule to be
changed. Thus, for example, in the negotiation problem, he calls
for a change in the rules: "I suggest that rules be redrafted to allow
is also implicit in Luban's taking the civil rights movement as the paradigm of morally
legitimate disobedience. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 455.

345. See supra Subpart III.B. L.a.
346. See supra Subpart III.B. .b.
347. See LUBAN, LAWYERS

AND JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 138.

348. PLATO, Crito, supra note 70, at 53-65.
349. PLATO, Apology, in

350. See

EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO,

LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE,

supra note 70, at 42.

supra note 2, at 138.
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lawyers to forego immoral tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends without withdrawing, even if their clients insist that they use these tactics
35
or pursue these ends."- 1

Luban is quite right to point out that one can view rules from
either of two perspectives: The role agent's perspective, from which
they are unchangeable, or the role designer or legislator's perspective, from which they are reformable.3 52 Well and good-if you can
supply a common set of values and if you are in a position to wait
until the changes are made. But what is a lawyer-what are you-to
do in the meantime, which is now and the foreseeable future?
Luban fails to see that the fourfold root is more appropriate for role
designers than for role agents, for whom changing the role is simply
not a viable option.3 53
We are back to the painful dilemmas of the Crito, and here
Luban waffles. Sometimes he recommends courageous disobedience to the law; 3 54 other times, deference to the different opinions
of one's fellows, enshrined in law.3 5 5 In the last analysis, however, it
is just a matter of which horn to impale yourself on; never does he
suggest breaking out of the dilemma of the Crito. He does suggest
351. Id. at 159.
352. Id. at 138-39.
353. This point has not, however, been lost on Luban's critics. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra

note 13, at 151-52 (suggesting that Luban might use his system as the basis for reforming the lawyer codes and arguing that it too frequently calls for civil disobedience
under existing law); Wasserman, supra note 26, at 402-03 (arguing that the fourfold root
is "far more appropriate for the legislator" than for the individual role agent).
Simon, like Luban, overlooks this problem when he declines to "distinguish between ethical analysis relevant to a regulatory body promulgating rules of professional
conduct and analysis relevant to an individual lawyer operating within the limits of
promulgated rules." Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1084. Moreover, Simon
also occasionally shifts to the role designer's perspective, as in his discussion of the
confidentiality of client communications, and thus obscures the problems that confront
the role agent. See id. at 1140-43.
354. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 149-50, for Luban's discussion
of Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962), as a foil to the Lake Pleasant
case; and Luban, Partisanship,supra note 62, at 1026, for his emphatic argument that the
lawyer in the Spaulding case should have betrayed the client: "Betrayal? I suppose. Justified? You bet." See also LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 206-34 (calling
for whistle-blowing in the Pinto case); supra note 319 (Luban's position on defending
accused rapists).
355. At some risk of over-generalization, it can be said that Luban comes down more
often for disobedience in Lawyers andJustice, and more for deference in Mid-Course Correc-

tions. He does not renounce in the latter his earlier view that the dilemma posed by
individual questioning of public norms is fundamental, but he nevertheless insists on
deference. The escape from over-immersion in role is to come through the morality of
acknowledgement. As we have already seen, however, this works only at the level of
applying good rules, and it does not always work well even there.
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different arguments for staying in the dilemma, however, 356 arguments that press him toward his most ambitious claim.
3. Luban's Extramural Claim.-Luban's modest intramural claim
needs a theory of political obligation to make it work, to give its
individual adherents a reason for deferring to collective norms they
see as misguided.3 5 7 Luban's ambitious intramural claim fails to
meet this need. His Kantian argument could not show, on terms
acceptable to both him and libertarians, either that his world of relatively more cooperative schemes was better than their world of relatively few, or that they would be unfair toward their fellows if they
acted on that preference and disobeyed laws with which they disagreed. Nor did he show, in his Cecilia example, that this disobedience will come at the cost of personal moral integrity. He shows
only that it produces a more individualistic character than he likes.
What he needs, again, is an objective argument that such a character
is bad, or more precisely, morally worse than viable alternatives. If
he can show us why it is objectively bad not to defer to dubious
cooperative schemes, and if we concede (as I think we must) that law
is a necessary means of effecting cooperative schemes, then he will
have made his case for political obligation.
There are, we have seen, two avenues to moral objectivity, the
realist route and the interpretivist route. Luban relies on scholars of
both schools in his intramural arguments for legal obligation. He
does not expressly incorporate their extramural points into his position, and we cannot examine any of their arguments in detail or all
of them even in outline. We can, however, see how a representative
theorist from each school, and one on whom Luban expressly relies,
runs afoul of the problems of objective ethics in the context of political obligation.
Let us begin with the realist John Finnis, whose views on the
foundations of ethics we examined briefly in Part 11358 and on whose
356. My brand of fideism gives the opposite counsel: disobey secretly (unless the risk
of detection, together with the severity of the sanction, is too great) and in good conscience. See infra Subpart IV.A.
357. Luban gives principles, within liberalism, for rejecting some of the more egregious laws. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUsTICE, supra note 2, at 43-49 (arguing against
discriminatory laws). What Luban fails to give are reasons for not rejecting more, those
laws that the lawyer thinks are (merely) misguided as to accepted values, or which implement orderings of values the lawyer personally rejects. See id. at 43 ("I shall not stress [a
beneficiality requirement], for almost all laws are enacted to benefit someone or other,
and it is likely that almost all of them succeed in doing so.").
358. See FINNIS, supra note 81, at 59-75 (setting forth knowledge as a basic good).
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theory of political obligation Luban explicitly relies. 3 59 Finnis begins with basic and self-evident goods, apprehended directly as both
basic and good by reason in a special moral mode.3 60 He notes,
however, that these basic goods may conflict, as we saw in the last
section. Such conflicts suggest that it is not enough to discover objectively good goods; we also need an objectively valid means of coordinating them. And there is one such means: Reason in its
special moral mode, itself one of the self-evidently basic goods,
structures our pursuit of goods according to fundamental principles
of practical reasonableness that are also self-evident. 3 6 ' This operation of self-evident and rational moral method upon self-evident basic human goods, the principles of natural law, produces rational
moral directives.36 2
One of the most basic principles of practical reason is "the requirement of favoring and fostering the common good of one's4
communities.13 63 These include one's political community,3
where the notion of common good, in the sense of "general welfare" or "public interest," has its proper application. 36 5 Appealing
to these self-evident principles, particularly the requirement of pursuing the common good, Finnis argues not just that a political community with relatively more collectively beneficial schemes requires
coordination through a coercive authority-the factual point Luban
makes about the need for law-but also that such a community is
good, and better than the alternatives-the normative point Luban
needs to make in order to answer libertarians and allied critics.3 6
But Finnis, rigorous Thomist that he is, is not content to leave
matters there. He raises, and addresses in detail, the next logical
question: What guarantees the insights of the practical reasonableness on which political legitimacy (and much else besides) seems to
359. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 32 n.2; Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 455 n.86.
360. See FINNIS, supra note 81, at 81-90; see also supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
361. FINNIS, supra note 81, at 100-03; see also id. at 103-26 (listing Finnis's description
of each of his nine requirements of practical reason); Stier, supra note 2, at 590 ("Persons of good character are disposed both to recognize and to choose that which is good
or right when engaged in the process of practical reasoning.").
362. See FINNIS, supra note 81, at 103 ("[W]e could say that the requirements [of practical reasonableness] express the 'natural law method' of working out the (moral) 'natural law' from the first (pre-moral) 'principles of natural law.' ").
363. Id. at 125.
364. Id. at 147-50.
365. Id. at 154-56.
366. See generally id. at 161-350. For Finnis's particular discussion of legal obligation,
see id.at 297-343. As a corollary of grounding obedience to law on the objective goodness of law, Finnis outlines a solution to the problem of unjust laws. See id. at 351-66.
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rest? The answer is God, and not just any god. It is not the aloof
god of Plato and Aristotle, approachable by unredeemed human
reason, but the self-revealing God of Christianity, opaque to pagan
eyes:
Without some revelation more revealing than any that
Plato or Aristotle may have experienced, it is impossible to
have sufficient assurance that the uncaused cause of all the
good things of this world (including our ability to understand them) is itself a good that one could love, personal in
a way that one might imitate, a guide that one should follow, or a guarantor of anyone's practical reasonableness. 6 7
I have followed Finnis into the heavens not to declare that they
are empty, but to note how far he takes us beyond the three walls of
secularism, egalitarianism, and humanism within which Luban set
out to find his foundations.
It is one thing to resign oneself, with Hardy, to the harsh reality
that "He who breathes All's Well to these/ Breathes no All's Well to
me."-3 6 8 It is quite another to resign oneself to the prospect that
those who breathe "Thou shalt" in His name mean it to apply not
only among themselves, but also to you and me, and with the force
not just of might, but also of right. One of the chief tasks of liberal
thought lo, these many years, has been to deliver us from that prospect; we are entitled to be more than a little surprised to learn that
liberal thought is looking in that direction not for attack, but for
deliverance. 6 9
It is possible, of course, not to follow Finnis behind the certitudes of intuition; one can simply stop there.3 70 Alternatively, one
367. Id. at 398.
368. Thomas Hardy, The Impercipient, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE,

supra note 106, at 1740, 1741.

369. Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLIcs 295 (1975) (concluding with
the words "Speak, God"). It is, of course, possible to ground morality on God without
reference to the Christian revelation, but that approach raises the Euthyphro problem.
See supra note 97. On the incompatibility of contemporary liberalism with appeals to

religious foundations, see

FISHKIN, supra note 78, at
MAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980)

153-55. See also BRUCE A. ACKER(noting that the liberal principle of
neutrality requires that "nobody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting
a privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied the rest of us"). But see KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE vii (1988) (maintaining
that "citizens and officials in this liberal democracy properly rely on their religious convictions when they decide what political actions to take").
370. Not surprisingly, one standard approach of liberal political theorists, wary of the
problem of deriving an "ought" from an "is," is to leave matters there. See, e.g., Robin
West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule
of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 820-21 (1986) (arguing that legal liberals, committed to
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can take the interpretive turn. This is the approach Ronald Dworkin
takes, and he nicely illustrates its problems. Rejecting traditional
theories of legal obligation, 3 7' Dworkin offers a theory grounded in
community and resting on two premises.3 7 2 First, most of us believe
that membership in certain communities creates certain moral obligations on members, even without their consent. In his words,
[m]ost people think that they have associative obligations
just by belonging to groups defined by social practice,
which is not necessarily a matter of choice or consent, but
that they can lose these obligations if other members of the
group do not extend them the benefits of belonging to the
group. 37
Second, political communities of the kind he recommends3 74 are
like these obligation-generating communities in the relevant
ways. 3 75 From these premises, Dworkin concludes that political
communities of the kind he recommends generate morally binding
obligations even on members who do not consent.3 7 6
Dworkin argues at great length to show that the second premise
is in fact true, that his preferred kind of political communities are
like the other kinds of obligation-creating communities.3 7 7 But even
assuming, arguendo, that both premises are true, Dworkin's conclusion does not follow. What he has proved is not that his recommended political communities generate binding moral obligations,
but that "we" or "most people" think they do. To prove his point,
Dworkin must add an additional premise-that what most people
think is obligatory really is obligatory, binding on those who
disagree.
One way to prove that premise would be to show that it is right
the separation of facts and values, rest their arguments for the morality of law on "intuitively grasped and noncontingent moral truths").
371. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 190-95 (rejecting tacit consent, the duty to be just,
and notions of fair play as explanations for the moral authority of law).
372. See id. at 195-216.
373. Id. at 196.
374. The kind of political community Dworkin recommends is one in which the laws,
whether made by judges or legislators, have what he calls integrity. Very briefly, laws
have integrity if they can be shown to fit into a coherent interpretation of the legal system as a whole. Id. at 165-66.
375. Id. at 206-15.
376. See id. at 214 ("A community of principle[, one that is based on integrity,] ... can
claim the authority of a genuine associative community and can therefore claim moral
legitimacy-that its collective decisions are matters of obligation and not bare power-in
the name of fraternity.").
377. See id. at 206-15.
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by the sort of transcendental standard the realists assert, a prospect
Dworkin mocks.1 78 Another way, bordering on fideism, would be to
show that all members of the relevant political communities accept
the premise and thus by departing from what most members think
moral, dissenters depart from a standard they themselves accept.
But such a claim seems improbable in any existing political community, and Dworkin never asserts it. Instead he argues that trying to
find some kind of objectivity behind his original major premise is
pointless.3 7 9 If that is so, however, 8 0 then the critical question for
Dworkin's theory of legal obligation remains: Why should you as a
dissenter consider yourself bound by the opinion of other members
of a community you did not voluntarily join?
The positions of Finnis and Dworkin, while not exhaustive of
the possibilities, are sufficient to show the problems that are likely to
arise in other attempts to take either of the two paths of objectivist
ethics, the realist or the interpretivist. Either they will, like the realist Finnis, rely on insights inaccessible to some of us, or they will,
like the interpretivist Dworkin, elevate the standards of particular
human communities to normative status. Rather than examine ways
to surmount these problems and build a theory of political obligation, I shall take a different course.
IV.

IN DEFENSE OF A FIDEIST LAWYERS' ETHICS

Let us now take stock of where we are. Looking back, we have
not demolished the twin foundations, objective ethics and political
obligation, on which Luban and Simon erect their theories of legal
ethics. But we have seen some of the problems with these foundations, both in themselves 38 ' and as the basis for a system of legal
ethics.3 8 2 Seeing those problems, however, is hardly a sufficient
ground for rejecting Luban's and Simon's systems. In addition, we
must see that a more satisfactory system can be built upon alternative, skeptical premises.
To some extent, we began to clear the ground for that alternative in Part III, where I showed that fideism does not fall prey to the
378. See id. at 80-81; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 172-73 (1985)
(discussing the "incomprehensible metaphors" of philosophers who believe that propositions such as the injustice of slavery really are "out there").
379. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 80-85; DWORKIN, supra note 378, at 171-77.
380. And it is not. See Moore, supra note 78, at 952-57 (suggesting that Dworkin's
arguments on this point are paradoxical, if not self-contradictory).
381. See supra Part II.
382. See supra Part III.
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problems Luban claimed to find with any liberal lawyers' ethic other
than his own. Now we must turn to two great problems peculiar to
skepticism, problems that Luban and Simon implicitly seek to avoid
in the very adoption of their objectivist and legitimist premises.
First, when, if ever, could we accept the state's coercion of dissidents to participate in a beneficial cooperative scheme? And second, by what, if neither law nor public morality, will individuals who
follow the fideist course be restrained? I will address these questions respectively as the problem of political illegitimacy and the
problem of ethical skepticism.
I think these problems are at the root of why Luban and Simon
have turned from a more individualist lawyers' ethic to their present
position of deference to public norms. s83 The problem is not so
much that "no one after drinking old wine desires new," or that
each finds that "the old is good. ' " 8 4 They have tasted the new wine
of individual moral responsibility, and they know that in important
ways it is better than the old. But it is heady stuff, and it threatens to
burst the old wineskins of political legitimacy and objective morality, and with them the comfortable confines of a lawyerly morality of
rules and exceptions. It is this loss, not the loss of the old wine, that
they fear, for they themselves have rejected the old wine of absolute
deference to role obligation. And yet, to preserve the old wineskins,
they would dilute the new wine with the old, producing a prima facie
obligation to obey collective norms. Before we accept the admixture of the old-and before we drink too deeply of the new-we
must see what will be left, what will contain the new wine if the old
wineskins are burst.
A.

Problems with Political Illegitimacy

Why do liberals like Luban and Simon insist on political legitimacy? The reason, perhaps more psychological than logical, is that
they fear the alternatives, which they take to be libertarianism and
anarchism. 8 5 At the root of this fear is the mistaken notion that
acceptable coercion on the part of the collective and morally obliga383. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at 1084 n.l ("I now think that I was
mistaken to argue in an earlier article [Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, at 130-44] that the
critique of conventional advocacy presented there required abandonment of the lawyer's
professional role."); Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 433 ("This [later, and
more role-deferential] way of understanding the fourfold root avoids the unpleasant result of the first, consequentialist interpretation, namely the extreme attenuation of professional duty that it implies.").
384. Luke 5:36-39 (Revised Standard).
385. Luban is quite explicit about this in Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 453-
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tory obedience on the part of the individual stand or fall together.
In Dworkin's words, "no general policy of upholding the law with
steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a source of
genuine obligations. "386 Luban feels morally comfortable with the
collective's coercion of dissidents only if he can be convinced that
they are morally obliged to obey. Thus if his way of thinking fails, if
we cannot point to some inclusive set of moral norms under which
citizens are morally bound to obey laws with which they disagree,
coercion is drastically curtailed, if not precluded. We are left with
libertarianism, which tightly restricts collective coercion, or with anarchism, which rejects it entirely. Luban, committed as he is to a
wider range of collectively beneficial schemes than either libertarianism or anarchism is likely to produce, recoils from this loss of
political community and casts about for what he takes to be its precondition, an obligation on the part of citizens to obey laws that
putatively provide collective benefits.
Such an obligation is not, however, a necessary precondition of
Luban's wider range of collectively beneficial schemes. On the assumptions of metaethical skepticism one can accept governmental
coercion without accepting citizens' reciprocal moral obligation to
obey.3 8 7 This is because skepticism denies a critical premise Luban
implicitly affirms-that individuals have a prima facie right to do as
they like-and a corollary of that principle-that compelling them to
do otherwise requires a trumping of that right with a moral duty to
obey.3 8 On moral skeptical grounds, by contrast, the libertarian
and anarchist quo warranto is a two-edged sword; to their question,
"By what right do you coerce me?" the skeptic replies, "By what
right do you claim to resist?" The peculiarity of the legitimists' predicament is that they accept without question the presumptive right
to resist and yet feel embarrassed if they cannot find a right to
coerce.

38 9

62. See also Stick, supra note 181, at 394 (suggesting affinity between moral skepticism
and libertarianism).
386. DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 191.
387. Cf. WOLFF, supra note 283, at 79 (noting that even philosophical anarchists-

those who reject the possibility of legitimate coercion-can acknowledge the desirability
of schemes requiring the coordination of large groups of people).
388. See ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974) ("Individuals have
rights, and there are things no person or group can do to them (without violating their
rights)."). In suggesting that Nozick thus assumes a critical conclusion, I am following
Left. See Left, supra note 77, at 1240-41. The fact that Nozick has subsequently found
his libertarian conclusions "seriously inadequate" does not mean that those conclusions
did not rest on the premise of individual rights. NoziCK, supra note 250, at 17.
389. This is an error akin to the illogical linking of skepticism with relativism. Just as
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Where, then, does this skeptical divorce of coercion from morally obligatory obedience leave us, if not with anarchism or libertarianism? Our view of law from the position of both role agent and
role designer or legislator would dramatically change. As
rulemakers, or as members of a political majority, we would have to
accept that coercing dissidents is sometimes the lesser evil. We
must either coerce them against their wills or do without beneficial
cooperative schemes; sometimes we must swallow hard and choose
the latter.3 9 ° (And if we could be convinced, say, that a sales tax on
luxury boats and cars was financing head start programs without
collateral harm to the poor, at least a few of us would not swallow
very hard.3 91 ) We recognize, however, that dissidents need not feel
morally compelled to obey those of our laws that strike them as
wrong-headed or evil. Our morals do not apply to them by their
own choice; we for our part know our values are not universal.
This, in turn, should alter our attitude toward dissidents. If the
morality behind our law is not universal, we can no longer think
them wrong or evil merely because they disobey the law. Rather, we
will have to assess their disobedience on its own merits, looking, for
example, to its motivation and its impact. In particular, we can respect them under our own standards, if they act with what counts for
us as personal integrity. (If Freedman's Robin Hood is not to your
liking, think instead of Luban's Cecilia.) This would hold equally
true for dissidents who are fellow secular egalitarian humanists and
for others. The chief difference would be that we share a wider
range of background assumptions with the former and are thus less
likely to find ourselves in substantive disagreement.
Parallel changes would occur in our own posture as subjects of
the law, particularly when we face laws with which we ourselves disagree. 9 2 With the removal of the moral prima facie case for obediit is wrong to deduce, from the absence of moral absolutes, that anything is morally
permissible, so it is wrong to deduce, from the premise that obedience is not morally
obligatory, that collective coercion is morally forbidden. Both deductions assume a midair position from which toleration is pronounced right or good, a midair position which,
on skeptical premises, does not exist.
390. Cf WOLFF, supra note 283, at 81-82 (projecting an affluent society free of state
coercion on extremely optimistic-one might fairly say Utopian-economic and technological assumptions).
391. Compare

RICHARD

A.

EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF

(1985) (condemning progressive taxation, transfer payments, and
other Progressive and New Deal programs on libertarian grounds) with BERLIN, supra
note 260, at 12 (arguing that liberty may have to give way at times to make room for
various social welfare programs).
392. Here my position is quite close to that of the philosophical anarchists. See
EMINENT DOMAIN

1992]

BEYOND THE NEW ROLE MORALITY

ence, conscientious dissidence should come at substantially less
cost. And, these costs should not be too heavily discounted, for
they are often paid in the hard currency of shattered lives, including,
as Luban himself makes ominous allusion, the size of dissidents' liquor bills.3 9 3 On illegitimist premises, to decline to take your punishment or to refuse to come out and fight (with the customary "like
a man" stated or implied) is not to be a coward or a crank-or at
least not by any standards other than those of the taunter.
This is not a particularly radical departure from our current
moral practice. We already celebrate, rather than execrate, the
Minutemen who returned ball for ball, not from the tidy formations
of conventional warfare, but "from behind each fence and farm-yard
wall." 9 4 And, when the prospect of prevailing is particularly low, as
it was for Spanish Jews in the Inquisition, we do not even require a
formal declaration of independence. 9 5
If the illegitimist position removes the Hobson's choice between open disobedience and bad conscience, its alternative is not
altogether easy. On illegitimist premises, it is no moral solace to do
what the law requires, if you find it objectionable under your own
system of values (except, of course, to the extent those values include deferring to the collective will in the case in question). On the
other hand, the illegitimist position does not free you from the duty
of open opposition only to deliver you to a duty of invariable private
disobedience. Prudential concerns may certainly come into play, in
particular the likely cost to you and others of your getting caught.
Obeying will sometimes be justified by the excessive cost of resisting, even if one's conscience cannot be entirely clear in such
cases.

39 6

To summarize, it is possible to have acceptable collective coerWOLFF, supra note 283, at 71 (describing how anarchists "treat all governments as

nonlegitimate bodies whose commands must be judged and evaluated in each instance
before they are obeyed").
393. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 138.
394. HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, Paul Revere's Ride, in FAVORITE POEMS OF
HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW 34 (1947).
395. Some cultures go further in this direction than ours, as evidenced by the Shi'a
Muslim practice of taqiya, which involves concealment of one's private religious views, by
dissimulation if necessary. EDWARD RICE, CAPTAIN SIR RICHARD FRANCIS BURTON 2, 97
(1990).
396. See'GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 140 (giving an example of a situation in which a
lawyer's knowingly submitting false documents to a court is "a morally praiseworthy
act," but one that the lawyer may justifiably forego rather than risk his or her career);
Stier, supra note 2, at 603 ("Such behavior may be desirable, but moral courage is something only the self-righteous demand of us at all times.").
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cion on illegitimist premises, though acceptable within a coherent
fideist morality, not in terms of an objective common morality.
There are, however, two troubling aspects of the illegitimist position. These aspects correspond to the two perspectives from which
we have already viewed the illegitimist position-that of the individual facing coercion and that of the collective facing conscientious,
but secret, disobedience.
From the perspective of the individual, the illegitimist position
raises the horrifying Hobbesian prospect that government has no
moral limits. That, so far as it goes, is true. But it does not follow,
as it does for Hobbes, that anything the government does is morally
justified as long as order is maintained, or that individual liberty is
necessarily traded at a discount. The collective can value individual
freedom as well as cooperative schemes; indeed, a society that respects individual freedom can itself be seen as a great collective benefit. Moreover, the system can also insist on the rule of law, though
as a matter of preference or prudence rather than absolute moral
necessity. You can appeal to the system's own values, even if they
are not yours, and even if they are not in the order of the cosmos.
The fact that they are not in the order of the cosmos may, indeed, be
an advantage. Counterbalancing the fact that no coercion is morally
forbidden is the fact that none is morally justified;3 9 7 those who coerce you have no excuse, no answer but to take responsibility.
There are no cosmic shoulders to which they can legitimately shift
it.
From the collective's side, there is the problem of disobedience.
Here we return to a problem we touched upon earlier: what happens if we universalize the maxim that you obey only the laws with
which you agree? We saw above that, even if the result is a libertarian world, if we are to answer the libertarians within Kant's ethical
framework, we must still show that a world with relatively more collectively beneficial schemes is preferable. Having despaired of that
answer in this Part, and having taken up our preferred world as a
pure preference without unassailable moral foundations, we now
face the practical consequences themselves. These come in the
form of a more and a less drastic concern.
The more drastic concern is that, by acting on illegitimist principles, you will destroy the law, reducing your polity to the status of
Belfast, if not Beirut. This echoes one of the concerns that the Laws
of Athens raised in the Crito, a concern that need not detain us long.
397. See Singer, supra note 47, at 54.
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Luban, along with a host of others, dismisses it as dubious.3 98 What
Beirut and Belfast lack is not a respect for law, but a respect for life.
And respect for the latter does not invariably follow from a respect
for the former, as the fastidious judiciary of the Third Reich made
clear.3 99 Respect for the law, of course, neither caused nor precluded the Nazis' legalized atrocities. But, if the Crito is to be
credited, respect for the law did cost the life of Socrates.
The less drastic, and more plausible, concern with the illegitimist position is not that the legal order will totally collapse, but
that, in the language of the economists, its maintenance costs will be
marginally higher. Enforcement costs are lower in a world where
conscientious folk obey laws reflexively rather than by calculation,
moral or otherwise. In either world, Holmes's amoral bad men will
obey only by calculation, so they do not weigh significantly in the
comparison. The critical difference is what the conscientious will do
under the two alternatives. In a system where their obedience to law
is reflexive, their obedience adds nothing to the collective's enforcement costs after an initial investment in bringing them around to a
deferential position. They obey as a matter of conscience, perhaps
even habit, and thus public enforcement mechanisms are not
needed to deter them. By contrast, in a system where the conscientious obey only those laws with which they agree, enforcement resources must be deployed to keep them in line, just as they must be
for Holmes's bad men. Though their motives may differ, the outward effect on enforcers is the same: obedience from either class
will come only at the public cost of a credible threat that sanctions
will be visited upon violators.
Faced with this addition to the pool of potential law violators, a
strict consequentialist would be tempted toward the following
course: persuade the conscientious to obey reflexively, even if the
only justification is lowered enforcement costs. But the gain in
lower administrative costs seems to me unwarranted by the price of
obedience. It is one thing to be told that the legal order will collapse, if you violate laws with which you disagree; it is quite another
to be told that your disobedience will merely make it a bit more
398. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 36; see also Mackie, supra note
210, at 147 (summarizing and defending similar doubts of Raz and Woozley). One
might also argue that what is lacking among members of these societies is not just respect, but love. For a discussion of fears of building political systems on love rather than
respect, see infra text accompanying notes 450-452.
399. See generally Ingo Miller, Hitler's Justice (Deborah L. Schneider trans., 1991) (detailing the use of the legal system to perpetrate atrocities).
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costly for the law's proponents to have it their way. 400 The legal
order, if not civilization itself, already comes at a fairly high cost in
individual discontentment, and I see no reason to inflate its sticker
price with an additional surcharge. 40 '
A final point in favor of the illegitimist position, and for some
perhaps the most compelling, is this: It best fits both our practice,
the way we actually deal with the issue of collective coercion, and
that practice, in turn, reflects our fundamental commitments to social order. The one thing any polity, including ours, cannot do is
suspend coercion until it is justified to everyone's satisfaction. We
will not suspend the enforcement of collectively beneficial schemes
until we can show coercion to be consistent with either the moral
order of the cosmos or a set of beliefs to which everyone in our
polity subscribes. We will not let Nietzsche's blond beasts run rife,
on any argument anyone might make.40 2
B.

Problems with Ethical Skepticism

Ethical skepticism raises two basic sets of problems relevant to
our purposes. The first set comprises problems with abandoning
400. This may actually be an appealing, rather than an off-putting, prospect. If Prohibition is any indication, many of us might think ourselves better off if more laws were to
collapse under the weight of their enforcement costs. See LUBAN, LAwYERS AND JUSTICE,
supra note 2, at 36 (discussing "evil, unfair, or grossly stupid laws"). Disobedience, in
fact, might work to place a kind of Pigouvian tax on the overproduction of marginally
popular laws. The tax might even be roughly proportional to the law's unpopularity:
the less popular the law, the more widespread the disobedience, and hence the more
costly the enforcement. The proponents of such laws can, of course, externalize these
costs through the tax system to a significant extent, but that itself may come back to
haunt them. Indeed, it seems more likely that voters will be aroused by the cumulative
effect of enforcement costs than by the direct effects of any particular special interest
legislation.
401. The degree of deference in such a system could, however, be set significantly
lower than the amount of deference Luban and Simon suggest. See Mackie, supra note
210, at 151-57 (calling for the invention of a prima facie duty to obey the law as a means
of reducing enforcement costs and noting that this duty could be overruled in particular
cases).
402. This is not to say that we should disregard Nietzsche's argument that we insist on
checking them out of spite or, to use his term, ressentiment. See NIETZSCHE, supra note
300, at 360. Though we cannot rebut that charge, we can answer it with the observation
that, if it is true, we have fallen short of our own standard, which is to do the right thing
for the right reason. Even if we have not yet attained that goal, neither has Nietzsche
shown that it is unattainable. As Philippa Foot has remarked: "[I]f Nietzsche extends
the range of experience in which the standard of honesty about motives applies, moralists should not take this amiss." Philippa Foot, Nietzsche's Immoralism, N.Y. REV. BooKs,
June 13, 1991, at 18, 22. For a suggestion that it is attainable, consistent with Nietz-

sche's own values,

see BERTRAND RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 799-800

(1946) (dialogue between Buddha and Nietzsche).
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ethical objectivity. The solution that I recommend to those
problems, fideist community, in turn presents the second set of
problems. I will address both sets of problems from a position of
secular egalitarian humanism, though I will borrow frequently from
40 3
the vocabulary of western theology.
1. Problems with Abandoning Ethical Objectivity. -The practical
consequences of abandoning ethical objectivity have long bedeviled
those who follow this course. 4 0 4 These problems, sometimes raised
by skeptics themselves, sometimes by their opponents, fall under
two main headings: Harms that skepticism will inflict on its adherents and harms that skeptics will inflict upon others. These standard objections recur in the context of legal ethics, with a telling
degree of emotion. When the focus is on the social effects of skepticism, the emotion is frequently horror, abhorrence, and outrage;
when the focus shifts to the effects on skeptics themselves, the emotion is quite often sympathy, or even pity. But the two responses,
different though they are, have a deep common root-extreme fear
of the practical consequences of loosing morality from its ancient
moorings in the mind of God, the order of the cosmos, or the mores
of a particular culture.
Worries of the first sort, those for the souls of the skeptics
themselves, inform Simon's effort to base his system on law rather
than morality. Recourse to any form of morality, he argues, leaves
the opponent of the old role morality practically disadvantaged and
psychologically alone. These problems are afortioricompounded, as
we have seen, for skeptics, who make no claims for the objectivity of
their moral positions.40 5 Thus, for example, Michael Moore, whom
403. In assuming that theological analogies usefully illuminate political and ethical
issues, I am following Luban, who follows Levinson. See Luban, Difference Made Legal,
supra note 71, at 2157-58 (citing SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988)); see
also THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 59-71 (1935) ("An Analogy
between Law and Theology"). The analogies are likely to be enlightening, it seems to
me, if only because the language of theology addresses the same human condition in an
older and richer vocabulary. In this sense, theological language is now to modern political and ethical language what Latin once was to the medieval languages of Europe. Of
course, there is a risk that, to an increasingly large audience, theological language is
today what Latin is today--dead.

See JOHN A.T. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD 41-44

(1963).
404. See CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSO80-81 (1932) (discussing philosophers criticized by contemporary orthodox religious opponents for destroying the foundations of morality); PURCELL, supra note 125, at
159-78 (discussing a similar criticism leveled at the legal realists).
405. See supra text accompanying note 206.
PHERS
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we encountered earlier as a proponent of moral realism, maintains
that
[t]he psychological consequence of this [abandonment
of claims to ethical objectivity] for the skeptic is to devalue
his own values. Even those things that he most cherishes
he will regard on a par with his taste, e.g., for watermelons:
a purely subjective, arbitrary preference. He will think that
the difference between preferences regarding watermelons
and preferences regarding concentration camps will only
be one of relative strength.40 6
Some suggest that this makes skeptics supporters of the status quo
by default, 0 7 which, for lawyers, means the unquestioning acceptance of client ends.40 8 Others go so far as to suggest that, faced
with the groundlessness of their moral positions, skeptics are at risk
of sliding downward into moral indifference and personal decay. 40 9
But skeptics do not just abandon our common moral foundations; they threaten to subvert them. This leads to the second problem, and a less sympathetic tone of criticism. The suspicion seems
to be that hidden in the dark attic of every skeptic is a picture of
Dorian Gray. In a somewhat different context, Luban illuminates
the lurid details in portraying "the Bohemian, the noble savage, Mr.
Natural, the man or woman beyond roles.""'0 The tone, perhaps
406. Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1063-64. Among others who worry over
distinguishing morality from mere taste, the preference (in terms of examples, at least)
runs strongly in favor of ice cream over watermelons. See DWORKIN, supra note 378. at
170; GREENAWALT, supra note 200, at 27; ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE 14 (Joan
C. Callahan ed., 1988) [hereinafter ETHICAL ISSUES]; Hanna Pitkin, A Comment on Professor
Waldron, 77 CAL. L. REV. 591, 594 (1989); Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 12, at

1120. Until recently only two flavors, chocolate and vanilla, have been offered, but
Dworkin is now offering rum raisin in Law's Empire. See DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 81.
407. See UNGER, supra note 88, at 12; see also Stick, supra note 181, at 394 (arguing that
"the prime liberal value of tolerance arises from a skepticism about shared community
standards regarding religious and moral values"); West, supra note 81, at 1491-99 (noting the serious, but not unavoidable, tendency of nonobjectivist theories of value to
slide into "quietism").
408. Deborah Rhode has noted, and tried to rebut, the argument that moral skepticism plays into the hands of the old role morality by giving the absence of moral absolutes as an excuse for deferring to the wishes of clients. See Rhode, supra note 15, at 617,
620-23.
409. See Reed E. Loder, Moral Skepticism and Lawyers, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 47, 56-57.
Moore does not go that far, but he suggests that "[i]f nihilism is not the consequence of
skepticism, neither is the kind of passionate commitment to one's ideals [that is] possible
only if one believes that they are right." Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1064; see
also Cornell, supra note 103, at 312-13 (moral skepticism tends to produce a paralyzing
sense of purposelessness).
410. LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE, supra note 2, at 115.
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even more than the content, bespeaks the depth of the fear. What
one of the more skeptical of the legal realists noted in 1933 is
equally true today: "belief that such common decency and scrupulousness as are left would disappear with right and ought is still widespread and powerful." ''
And even if the skeptics themselves are well-meaning and wellbehaved, what defense does their philosophy leave us against those
who are neither? On that issue the level of anxiety runs especially
high, and the tone of criticism comes closest to paranoia. Critics
of legal realism invoked the specter of Nazism and Stalinism, arguing that such evils could be resisted only from a moral fortress
founded upon objective ethics, a foundation that skeptical legal realists were sapping.4 1 Unilateral moral disarmament against the Nazis is still among the favorite bogeys of skepticism's critics; Moore's
watermelons-or-Auschwitz dilemma is a case in point.4"'
The answers to these objections to skepticism lie in the concept
of fideist community. To see why this is so, the first point to note is
that the fear of skepticism's degenerating into the Beatnikism Luban
parodies is akin to what we identified earlier as the logical mistake of
believing that skepticism leads inevitably to nihilism. Just as it is
763, 766-67 (1933) (reviewing
(1933)); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 81, at 168-69 ("One reason why conservatives and traditionalists attack reflection is
that they fear the uncertainty that seems to follow from it, the situation in which the best
lack all conviction."). The tone tends to be even harsher toward those skeptics who are
teachers; the perceived risk here is that they will drag their students down with them into
the black hole of cynicism. Compare Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) ("Teaching cynicism may, and perhaps probably does, result in
the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation.") with Anthony T.
Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 966 (1981)
(distinguishing "skepticism about particular truth claims" from "cynical carelessness about
the effort to generate such propositions and to establish their validity," even when the
former leads one, as it did in the case of Socrates, "to reject every account of what the
truth is"). The cynics Carrington fears, it is worth noting, are explicitly those who do
not believe "that legal principles actually influence the exercise of power," a belief that
metaethical skeptics can maintain quite comfortably. Carrington, supra, at 227.
412. PURCELL, supra note 125, at 161-62, 178.
413. Moore, Moral Reality, supra note 81, at 1064; see also Heidi M. Hurd, Relativistic
Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1466-71 (1988)
(stating that the "relativist thus tacitly accepts perpetuation of barbarism, chauvinism,
sadism, and so forth by arguing both that such practices are relative to a group's beliefs
and thus cannot be externally criticized, and that such practices are internally consistent
and thus cannot be internally criticized"); FISHKIN, supra note 78, at 140-49 (arguing
that metaethical skepticism poses its adherents with the dilemma of arbitrarily imposing
their arbitrary views on others or lapsing into a relativism that cannot condemn the
Nazis); Rhode, supra note 15, at 622 n. 114 (citing the use of the Nazi example against
moral skepticism).
411. Walter Nelles, Book Review, 33 COLUM. L.
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possible that, faced with the absence of external values, one will decline to embrace any value, so it is possible that, faced with the fideist possibility of choosing one's own values, one will choose to be
committed, as a limiting case, to noncommitment, to radical contingency. That this avenue is open has long been recognized; it is the
way of the Underground Man4 14 if not of Rameau's nephew.4 15 And
there is no denying either that moral skepticism opens this path, or
that, on skeptical premises, there is no moral high ground, no "midair position," from which to condemn it. Nevertheless, to say that
skepticism opens the possibility (or, if you prefer, poses the threat)
of such a life is not to say that it either requires such a life or precludes others. The contrary, on both counts, is the case. The
Christ, the Prophet, and the Buddha (to name but three) also
beckon.416
Commitment to the way of the Underground Man, to following
the immediate whims of the id in all things, may logically and practically preclude community with others, but that is hardly true of
other forms of commitment. You can have communion with those
who share your creed, who are committed to the things to which you
are committed. These may be as mundane as hobbies and pastimes
or as significant as theological positions, political causes, and scholarly schools. And in any of these areas, the common commitment
may be to matters of process as well as, or perhaps instead of, substance-commitments to such things as good sportsmanship and
fair play, religious toleration, political freedom, and scholarly objectivity. Transcending but potentially informing all of these kinds and
levels of common commitment, one can simply be committed to another as a friend, as someone with whom one shares mutual respect
and concern.
The personal and ideological commitment that fideist communities at once rest upon and foster is, in turn, the answer to two
other objections to skepticism. It is true, on skeptical premises, that
one's moral commitments are in a sense no more firmly grounded in
objective and external reality than one's preference for chocolate
over vanilla or Bach over Beat. But an Elvis fan club is not a fideist
414. See Dostoevsky, supra note 250, at 52.
415. See DENIS DIDEROT, RAMEAU'S NEPHEW AND OTHER WORKS (Jacques Barzun &
Ralph H. Bowen trans., 1975).
416. See generally BARNES, supra note 110, at 3-28, 50 (1967) (analyzing the position of
the Underground Man in detail, and concluding that "those who hold that the arbitrary
caprice of the Underground Man is the natural corollary of existentialist freedom are
wrong"); DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 104, at 16 (arguing that life of pure contingency is
possible, but not necessary).
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moral community. The difference between the two is not what they
rest on, but the level at which their members hold their objects.
Your moral commitments have to do with how you orient yourself in
the world, with what you think really matters, with what you are fundamentally committed to-in a word, with what you are. And in this
sense, the moral approaches, and perhaps subsumes, the religious 4

17

and even the metaphysical. 41 8 In this sense, the fideist's

moral commitments are hardly mistakable for taste in melons.
At the margin, the values one lives for become what one dies
for, a point the skeptic Oliver Wendell Holmes emphasized before
the advent of the Nazis.4" 9 This (to answer melodrama with melodrama) is the reply to those who say that moral skepticism leaves no
answer to the Nazis: It leaves the only answer they will understand.4 20 As Singer points out: "What protects us against Nazism is
not the belief that reason can prove it wrong. What protects us is
outrage."

42

1

Beyond that, the very groundlessness of fideism may operate as
a check in the realm of personal morality in the same way that illegitimacy operates as a check in the political sphere. Over against both
Luban's beatniks and all those whose morality claims to be really
right, fideists face an awesome ambiguity. They are ultimately responsible for not only what they will live for or even what they will
die for, but also what they must sometimes kill for, a responsibility
that cannot be laid anywhere else. They may, of course, discuss it
with their friends, which itself is an important check on individual
idiosyncrasy, but they are ultimately responsible for whom they take
as friends. As Sartre has shown, the moral advice you get depends
4 22
on whom you ask, and whether you take it is up to you.

417. See PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 153-63 (1949); ROBINSON,
supra note 403, at 46-47; cf. Simon, supra note 182, at 506 ("all normative questions are
fundamentally religious").
418. See TILLICH, supra note 115, at 1-31 (identifying courage as fundamental to ontology as well as ethics in Western philosophy). But cf. BARNES, supra note 110, at 379-99
(criticizing Tillich and other "new theologians" in their use of existentialist categories).
419. See Holmes, supra note 81, at 41, 44.
420. See ACKERMAN, supra note 369, at 17 (1980) (stating that those who "celebrat[e]
the power of the powerful to transcend all talk of good and evil . . . surely will understand me when I say that I'm willing to fight for my rival understanding of the world").
421. Singer, supra note 47, at 55.

422. See SARTRE, supra note 106, at 32-33, 91. As James Russell Lowell has said:
Ef you take a sword an' dror it,
An' go stick a feller thru,
Guv'ment aint to answer for it,
God'll send the bill to you.
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There is reason indeed to worry lest we become clods torn
asunder from our fellows and washed away in a maelstrom of solipsism. But it is wrong to think that the only alternative is being
locked in a Gondwanaland of globally recognized values. We instead may be islands in an archipelago of friends, not separated by
riptides of self-assertion but united by a pacific sea of mutual dialogue and reciprocal admonition.4 2
2. Problems with Embracing Fideist Community.-I have invoked
the notion of fideist community to address the problems of ethical
skepticism. But the very notion of fideist community itself is subject
to criticisms. These are essentially two: That it is no different from
the community Luban and Simon prescribe, and that, if it is a different kind of community, it is one in which no one would want to live.
To take the former criticism first, there are, to be sure, notable
similarities between the fideist ethics I describe and the normative
systems of Luban, Simon, and other interpretivists. For one thing,
Luban's brand of interpretivism, like interpretivism generally,
clearly rejects the realists' claims of a special realm of external moral
values. As Luban aptly puts it, "we can value anything from God's
Word to Garbo's smile, and it is a philosophical mirage to believe
that the fact that we value them transforms them into things of a
special class that can be characterized in a noncircular or nontrivial
way." 4' 24 And we not only agree on what values are not; we are also
relatively close to agreement on what they are. In Luban's words
again: "Values . . . are those reasons [for acting] with which the

agent most closely identifies-those that form the core of his personality, that make him who he is." 4' 2 5 Finally, because we agree
that values are reasons, Luban and I also agree that values can be
discussed, even disputed, within the community of those who share
them.
In unpacking this last point, however, we part company. The
sense in which Luban thinks that values are reasons gives a conception of ethics, and ethical community, that is significantly different
James Russell Lowell, The Biglow Papers, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF JAMES
RUSSELL LOWELL 182 (Horace E. Scudder ed., 1897).
423. Compare Luban's insistence on Donne's dictum that "no man is an island," in
Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 462.
424. David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 469
[hereinafter Luban, Paternalism];see also Luban, Epistemology, supra note 112, at 652 (rejecting "foundationalist pre-occupations").
425. Luban, Paternalism, supra note 424, at 470.
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from mine in both theory and practice. These differences become
clear in the following passage:
A value system, therefore, has two aspects. On the one
hand, values are reasons, and thus intersubjective and open
to criticism and public assessment. On the other hand, values are definitive of the person who holds them. Both aspects are crucial. Because of the former aspect, we feel
entitled to judge a person as having wrong values, inadequate
values, irrationalvalues, and so on. Because of the latter
aspect, we nevertheless sense that attempting to change a
person's values by main force, or to override them,
directly
4 26
assaults the integrity of his or her personality.
Between these two aspects we see in embryo the tension between
individual moral responsibility and obedience to collective norms
that we encountered fully fledged in Luban's system of legal ethics.
I want to focus here on Luban's notion of those norms: How are we
to understand "wrong," "inadequate," and "irrational" as applied to
values?
We must first understand a point made by J.L. Mackie: "Subjective agreement would give intersubjective values, but intersubjectivity is not objectivity. ' 42 7 Luban has, in fact, rejected objectivity in
the sense that Mackie and I use the term, the realists' sense. We
must, then, understand the meaning of "wrong," "inadequate," and
"irrational" in the context of an ethical community defined by
certain values, values that are intersubjective because they are held
by the members of that community. If you are a member of that
community, fellow members can denounce your values as deviant
and, conversely, you can defend your values, all under community
standards.4 2 8
But the same could be said of the fideist community I recommend. How, then, does that community differ from the moral community of the interpretivists? The critical difference is how you
become a member of the community, and thus how its norms become applicable to you. In the fideist moral community, membership is voluntary. You are in the community, and subject to
reciprocal moral scrutiny with other members, if (but only if) you
profess the faith. By contrast, in the interpretivists' community, or
at least in Luban and Simon's version of that community, member426.
427.
428.
tivity"

Id. at 471.
MACKIE, supra note 74, at 22.
See Stick, supra note 181, at 369-70 (distinguishing between "fundamental objecand "group objectivity").
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ship is automatic and universal, or nearly so. What "we feel entitled
to judge" you by is, implicitly at least, an ordering of values to which
you might not subscribe.
Yet, if this is how membership in a moral community is to be
understood, it is not clear what "intersubjective" means in such a
community. It can hardly mean intersubjective in Mackie's sense of
shared subjectivities, because membership in the community is not
based on common commitments. It could mean intersubjective in
the descriptive sense, that even those who do not subscribe to the
dominant ethos can nevertheless recognize what it is and that it is
dominant. But then how are the dominant norms applicable to, and
morally binding upon, those who do not subscribe? If we make the
relevant moral community coterminous with the political community, and if we make membership in the former a matter of birth, like
membership in the latter, then we come back nearly full circle to the
questions we addressed in the last section. Where the norms are
unwritten and informally enforced, we virtually collapse morality
into mores.4 29 Where the norms are codified and are enforced by
the state, we in effect subsume ethics under politics.
As Luban indicates, the "we" who are both morally in agreement and politically in power face the issue of using our political
power to ensure that our moral will is done by the "they" who disagree morally and who are weaker politically. Faced with that problem, as we saw in the last section, the temptation is great to insist
that those who are subject to our political clout are also subject to
our moral judgments. For if they are so subject, we are not only
physically able to coerce them. We are also morally entitled to condemn them, to say that they are bad, that their values are wrong,
inadequate, or irrational. And if we are so entitled, then the Gordian knot of political legitimacy is unravelling, if not quite untied,
and we need not cut it in the way I recommended in the last section.
But the response of those who disagree, and who are subject to
our power, remains: "A plague on both your houses, political and
moral." And if it is clear that we can coerce them to live with us in
an undivided political house, it is not nearly so clear how we can
ensure that they share our moral home. Moral secession is more
difficult to suppress than political, precisely because the former
429. Luban comes close to this in his generally favorable discussion of Aristotle's ethics. "[H]is view of morality," Luban approvingly notes, "is very closely related to what
we think of as manners: It consists in acting in the appropriate way in various situations,
and this will frequently be defined by the standards of the community in which one
lives." Luban, Epistemology, supra note 112, at 652.
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need not respond to the force of arms, a point that the force of arms
itself proves in the limiting case of martyrdom. All the more reason
on the part of the powerful, therefore, to declare the martyrs heretics. Heresy in theology, like error in morality, requires one true
faith to which all are subject. The problem in both fields is the
same: how to spread the frontiers of the faith and make subjects of
the unconverted without the power of the sword.43 °
These issues would, of course, be moot if there were, as a matter of fact, universal agreement on matters of morality. Then, to
paraphrase Mackie, we could cease to worry about objectivity, because subjective agreement would give us the intersubjective standards we need for reaching moral judgments. 4 3 ' Not surprisingly,
Luban insists that there is in fact widespread, if not universal, agreement on basic moral values. "[I]n point of fact our society generally
agrees about what the virtues are," because "[b]y and large we share
the same moral models and ideals .... Thus, the theoretical prob'43 2
lem raised above is not a real one."

As a matter of fact, most of us do share certain basic values. We
believe in human dignity and equality; we profess, if we do not always practice, a modicum of altruism; we grimace at gratuitous cruelty, if it occurs close enough to us. Furthermore, "we" includes not
just readers of long law review articles, and certainly not just liberal
readers. In this limited sense, what the fundamentalists insist on is
true (if not quite for the reasons they think): our culture widely reflects Judeo-Christian values. Even as to basic values, however, the
agreement is far from total. Luban himself points to several ethical
subcultures in America, 43 3 and expresses fear that the religious enthusiasms of the fundamentalist fringe will infect our largely secular,
430. This is why Salman Rushdie's declaration "I am not a Muslim" is so powerful, see
SALMAN RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS 405 (1991), and why his recent conversion is so problematic, see SALMAN RUSHDIE, Why I Have Embraced Islam, in
IMAGINARY HOMELANDS, supra, at 430. For his latest twist of faith, see Salman Rushdie,
Address at Columbia University (Dec. 11, 1991), in N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at B8
(noting that "Actually Existing Islam" bears the same relation to his "humanized, historicized, and secularized way of being a Muslim" as the "Actually Existing Socialism" of
the Soviet Union bore to "the utopia of peace and equality of which democratic socialists have dreamed").
431. See MACKIE, supra note 74, at 22-23.
432. Luban, Epistemology, supra note 112, at 657. Luban also asserts an extensive sharing of values in Partisanship,supra note 62, at 1023-25. See also BERLIN, supra note 260, at
18.
433. See Luban, Paternalism, supra note 424, at 462 (Hell's Angels); Luban, Mid-Course
Corrections, supra note 52, at 454-55 ("the 'rugged individualists,' the libertarians, the
survivalists, the Ayn Rand devotees"). Both the extreme oddity of these examples and
the fact that he lists libertarians among them without distinction obscure the fact that his
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egalitarian, and humanist political culture.43 4
Moreover, even if there is agreement at the most fundamental
levels about what our common values are, agreement about what to
include at the highest level of Luban's fourfold root analysis, that
still leaves important areas of disagreement. Sometimes the implementation of basic values brings them into conflict with one another, requiring that we sacrifice or subordinate some values to
others. We have seen particular instances of this in Part III: the
trilemma of client perjury and the conflict between the old role morality and the new.
Competing fideist communities in contemporary American
legal culture further evidence conflicts in values. In some ways the
most obvious of these communities is the traditional bar, as exemplified by the ABA. Troubled by a decline in the values for which it
stands, the ABA in 1986 promulgated a manifesto entitled A
Blueprint for Rekindling Lawyer Professionalism.4" 5 "Professionalism"
has become the central article of the ABA faith. It comprises the
traditional lawyerly virtues: technical competence, deference to
judges, and the problematic balance of client loyalty and public-spiritedness captured in the phrase "zealous advocacy within the
bounds of the law." 4 6 That this professionalism crusade has a religious aura about it is evident from the documents it has generated:
they are described as creeds of professionalism, and adherence is to
43 7
be made in the form of oaths, pledges, and professions of belief.
There is, moreover, a commendable bit of anxiety, in some quarters
of the ABA at least, about whether there is, or should be, one true
faith.43 8
This concern accurately reflects the fact that other faiths, some
"we" may not be as monolithic as he implies, as does his dismissal of anarchists with a
droll anecdote in a footnote. See id. at 461 n.107.
434. See Luban, Difference Made Legal, supra note 71, at 2214.

435.

See COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ".... IN THE SPIRIT

OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"

A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM

(1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION

ON PROFESSIONALISM].

436. See Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773,
777-78 (reviewing COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 435); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association
Commission on Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1149, 1151-59 (1987).
437. See I THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 12-13 (1989-90).
438. Though the ABA House of Delegates recommended in August 1988 that state
and local bar associations "encourage their members to accept as a guide for their individual conduct, and to comply with, a lawyers' creed of professionalism," it has not
promulgated such a creed of its own and it has insisted that such a creed not create
legally enforceable obligations. See 1992 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 557 (Thomas Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1992). This may, of
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militant, are afoot. Almost antipodal to the worldview of the ABA is
that of scholars and practitioners allied with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. Here the shibboleth is not "professionalism"
but "delegitimation," an effort not to restore a lost Eden of legal
values but to usher in a millennium marked by the absence of hierarchy, and hence of alienation, in human relations. 43 9 An article in
which New Leftist scholars of the CLS movement offer a theoretical
account of the practical successes of Old Leftist practitioners in the
National Lawyers' Guild (the ABA's ancient, self-appointed nemesis) concludes with the following call to fideist community:
Everything that we have said in this Article depends
for its effectiveness on the development of a movement of
lawyers who meet regularly to further develop the ideas we
have begun to present here, and who give one another the
strength to take the risks that a truly politicized law practice
requires. The possibility of utilizing social conflict to transform the legal arena . . .cannot be realized through the
efforts of isolated practitioners.
Any transformative movement of lawyers must thus
begin with the formation of small working groups, where
lawyers who already know each other can begin to discuss
what possibilities exist in their local communities for
delegitimating legal work, and how they can develop a
sense of collective support for one another's efforts.4 4 °
Perhaps at a very deep level the CLS folk and the ABA folk share a
common set of values. 4 4 1 But in terms of even the most generalized
practical goals, the CLS movement places itself in direct conflict
with the "liberal-legalist" view of the legal system.4 4 2 The one
group salutes the standard of "professionalism"; the other "delegicourse, bespeak a reluctance to extend civil liability, not an anxiety over moral
imperialism.
439. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 370-75 (1982-1983).

440. Id. at 410-11; see also Letter from William H. Simon, Professor, Stanford University Law School, to author (July 29, 1991) (on file with author) (discussing William H.
Simon & Robert W. Gordon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in THE REDEMPTION OF

(Robert Nelson & David M. Trubek eds., forthcoming 1992) as "suggesting that professional responsibility rhetoric could best be elaborated in the context
of affinity sub-groups of the bar a little like the ones you [Atkinson] mentioned," for
example, "the Lawyer's Guild and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York").
441. Luban himself tries to find those common values. See Luban, Legal Modernism,
supra note 73 (distinguishing CLS's "Neo-Kantian" emphases, which he finds compatible
with liberalism, from its "avant-gardist" tendencies, which he does not).
442. Gabel & Harris, supra note 439, at 369-70.
PROFESSIONALISM?
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timation." But members of each group are bound together by adherence to a common creed.4 43
Finally, remember our earlier discussion of Monroe Freedman
and the Trial Lawyers.4 4 4 Here there is evidence of far wider basic
agreement among opponents. Freedman has been the law's loyal
opposition; he has never, so far as I know, questioned the basic tenets of the "liberal-legalism" that the CLS movement rejects. And
yet his disagreement with the ABA position has been profound.
Moreover, it has spawned, or joined, rival communities. Some of
these communities, including the one that promulgated Freedman's
445
alternative to the ABA's Code, are large and formally organized;
others, like the one in which he initially came to his unorthodox positions, were small and informal.44 6
We must be clear on the point of these examples. They show
that, at a very practical level, lawyers and legal scholars differ on
values that are fundamental, or nearly so, and that those who share
common values tend to coalesce into movements, even communities, that encompass less than all of the political state in which they
operate. This is not to suggest, however, that members of these
groups share a skeptical metaethic. Some, perhaps all, have among
their members both interpretivists and realists. From the viewpoint
of these members, those who are not members of the group are
wrong, victims of false consciousness or some other contemporary
analogue of what was formerly called an unregenerate heart. On my
view, members of different groups are not wrong, they simply affirm
different articles of faith. Either way, however, the fact remains that
443. There is a curiously atavistic tendency to this factionalism. During the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, rival groups of Christians faced, and sometimes literally
fought, one another under the direction of competing cadres of Calvinists on the one
hand and Jesuits on the other. According to Michael Walzer, these are the prototypes of
more modern, and secular, radical parties. See MICHAEL WALZER, THE REVOLUTrIoN OF
THE SAINTs 2 (1965). Moreover, despite the intensity of their opposition, there remained common values among them. Even Geneva and Rome could unite not just
against atheists, but also against Anabaptists and Unitarians.
444. See supra notes 261-293 and accompanying text.
445. Two such examples are the American Trial Lawyers Foundation and the American Trial Lawyers Association. See supra text accompanying notes 261-272 (discussing
Freedman's work on drafting the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct).
446. FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at vii-viii. Here again, a comparison with the Reformation era is illuminating. Lutherans and the followers of Zwingli and later Calvin
could reach accord and make common cause on some issues of faith and practice, but
not others; so, too, theJansenists and the Jesuits on the Catholic side. This gave rise, on
the Protestant side, to rival creeds and churches and, on the Catholic side, to very different emphases on different elements of a common culture by distinct factions within a
single communion.
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these competing ethical communities within the legal profession call
into question the degree of moral agreement that Luban asserts.
But to hold myself to my own standard, I must not confuse the
indicative with the imperative. To say that such communities exist is
not to say that they are good, or that the kind of moral life possible
within them is adequate, much less ideal. Here we come to the second objection to fideist community: that it is dangerous, a cure
worse than the disease, or deficient, a theoretical edifice no one
would want to call home. We must address normative criticisms of
its adequacy from two directions, claims on the one hand that the
demands of such communities on their members are too narrow,
and the solidarity within them too shallow, and claims on the other
hand that the demands of such communities are too wide, and the
solidarity within them too deep. Both criticisms, at bottom, raise a
common problem: fideist communities are voluntary communities,
communities of believers.
There are several related arguments that fideist communities
are too narrow. John Stick denounces the idea of basing community
on freely chosen values as "the modern view of suburb as community," and declares it to be "desperately impoverished." 4'4 7 He envisions a world of windowless moral monads each undeflected in its
own eccentric orbit by "a balance of respect and critical judgments
for friends.

44 8

Another criticism of fideist communities derives from an overly
literal reading of what it means to say that their members share a
creed. First, intellectual assent is notoriously easy to fake, and communities founded on that basis alone risk the most absolute form of
superficiality, hypocrisy. 4 4 9 Moreover, there are problems even
where belief is sincere. Creeds, after all, are verbal formulas, and
communities based upon them run the dual risks of splitting into
narrow sects based on detailed agreement or of flattening out into
shallow latitudinarianism. Compounding that, they run the risk of a
447. Stick, supra note 181, at 394.
448. Id. at 395. This objection is reminiscent of C.S. Lewis's mock-diabolical advice
on the subversion of churches:
the parochial organisation [sic] should always be attacked, because, being a
unity of place and not of likings, it brings people of different classes and psychology together in the kind of unity the Enemy [God] desires. The congregational principle, on the other hand, makes each church into a kind of club, and
finally, if all goes well, into a coterie or faction.
C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREwrAPE LETrERS 81 (1943).
449. Duncan Kennedy aptly captured this problem in comparing such spurious catecants to the pod people of Invasion of the Body Snatchers. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1984).
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more profound shallowness-that their members share only a common agreement on principles, not a genuine concern for each other
as people.
Yet to the extent that they emphasize emotional rather than intellectual ties among their members, fideist communities run the opposite risk. Instead of holding themselves at the arms' length of
contractarian handshakes, their members may smother themselves
in the all-encompassing embrace of undifferentiated affection. For
the windowless moral monads of Stick's suburbanism, they risk substituting the homesick hemispheres of Aristophanes,4 5 ° longing to
lock one another in a libidinally charged return to oneness.4 5 '
Both these critiques, that fideist community is too narrow and
that it is too broad, are normative critiques; they question whether
communities based on voluntarily adopted positions are good, even
in the minimal sense of providing a form of moral life that you or I
could accept. Before I address those questions, I need to address an
even more fundamental question: whether it is possible to join and
remain in or leave such communities in the way that I, and both the
normative critiques, assume. This last criticism is more radical than
the other two, because it calls into question the "can" that the
"ought" of fideism implies. The normative claims of fideism rest on
this descriptive reality about human personality, that one can transcend the values of the moral community in which one is raised.
The contrary view is that all moral communities, not just the overly
erotic fideist communities, preclude the very kind of choice on
which membership in fideist communities is supposed to be based.
To struggle against contextuality is not just futile, but misconceived,
because we are inescapably a product of the moral communities in
450. PLATO, Symposium, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 85-88 (Eric H. Warmington &
Philip G. Rouse eds., W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1956) [hereinafter PLATO]; cf. West, supra
note 370, at 859 (noting importance to Critical Legal Studies and feminist jurisprudence
of a "[c]apacity for connectedness and the memory of oneness").
451. Luban accurately assesses this danger of communities based on "love" rather
than "respect," though he follows the all-too-common practice of citing the excesses of
the sixteenth century Muensterite community as typical of the generally peaceable
Anabaptists. See Luban, Difference Made Legal, supra note 71, at 2204. As Roland H. Bainton reports,
Despite the fact that for the first ten years under frightful prosecution [the
Anabaptists] had been without offense, yet when a handful of the fanatics ran
amuck the entire party was besmirched with the excesses of the lunatic fringe,
and well into the nineteenth century historians of the Reformation did little
more than recount the aberrations of the saints rampant.
BAINTON, supra note 183, at 106 (1952). For a sympathetic contemporary account, see
JOHN H. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS 157 (1972).
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which our values were formed.4 5 2
I cannot give an account here of fideist community that fully
meets these objections. What I can give is a vision of what such a
community would be like, and an example of such a community in
our midst. The point will be to sketch the possibility of such a community, and to suggest that membership within it would permit an
acceptable moral life. To be a fideist community, it must be one in
which loyalty to that community stands above obedience to the
political community, in which the obligations of ethics are superior
to those of politics. To answer the normative criticisms of that community, it must be a community in which love and respect are coordinated. Finally, to satisfy the descriptive criticism, it must offer a
means of transcending and transforming the broader cultural and
political community of which both it and its members are part.
For my vision of such a community, I draw upon Weinrib's admittedly unorthodox interpretation of the Crito. 4 53 According to
Weinrib, the Crito is best understood as a dialogue primarily about
friendship and only secondarily about political obligation. Indeed,
the account of political obligation that Plato, in writing the dialogue,
and Socrates, within the dialogue itself, place in the mouths of the
personified Laws of Athens is not to be taken as either Plato's or
Socrates's position on communal life. The model for communal
life, even political life, is to be friendship, and friendship as revealed
in the interactions of Socrates and his friend Crito in the dialogue.
On these basic points I agree with Weinrib over against the
orthodox interpretation, which holds that Socrates's beliefs are
reflected in the position of the Laws. I differ with Weinrib, however,
on the elaboration of these points, in three particular directions:
Socrates's understanding of friendship generally, his particular
friendship with Crito, and the political implications of friendship.
According to Weinrib, Crito is Socrates's "unphilosophical
friend. '4 5 4 His level of philosophical sophistication is low; "Crito
loved Socrates although he did not understand what he was
about. '4 55 Accordingly, to console his unphilosophic friend, Socrates answered Crito's specious arguments for escape in terms that
Crito could understand, even though the reasons he gave Crito were

452. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 52, at 443 (following

UNGER,

supra

note 88, at 36).
453. ErnestJ. Weinrib, Obedience to the Law in Plato's CRITO, 27 AM.J.JURIS. 85 (1982).
454. Id. at 104.

455. Id.
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not the reasons he himself found persuasive. 456
Weinrib demonstrates well Crito's lack of technical competence
and argumentative skill, even of substantive understanding. But
these are not the marks of true philosophy; if they were, the sophists
would be the great philosophers. Philosophy is rather, and quite
literally, the love of wisdom, the willingness to engage in discussions
of the things that really matter, things like human excellence. These
are the very things, Socrates reminded Crito in the beginning of the
dialogue, to which they had devoted their lives together.4 5 7 In that
sense, philosophers are friends of each other, for in engaging in dialogue about the things that really matter, they show reciprocal concern for each other's souls, the things that matter most.
It is in this, not in technical competence, that Crito fails both as
a philosopher and as a friend. As a philosopher, his problem is less
that he is intellectually unable to follow the arguments, and more
that he is not sufficiently willing to try. Over and over again, Socrates faults Crito not for failing to understand him, but for failing to
engage him. 4 5' The failure is not so much of reason as of will. This
same flaw infects his friendship as well. Crito focuses upon himself,
upon the harm that will befall him in Socrates's death, rather than
on the danger to Socrates. 4 59 And even as to himself, he overlooks
the real harm, which is not in what others will think or in his personal sadness, but in the loss of an interlocutor, a fellow philosopher. Crito is a flawed philosopher for precisely the same reason he
is a flawed friend.
And yet he is both a real philosopher and a real friend. He is,
after all, with Socrates in the time of crisis, and he has, after all,
resolved with Socrates to deal with this ultimate issue as they have
all others, by mutual discussion. The dialogues, as Weinrib himself
reminds us, are something other than, and more than, treatises;
what is done in them is at least as important as what is said.4 60
Weinrib may well be right that Socrates put forward the Laws'
political arguments for the benefit of his friend Crito, as the only
demonstration intelligible to Crito that his staying to die was consistent with their way of living, with following the course dialogue
reveals to be the better. Yet, I think the connection between the
456. Id. at 104, 108.
457. PLATO, Crito, supra note 70, at 57.
458. Id. at 59.
459. Id. at 52-53.
460. Weinrib, supra note 453, at 87-88; see also James B. White, The Ethics of Argument:
Plato's GORGIAS and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHL L. REV. 849, 850-52 (1983).
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flawed arguments and Socrates's concern for Crito is closer than
Weinrib realizes. Crito needed specious arguments not because he
could not understand the truth, but because the truth would have
shattered him. For the truth is that, had Crito been a better friend,
and hence a better philosopher, he might have refuted the specious
arguments and accomplished his original purpose, the deliverance
of Socrates from unjust death at the hands of the many.
It is this radical interdependence of friendship and philosophy,
and the dramatic consequences of its failure, that Plato is showing
us. If Plato succeeds, we can see what Crito could not: As Crito was
distracted though he purported to be listening, so Socrates purported to be more distracted than persuaded by the Laws' arguments,4" 6 ' both with disastrous results. And we can see that the
ultimate and most dangerous distraction is not the rush of events,
which presses us toward precipitous action, but the opinions of the
many, which pull us away from reflection with friends.
In this as in all his dialogues, Plato means to draw us in, to make
us philosophers, members of the community of Socrates's
friends.4 6 2 As such, we become responsible for the argument,4 6
and, in the Crito, responsible for Socrates's very life. What was fundamental to Socrates was not obedience to law, but dialogue with
his friends, a class that included all those willing to engage in his
reciprocally respectful form of inquiry. As he explicitly told Crito in
the beginning, it was conversation with his friends that determined
how he lived his life; 4 as Plato implicitly tells us, this was true to
the very end.
Here we have, in outline, a fideist community that meets the
two normative criticisms. On the one hand, Socrates is anything but
lacking in "a balance of respect and critical judgment for
friends." 4'6 5 Reciprocal concern for fellow members of the community is the very foundation of the community. Yet, on the other
hand, though this concern is as deep as death, it does not excuse
disregard for other members' individual integrity. Even Crito, for
all his want of philosophical sophistication, did not attempt to kidnap Socrates. Rather, the very form of expression of friendly concern, dialogue, demands that the other not be coerced.4 6 6
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

PLATO, Crito, supra note 70, at 65.
Weinrib, supra note 453, at 87-88.
White, supra note 460, at 865-66.
PLATO, Crito, supra note 70, at 55.
Stick, supra note 181, at 395.
So it was, perhaps, that Thrasymachus, who had to be forced to stay and discuss
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What, then, of the transcendence issue? Even if such communities would be an acceptable expression of moral life, can they exist?
Through membership in such a community, can we really call into
question the moral foundations of the community in which we were
raised? The standard answer of Platonists, of course, has been
"yes." By careful examination, we can rationally transcend the
opinions of the many, the realm of appearances, and rise to the level
of truth, in moral as in metaphysical and other matters. This interpretation of Plato is realism at its root. 4 67 As such, it is hardly consistent with my skeptical premises.
There is, however, another interpretation of Plato's dialogues,
one that gives us a means of transcendence that is consistent with
metaethical skepticism. Consider James Boyd White's account of
Socrates's way of life:
Socrates would typically seek out a person who claimed to
know how to do something.., and ask his interlocutor his
central questions: who are you, what do you do, and what
do you know? Since we all know how to do things that we
cannot explain, about which we have never thought beyond
saying "I am a banker" or "I am a surgeon," this line of
questioning has the result of making conscious what before
was not, the relation between self and culture. I am a football coach or a law professor, I say, but only then, when for
Socrates this is not a sufficient answer, do I begin to realize
that this identity is a cultural one, not necessary but
chosen, and chosen by me without my wholly knowing or
understanding it. In the ensuing conversation the interlocutor's account of himself and of his motives is shown to
make no sense even in its own terms; it is seen to be internally inconsistent. The one who claims to know, knows
nothing after all. This is the elenchus or refutation of which
Socrates repeatedly speaks, and it is the heart of dialectic.
•.. The effect of this process is to disturb the relation
between self and language, to break down the sense of natural connection and coherence between them. One comes
suddenly to see both self and language as uncertain, as capable of being remade in relation to each other. The true
aim of a dialogue that works this way . . . is nothing less
than the shared reconstitution of self and language.4 6
his position that might makes right, never became a meaningful participant in PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom trans., 1968).
467. Singer, supra note 47, at 29 n.92; OLAFSON, supra note 81, at 4; MACKIE, supra note
74, at 23; BERLIN, supra note 260, at 5-6.
468. White, supra note 460, at 851-52 (footnote omitted).
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More often than not, Socrates is unable to accomplish this aim
with his interlocutor in the dialogue. Yet Plato's purpose in holding
out this possibility to us through the text is to achieve such a relationship with us in fact. On White's view, then, the proof of transcendence does not occur in the text; at most the text gives an
example of what transcendence would be like. "[The reader] becomes a self outside his culture ... [and] is led to see that what is at
stake when he decides how to speak and what to say. .. is nothing
less than 'who he is' and what kind of community he will have with
others."4' 6 9 The proof of the possibility of transcendence is in us, in
what we do and become in response to the text.
Consistent with, if not implicit in, the fideist community that
White finds in Plato's dialogues is an understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community that I want to claim
for the fideist community I recommend as the basis for legal ethics.
This understanding bears upon the community being transcended,
the individual doing the transcending, and their relationship. The
community being transcended must produce more than the language by which it is transcended, more even than the individuals
capable of transcending it. It must also produce the very qualities of
mind and will by which it is transcended and out of which those who
transcend it build the new community into which they move.4 70
Contrary to a myth prevalent in our individualist culture, Abe Lincoln was not born in a log cabin he built with his own hands. Selfmade men and women are quite literally inconceivable. If this is
what those who question the possibility of transcendence are denying, they have my entire agreement.
With this point in mind, we can give a deeper answer to a worry
raised above, that of fideist ethics giving rise to extremes of narcissism. I have said that fideist community is one corrective, in that it
requires attending to the words of one's fellows. Could not a member of such a community, however, immodestly claim credit for having chosen to become a member, for having succeeded as a reader
of Plato where other readers and where Socrates's interlocutors
within the dialogue have failed? Yes, but if what I have just said
about the preconditions of such membership is true, then such a
claim would be evidently out of place. You cannot enable yourself
to become a member of this community, any more than you can
469. Id. at 871.
470. This is a point that even the most extreme defenders of the moral and metaphysical importance of individual choice, the existentialists, affirm in their insistence upon
"facticity." OLAFSON, supra note 81, at 169-70.
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cause your own membership in the community where accident of
birth places you. You can take pride in where you come from, but
you can hardly take credit for it. You can read the dialogues of Plato
with understanding; you cannot have written them.4 7 '
The theological concept of grace captures this attitude nicely,
if, in its original context, too narrowly. This is what Paul means
when he writes the Ephesian church, "by grace are ye saved through
faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God, lest any man
should boast. '

472

More succinctly, it is whatJesus referred to when

he said "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
heaven. ' 473 And if grace leaves no room for smugness, so it provides no foundation for complacency. Having been the objects of
grace, we are called to become the means of grace for others; that is
what it means to be a part of the community into which we are
called. In the context of Christian theology, that involves turning
from one's old way of life to the way revealed in one's encounter
with the Gospel;4 7 4 in the context of the Platonic dialogues, it involves engaging in and being responsible for shaping with your
friends your most fundamental commitments.
But can my reinterpretation of Socratic community as imagined
by Plato among the Athenian theory class serve as a model for prac-

471. A still deeper danger is that of vainglorying in one's humility, the besetting sin of
the kind of Calvinist Robert Bums satirized. See Robert Burns, Holy Willie's Prayer, in 2
THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, supra note 106, at 95-97.
472. Ephesians 2:8-9 (Revised Standard).
473. John 3:3 (Revised Standard). When faced with the despairing response of one
who took him both too literally and too self-reliantly-"How can a man be born when he
is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born?" John 3:4Jesus replied: "The wind blows where it wills, and you hear the sound of it, but you do
not know whence it comes or whither it goes; so it is with every one who is born of the
Spirit." John 3:8.
474. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOUER 239-45 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart
eds., 1978). It is reasonably clear, at least in the epistles attributed to Paul, that this
includes living in a mutually supportive community with fellow believers. See, e.g., Ephesians 4:1-16 (Revised Standard). There is, in contrast, deep division among Christians
on the role that moral law plays in the life of the Christian, and there is a vast literature
on the issue. It is fair to infer that I favor an antinomian reading of Paul's Epistle to the
Galatians over a "higher law" reading of Matthew's account of the Sermon on the
Mount, Matthew 5, 6, 7. It is not quite accurate, however, to suggest that this is to prefer
the ethics of Paul to that ofJesus. Cf. Luban, Difference Made Legal, supra note 71, at 219399, 2201-05. Matthew's Gospel is generally regarded as the most legalistic, the most
concerned to show the continuity between Jesus's teachings and those of the contemporary rabbinical community, which was dominated by the sect of the Pharisees after the
fall of the Temple in 70 Common Era. NORMAN PERRIN, THE NEw TESTAMENT:
TRODUCTION 169-75 (1974).
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ticing lawyers today?4 75 To see how it can, consider Monroe Freedman's description of the genesis of his heterodox positions on legal
ethics:
About fifteen years ago, I began engaging in serious
discussions of legal ethics with a small number of other
lawyers, most of whom were also doing criminal defense
work. We found that we were all attempting to cope with
some vexing ethical dilemmas, each in his or her own way,
and that sharing our experiences and talking them out
helped us considerably in attempting to resolve our difficulties, even though, in a number of respects, we continued
to disagree.4 7 6
The key features of Freedman's community closely parallel the Socratic model I have sketched. The number of members was small,
not because it was exclusive, but because it included people who
cared deeply for one another and shared common concerns.4 7 7 For
this reason, their occasional disagreement did not produce schism.
Their community rested not on subscription to a detailed creed, but
on common commitment to shared values-and to each other. This
interaction both sharpened their intellectual comprehension and
strengthened their moral resolve. It helped them not only to define
their position theoretically, but also to be themselves morally. If
personal integrity is essential to maintaining a moral position, as
both Luban and I believe, then your most morally important interlocutors will be those who know you, and who care for you,
personally.
This is a good example of fideist community, 4 7 8 but it is not a
perfect one. There is, most obviously, a danger of parochialism. It
is not clear what the attitude of Freedman's group was toward those
with diametrically opposed views, or toward those who, though cognizant of the kind of problems Freedman and his friends faced, were
removed from the daily demands of criminal defense practice and
thus able to give a broader, not to say better, perspective. But if
475. This is White's point as well, though he is more sympathetic than I to the old role
morality. See White, supra note 460, at 873-94.
476. FREEDMAN, supra note 262, at vii-viii.
477. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 292, at 269 ("But to be a friend of many people is
impossible, if the friendship is to be based on virtue or excellence and on the character
of our friends.").
478. Another example is the Enlightenment, especially in France. See LEONARD KRIEGER, KINGS AND PHILOSOPHERS, 1689-1789, at 170-73 (1970) (suggesting that sociability
played a central role in maintaining the coherence of the mature Enlightenment in the
third quarter of the eighteenth century).
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Freedman's group did not include such members, it does not appear
in principle or in spirit to have ignored them.4 7 9
Furthermore, Freedman's group certainly had the interests of
nonmembers as a central concern; its inward focus was to help its
members in their efforts on behalf of criminal defendants. Quite
conceivably, such a group might, more generally, concern itself with
working toward a more just criminal justice system or, still more
generally, a more just society. Such a society might, indeed, be a
political community that incorporates the very kinds of mutual dialogue and deference that characterize their fideist community.4 8 °
This goal, of course, would involve the tacit admission that less-inclusive fideist communities are not the ultimately desirable form of
human social intercourse.4 8 '
But if we must be careful not to confuse the kind of community
that is now possible with that toward which we may work, we must
also be wary of the opposite confusion: the suggestion that our
present political community is entitled to claim our moral allegiance. The effort to liberalize the ABA's client confidentiality rules
suggests of our profession 4 82 what the public choice theorists suggest about our larger political community: 4 83 mutual dialogue in
479. An example of a community of lawyers that included nonlawyers in the way that I
suggest here is the Abolitionist bar, which drew upon the larger Abolitionist community
for moral support and guidance. See COVER, supra note 138; supra note 127 and accompanying text; supra note 130 and accompanying text.
480. Drucilla Cornell calls for reconstituting the political community along very much
these lines, under what she calls "the virtue of civic friendship." See Cornell, supra note
103, at 359-78.
481. See UNGER, supra note 369, at 220-22; see also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 n.96 (1986)

("[I]f the appeal of [the civil] republican vision is restricted to cases of small, homogeneous communities, it has little contemporary significance for American constitutional law
or theory.").
482. Luban describes the culmination of that process, which produced rules extremely protective of confidentiality in the corporate as well as the criminal defense context, as "a shoot-out in the ABA." LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 180-85.
As he points out, the Model Rules as drafted by the Kutak Commission "contained some
significant morally activist elements, but many of these were blown away in the ensuing
political fracas." Luban, Partisanship,supra note 62, at 1007 n.12; see also Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 14 LAw &

Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (tracing the six year process by which the ABA developed its
latest ethics code for lawyers).
483. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey conveniently summarize the public choice
theorists' pessimistic views of representative government but hold out their own hope of
greater public spiritedness on the part of both representatives and their constituents.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, TheJurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV.
873 (1987). The trouble with that hope, however, is that, as we have seen, visions of the
public good vary. I seriously doubt that the views of those who prevailed in the passage
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the collective interest is a goal more easily expressed than achieved.
Nor is it clear that acting as if that goal were already achieved will
make its realization more likely.
To live without absolutes is not to live without purpose, and to
have a purpose not founded on absolutes is not to be the willful
manchild skepticism's critics bemoan. The fideist alternative I have
identified permits you to renounce morally binding principles derived from involuntary membership in the accidental populace of a
particular state or culture and to embrace binding relations with
freely chosen fellows in a smaller, voluntary community of
friends.4 8 4
CONCLUSION

The Old Masters' invention of the vanishing point, the point in
which parallel lines are made to converge, was a great aesthetic advance. It made painting look like the world as it appeared, and thus
it satisfied a thirst for truth with a taste of verisimilitude. So Luban
and Simon's assumption of a common moral order, an assumption
hardly unique to them, fills a similar yearning in the sphere of ethics, a yearning for a consistent moral cosmos. But our yearning for
ultimate ethical order may be misplaced, and the traditional image
may be not just confining, but distorting as well. Conscientiously
held orderings of values, even among secular egalitarian humanists,
may simply fail to converge on critical issues of legal ethics, including that most basic issue, how a good person can be a good lawyer.
of the ABA Model Rules were all shaped entirely by venality; the problem is that their
views, however sincerely held, are radically at variance with my (and Luban's) own.
484. The suggestion that legal ethics can be founded upon friendship among likeminded lawyers should not be confused with Charles Fried's effort to ground legal ethics
on an analogy between the lawyer-client relationship and friendship. Fried, supra note 2,
at 1071. Fried's critics have shown his analogy to be strained at best. See Dauer & Leff,
supra note 290, at 573-80. Others make the more cautious suggestion that something
like Socratic friendship can form the lawyer-client relationship. See White, supra note
460, at 893; Simon, Ideology, supra note 12, at 135; Simon, supra note 182, at 488-89;
SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 21-33.
By contrast, the friendship to which I point among lawyers is quite literal, as the
examples of Socrates and Freedman attest. This is not to say that lawyers and clients
may not be friends, that lawyers in the model of legal ethics I propose would not be
deeply committed to and respectful of their clients, or that lawyers should not engage in
dialogue with their clients. It is, however, to say that the values that guide your conduct
as a lawyer, including your conduct on behalf of clients, will be those of your friends, not
those of your clients. But cf. Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal

Services Practice, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1990) ("The role-driven obligation of
poverty lawyers to care for a community of clients restricts the representational choices
available on behalf of any individual client.").
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If this is so, no flask fashioned from the stuff of public norms
can contain the new wine of lawyers' individual moral responsibility
that Luban and Simon have given us. This new wine must be drunk,
and not drunk alone, in nihilistic despair or narcissistic self-indulgence, but sacramentally, in congregations of those who believe in
shared goals, and celebratorily, in symposia whose members are
bound together by their friendship with one another. Rather than
resign ourselves to the hemlock of obedience to the state, we who
adhere to a fideist creed must sometimes heed the advice of Crito:
bribe the guard, and flee for sanctuary to the friends of friends, even
48 5
to lawless Thessaly.
This is not to say that Socrates was wrong to take the poison. It
is, rather, to suggest that Socrates's life, like the Crito, is not primarily about political obligation, or even moral obligation, but about
personal commitment-commitment, in Socrates's case, to practical
discussion with his fellows, particularly with his friends. From this
perspective, Socrates's primary message to Crito, who loved him,
and Plato's message to us, who would follow him, is not that we are
to obey the laws unless we can change them, but that we should be
committed to following the considered advice of our friends, unless
we can dissuade them. Thus the tragedy of the Crito is not that the
Athenian assembly convicted and executed Socrates on false
charges, but that his friends failed to rebut his fallacious defense of
political obligation. And the triumph is that he submitted, not to
the wrong though legal verdict of the jury, but to the conscientious
though flawed conclusions of his friends. If the Gospel is to be believed, you can have no greater love than to lay down your life for
48 6
your friends.
Socrates's death, we are fond of saying, was the vindication of
his life; I am saying so too, and not in a particularly original way.
But if skepticism is right, there is no other way. Ultimately, then, I
must put my argument to you that way too. It is not a fashionable
way; for realists and interpretivists, it is even a bit embarrassing. I
cannot say that it is the one true way, as the realists can, or even that
it is the best reading of the way of our culture, as the interpretivists
can. All I can say is that it is a viable-literally, a livable-way; ultimately, that it is my way. This is not to say, however, that it is
merely idiosyncratic. Quite the contrary; I have been at considera-

485. See PLATO, Crito, supra note 70, at 53-54.
486. Seejohn 15:13 (Revised Standard).
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ble pains to show that it is consistent with both secular egalitarian
humanism and the insights of Judeo-Christian theology.
On skeptical metaethical premises there is, of course, no one
true way. I have been necessarily sketchy about the content of my
particular brand of fideism. But as we have seen, it has two critical
components: commitment to dialogue with friends about how to
live, and humility at being able to participate in such dialogue. If
this Article is to be faithful to that creed and conducive to the kind
of community it calls for, you and I must share, in the quaint language of the Dialogues, concern for each other's souls.4 8 7
Saint Socrates, intercede for us.

487. See White, supra note 460, at 894 (concluding with a call for continued dialogue);
Luban, Partisanship,supra note 62, at 1043 (calling for scholarly inquiry in the Socratic
spirit).

